Changes

The Civil War saw the largest military forces ever raised in the Western Hemisphere. By 1864, The Union needed to provide for and move 1 million men under arms.  To do so, riverboats and rail systems were utilized by both sides.  Confederate soldiers travelled in fewer numbers by rail and steamer than their Union counterparts, largely due to lower capacity, reliability and availability of military transportation in the South.  Most western riverboats were constructed and owned by Northerners, most were in Northern rivers when the war broke out, and all of the owners were happy to do work for the US government due to their belief in the financial stability of the government in Washington. The Confederates by comparison had a shortage of boats and during Grant's Vicksburg campaign, destroyed dozens to keep them from falling into Union hands.  Southern railroads were not as advanced as the Northern lines when the war started and never caught up.  There were too few engineers and mechanics, too little iron, too little money, and too few plants capable of building engines and cars, all of which the Confederacy failed to address or compensate for.  Railroad owners preferred to ship private freight and passengers because they received payment to do so. The Confederacy also was reluctant to take control of the railways and operate them using army personnel.  Therefore, the failure was multi-dimensional, one of technology, industrial capacity, financial power and the assertion of governmental control.<ref name=":0" />

The Civil War saw the largest military forces ever raised in the Western Hemisphere. By 1864, The Union needed to provide for and move 1 million men under arms.  To do so, riverboats and rail systems were utilized by both sides.  Confederate soldiers travelled in fewer numbers by rail and steamer than their Union counterparts, largely due to lower capacity, reliability and availability of military transportation in the South.  Most western riverboats were constructed and owned by Northerners, most were in Northern rivers when the war broke out, and all of the owners were happy to do work for the US government due to their belief in the financial stability of the government in Washington. The Confederates by comparison had a shortage of boats and during Grant's Vicksburg campaign, destroyed dozens to keep them from falling into Union hands.  Southern railroads were not as advanced as the Northern lines when the war started and never caught up.  There were too few engineers and mechanics, too little iron, too little money, and too few plants capable of building engines and cars, all of which the Confederacy failed to address or compensate for.  Railroad owners preferred to ship private freight and passengers because they received payment to do so. The Confederacy also was reluctant to take control of the railways and operate them using army personnel.  Therefore, the failure was multi-dimensional, one of technology, industrial capacity, financial power and the assertion of governmental control.<ref name=":0" />

In supplying its army, the Confederacy's procurement policy compounded its issues.  The Quartermaster and Subsistence bureaus were decentralized and inefficient.  There were no designated areas of forage, no delineations of authority between agents of the supply bureaus and the supply agents of the armies of the field.  The field commanders were concerned mostly for their own troops, or arranging procurement and distribution through their own districts, and had little understanding of the bigger problems.  The main foreign policy to wage war was through economic pressure resulting from the withdrawal of cotton from Union and European markets.  At the same time, the Confederate Congress failed to impose price controls of foreign or domestic procurements.  As prices soared, allotments to its War Department did not keep apace.  The department only ever had enough to meet minimum requirements to maintain the armies, not including offensive campaigns.  In the early stages of the war, the Southern people came to the aid of the army, which was sustained through massive voluntary contributions. By 1862, the loss of border areas and New Orleans meant critical shortages of beef, flour, clothing, and other manufactured goods, leading to the contraband trade systems.<ref name=":1">Hagerman, Edward. <u>The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command</u>. Indiana University Press, 1988.  Pp 127-129.</ref>

In supplying its army, the Confederacy's procurement policy compounded its issues.  The Quartermaster and Subsistence bureaus were decentralized and inefficient.  There were no designated areas of forage, no delineations of authority between agents of the supply bureaus and the supply agents of the armies of the field.  The field commanders were concerned mostly for their own troops, or arranging procurement and distribution through their own districts, and had little understanding of the bigger problems.  The main foreign policy to wage war was through economic pressure resulting from the withdrawal of cotton from Union and European markets.  At the same time, the Confederate Congress failed to impose price controls of foreign or domestic procurements.  As prices soared, allotments to its War Department did not keep apace.  The department only ever had enough to meet minimum requirements to maintain the armies, not including offensive campaigns.  In the early stages of the war, the Southern people came to the aid of the army, which was sustained through massive voluntary contributions. By 1862, the loss of border areas and New Orleans meant critical shortages of beef, flour, clothing, and other manufactured goods, leading to the contraband trade systems.<ref name=":1">Hagerman, Edward. <u>The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command</u>. Indiana University Press, 1988.  </ref>

The situation was not easily or quickly remedied.  By February 1963, the Confederate army was in crisis with extreme shortages in footwear, clothing, draft animals, and wagons.  In addition, the rations were at a severely reduced calorific standard such that although they could sustain an army in encampment, they were completely inadequate for field operations.<ref name=":1" /> Therefore early in 1963, to effectively marshal their limited resources, the Confederacy reorganized the Quartermaster and Subsistence bureaus.  The procurement wing of the Quartermaster Department was streamlined and centralized, with exclusive control over purchasing as well as eliminating wasteful competition between the bureau supply agents and those of the field commanders.

The situation was not easily or quickly remedied.  By February 1963, the Confederate army was in crisis with extreme shortages in footwear, clothing, draft animals, and wagons.  In addition, the rations were at a severely reduced calorific standard such that although they could sustain an army in encampment, they were completely inadequate for field operations. Although the confederacy had enough food to feed both its civilian and military populations, Virginia was the only state without food surpluses.  It was also where the surpluses were most needed to support the army campaigning being conducted in its area. Therefore early in 1963, to effectively marshal their limited resources, the Confederacy reorganized the Quartermaster and Subsistence bureaus.  The procurement wing of the Quartermaster Department was streamlined and centralized, with exclusive control over purchasing as well as eliminating wasteful competition between the bureau supply agents and those of the field commanders. The Subsistence Department underwent similar changes except that the commissary general chief did not receive authority to centralize distribution.  Instead, the chief commissaries of the armies in the field submitted their requisitions instead to the their counterparts of the state or states in which their armies were located or intended to pass through.  Commissaries of one state or district could borrow on the depots of others. However, there remained no chain of authority between the field commanders and the Subsistence Department, giving rise to conflicts that impacted efficient gathering of available resources.  The organization changes were an improvement but still allowed for more waste than could be afforded.<ref name=":1" />