Changes

==Certificate Recommendations and Guidance==

==Certificate Recommendations and Guidance==

In support of the HTTPS Everywhere initiative, a [[Media:Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates.pdf|recommendations document]] was developed for the purpose of identifying the minimum requirements for TLS server certificate type and content, issuing CA conformance and website responsibilities that apply to all externally facing GC websites. This effort was led by TBS OCIO in close collaboration with members of the HTTPS working group including CRA, CSE, ESDC and SSC.  

In support of the HTTPS Everywhere initiative, a [https://wiki.gccollab.ca/images/9/92/Recommendations_for_TLS_Server_Certificates_-_14_May_2021.pdf Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates] was developed for the purpose of identifying the minimum requirements for TLS server certificate type and content, issuing CA conformance and website responsibilities that apply to all externally facing GC websites. This effort was led by TBS OCIO in close collaboration with members of the HTTPS working group including CRA, CSE, ESDC and SSC.  

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While there are many technical details within the report that are not captured in this brief summary, the most important recommendations are:

While there are many technical details within the report that are not captured in this brief summary, the most important recommendations are:

* Organization Validated ('''OV) certificates are not recommended''' for use, as they provide no brand or security benefits above DV certificates.

* Organization Validated ('''OV) certificates are not recommended''' for use, as they provide no brand or security benefits above DV certificates.

* If used, '''EV certificates should be obtained from SSC''' (contact [mailto:ssc.ssltls.spc@canada.ca ssc.ssltls.spc@canada.ca]) in order to take advantage of the reduced pricing from an approved CA vendor (Entrust).

* If used, '''EV certificates should be obtained from SSC''' (contact [mailto:ssc.ssltls.spc@canada.ca ssc.ssltls.spc@canada.ca]) in order to take advantage of the reduced pricing from an approved CA vendor (Entrust).

[[File:Le-logo-twitter.png|250px|link=https://letsencrypt.org/]] [[file:entrust_site_seal_ssl.png|200px|link=mailto:ssc.ssltls.spc@canada.ca]]

Recently the National Institute of Standards and Technology released [https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/tls-server-certificate-management Special Publication 1800-16 Securing Web Transactions: TLS Server Certificate Management] for public comment. This draft practice guide provides additional information for enterprises that rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure both customer-facing and internal applications, so they can  better manage TLS server certificates by:

For additional information, please see [[Media:Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates.pdf|Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates]] for GC Public Facing Web Services or contact TBS-CIOB Cybersecurity ([mailto:zzTBSCybers@tbs-sct.gc.ca zzTBSCybers@tbs-sct.gc.ca])

===Automated Certificate Management Engine (ACME)===

===Automated Certificate Management Engine (ACME)===

<u>[https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 RFC 8555: Automatic Certificate Management Environment]</u><br>

<u>[https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 RFC 8555: Automatic Certificate Management Environment]</u><br>

''Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance <u>on Linux platforms</u>. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.'' For details, see the IETF document here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555

''Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.'' For details, see the IETF document here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555

From the Datatracker, published 2019-03-12: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8555/

From the Datatracker, published 2019-03-12: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8555/

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# [https://www.venafi.com/ Venafi]

# [https://www.venafi.com/ Venafi]

# [https://sectigo.com/resources/sectigos-acme-automation Sectigo (formerly Comodo CA)]

# [https://sectigo.com/resources/sectigos-acme-automation Sectigo (formerly Comodo CA)]

===Wildcard Certificates===

===Wildcard Certificates===

* In the absence of HSMs, risk mitigation measures should include effective monitoring and auditing of the system so that private key compromise can be detected as early as possible followed immediately with revocation of the associated server certificate.

* In the absence of HSMs, risk mitigation measures should include effective monitoring and auditing of the system so that private key compromise can be detected as early as possible followed immediately with revocation of the associated server certificate.

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Per the [[Media:Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates.pdf|Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates]] [PDF], “care must be exercised when using multi-domain and wildcard certificates to ensure collateral damage is minimized in the event of private key compromise.  Copying the same private key to multiple web servers is strongly discouraged unless appropriate risk mitigation measures are in place such as using CSE approved Hardware Security Modules to protect the private key.”

Per the [https://wiki.gccollab.ca/images/9/92/Recommendations_for_TLS_Server_Certificates_-_14_May_2021.pdf Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates] [PDF], “care must be exercised when using multi-domain and wildcard certificates to ensure collateral damage is minimized in the event of private key compromise.  Copying the same private key to multiple web servers is strongly discouraged unless appropriate risk mitigation measures are in place such as using CSE approved Hardware Security Modules to protect the private key.”

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Download the Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates.pdf:  

Download the Recommendations for TLS Server Certificates.pdf:  

[[File:Pdf icon.png|75px|left|link=https://wiki.gccollab.ca/images/8/89/Recommendations_for_TLS_Server_Certificates.pdf]]

[[File:Pdf icon.png|75px|left|link=https://wiki.gccollab.ca/images/9/92/Recommendations_for_TLS_Server_Certificates_-_14_May_2021.pdf]]

 

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