Changes

# Division Level Tactical Decision: MGen Rodes was instructed to not bring on a general engagement but assume a defensive position and wait for the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate.  On 1 July at Oak Ridge, Rodes incorrectly assumed he was on the Army of the Potomac's right flank and attack.  After the first attack failed, he launched a second attack.  The attacks resulted in four divisions of Lee's army being committed prematurely to battle and a piecemeal deployment of the rest of the army as it arrived.  Lee lost the ability to use the full power of his force.

# Division Level Tactical Decision: MGen Rodes was instructed to not bring on a general engagement but assume a defensive position and wait for the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate.  On 1 July at Oak Ridge, Rodes incorrectly assumed he was on the Army of the Potomac's right flank and attack.  After the first attack failed, he launched a second attack.  The attacks resulted in four divisions of Lee's army being committed prematurely to battle and a piecemeal deployment of the rest of the army as it arrived.  Lee lost the ability to use the full power of his force.

# Corps Level Tactical Decision: Conversely, Ewell did follow Lee's instructions and did not conduct an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Union had already established a strong defensive position.  This allowed the Union to continue to occupy and reinforce Cemetery and Culp's Hill, impacting Lee's offensive options for 2 July.  

# Corps Level Tactical Decision: Conversely, Ewell did follow Lee's instructions and did not conduct an attack on Cemetery Hill, where the Union had already established a strong defensive position.  This allowed the Union to continue to occupy and reinforce Cemetery and Culp's Hill, impacting Lee's offensive options for 2 July.  

# Army Level Tactical Decision: For 3 July, the plan to continue attacks on both Union flanks was not tenable so Lee decided to attack the Union centre, a force advancing over open ground in the face of strong defensive fire that came to be known as "Pickett's Charge" and at the cost of extensive casualties.  By this time Lee had lost ~34% of army from 1-3 July, ammunition was low with no resupply possible north of the Potomac river, water was scarce, and the ability to resupply was severely curtailed.

# Army Level Tactical Decision: For 3 July, the plan to continue attacks on both Union flanks was not tenable so Lee decided to attack the Union centre, a force advancing over open ground in the face of strong defensive fire that came to be known as "Pickett's Charge" and at the cost of extensive casualties.  At this point, Lee had lost ~34% of his army from 1-3 July, ammunition was low with no resupply possible north of the Potomac river, water was scarce, and the ability to resupply was severely curtailed.  It was decided to withdraw.

[[Force Generation]]

[[Force Generation]]