Changes

Union victory of the Civil War is credited to Grant and Lincoln's implementation, in 1864, of an overarching strategy that incorporated all aspects of power to achieve results: political, economic, and diplomatic elements as well as military operations.  Prior to 1864, Union politics often drove military decisions, with Union generals having unclear guidance and needing to pursue multiple objectives, including destroy Confederate armies, occupy territory, build railroads, and protect supply lines.  The Union's 1964 strategy was a collection of complementary activities: Grant's military operations, Republican leadership plans for winning a reelection, and the State Department efforts to increase the Confederacy's isolation.  At this time, the Union also determined that the Confederacy's centre of gravity was the support of the Southern population for continuing its war effort.  The Confederates arguably determined this before the Union did.  One of Lee's reasons for the invading the North in 1863 was to achieve a military victory on Northern soil in order to convince the Northern public that their war was unwinnable.<ref name=":0"><nowiki>https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-77/Article/581883/union-success-in-the-civil-war-and-lessons-for-strategic-leaders</nowiki></ref>

Union victory of the Civil War is credited to Grant and Lincoln's implementation, in 1864, of an overarching strategy that incorporated all aspects of power to achieve results: political, economic, and diplomatic elements as well as military operations.  Prior to 1864, Union politics often drove military decisions, with Union generals having unclear guidance and needing to pursue multiple objectives, including destroy Confederate armies, occupy territory, build railroads, and protect supply lines.  The Union's 1964 strategy was a collection of complementary activities: Grant's military operations, Republican leadership plans for winning a reelection, and the State Department efforts to increase the Confederacy's isolation.  At this time, the Union also determined that the Confederacy's centre of gravity was the support of the Southern population for continuing its war effort.  The Confederates arguably determined this before the Union did.  One of Lee's reasons for the invading the North in 1863 was to achieve a military victory on Northern soil in order to convince the Northern public that their war was unwinnable.<ref name=":0"><nowiki>https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-77/Article/581883/union-success-in-the-civil-war-and-lessons-for-strategic-leaders</nowiki></ref>

By 1864, Lincoln had set relatively mild terms for Southern states to return to the Union, which caused debate within the Confederacy whether further resistance would be worse than submission.  Concurrently, Union was making economic life difficult for the Confederacy.  While the majority of Confederate ports were in Union hand, 84% of ships were successful in running the blockade.  Further, since 1862, the South developed sufficient production facilities of arms and ammunition to negate the dependence on imports.  However, the blockade did have two important effects: restriction of luxury goods, creating an impression of hardship for the Southern ruling class; and cessation of access to customs revenues, the primary source of income in the 19th century.<ref name=":0" />   

By 1864, Lincoln had set relatively mild terms for Southern states to return to the Union, which caused debate within the Confederacy whether further resistance would be worse than submission.  Concurrently, Union was making economic life difficult for the Confederacy.  While the majority of Confederate ports were in Union hand, 84% of ships were successful in running the blockade, a British-supplied blockade.  Further, since 1862, the South developed sufficient production facilities of arms and ammunition to negate the dependence on imports.  However, the blockade did have two important effects: restriction of luxury goods, creating an impression of hardship for the Southern ruling class; and cessation of access to customs revenues, the primary source of income in the 19th century.<ref name=":0" />   

Diplomatically, the Union from the beginning sought to prevent foreign recognition of the Confederacy.  US diplomatic missions informed foreign governments that the conflict was not legally a war but an internal dispute.  This had the effect of any recognition of the Confederacy being contrary to international law. Further, while there may have been European desire to see the Union broken, the Emancipation Proclamation effectively equated support to the Confederacy with support for slavery, an unacceptable position in most European countries.<ref name=":0" /> In contrast, the Confederates were confident that European reliance on Southern cotton and their desire for free trade would elicit full support and therefore, adopted a more passive approach in their foreign policy.  Britain and France believed the division of the United States was irrevocable.  While they were dependent on cotton, they also had an ample supply in storage and wartime trade with the Union was highly profitable so a European policy of neutrality was adopted.  This was only threatened when the combination of Union errors, the actual and feared depletion of cotton stocks, and horror at the death and destruction in America brought Europe to the brink of intervention.  Northern diplomacy, military successes and economic dominance ultimately prevented this, which is thought would have brought Confederate success.<ref><nowiki>https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Civil-War-Diplomacy.html</nowiki></ref>

Diplomatically, the Union from the beginning sought to prevent foreign recognition of the Confederacy.  US diplomatic missions informed foreign governments that the conflict was not legally a war but an internal dispute.  This had the effect of any recognition of the Confederacy being contrary to international law. Further, while there may have been European desire to see the Union broken, the Emancipation Proclamation effectively equated support to the Confederacy with support for slavery, an unacceptable position in most European countries.<ref name=":0" /> In contrast, the Confederates were confident that European reliance on Southern cotton and their desire for free trade would elicit full support and therefore, adopted a more passive approach in their foreign policy.  Britain and France believed the division of the United States was irrevocable.  While they were dependent on cotton, they also had an ample supply in storage and wartime trade with the Union was highly profitable so a European policy of neutrality was adopted.  This was only threatened when the combination of Union errors, the actual and feared depletion of cotton stocks, and horror at the death and destruction in America brought Europe to the brink of intervention.  Northern diplomacy, military successes and economic dominance ultimately prevented this, which is thought would have brought Confederate success.<ref><nowiki>https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Civil-War-Diplomacy.html</nowiki></ref>

<big>Key military factors in the Civil War, which can be seen as dominant in the outcomes at various points of the Gettysburg Campaign:<ref name=":0" /></big>  

<big>Key military factors in the Civil War, which can be seen as dominant in the outcomes at various points of the Gettysburg Campaign:<ref name=":0" /></big>  

* doctrine (FE) - the superiority of defense to offense

* doctrine (FE) - the superiority of defense to offense

* organization (FG, FM, FS) - force mass of a scope not seen before

* organization (FG, FM, [[Force Sustainment|FS]]) - force mass of a scope not seen before

* RMA (FD) - technology such as the telegraph, railways, and rifled musket as well as organization like improved methods of field fortification that created invulnerability to frontal assaults

* RMA (FD) - technology such as the telegraph, railways, and rifled musket as well as organization like improved methods of field fortification that created invulnerability to frontal assaults

Force Generation

Force Generation

Force Sustainment

[[Force Sustainment]]

Force Management

Force Management