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["Information"]
["Tool Purpose","The purpose of this tool is to structure and streamline some tier 0 security practitioner activities.\n  \nDemo Video: https://gccollab.ca/file/view/7964117/entbs-saas-assessment-tool-mvp-2-english-demofr"]
[]
["Instructions"]
["Readiness Worksheet \n(step 1)","Click on the \"Run Readiness Check\" button in the \"TBS SaaS Assessment Tool\" ribbon bar. \n\nFollow the instructions on screen by providing the required information.\nDemo Video: https://gccollab.ca/file/view/7964117/entbs-saas-assessment-tool-mvp-2-english-demofr"]
["GC SaaS Assessment Worksheet \n(step 2)","Click on the 'Update Active Worksheet\" button. Wait patiently while the entire worksheet is updated. Complete all action items (blue cells) and complete the assessment as required. \n\nComplete worksheet as required."]
["CCCS Assessor Workbook Worksheet  \n(alternative step 2)","Click on the 'Update Active Worksheet\" button. Wait patiently while the entire worksheet is updated. Complete all action items (blue cells) and complete the assessment as required.\n\nComplete worksheet as required. "]
["Definitions of Suggested States","Tier 0 suggested state definitions:\n• “Met Inherited” for the CCCS assessor workbook PaaS/IaaS layers (aka “Do not assess”)\n  o If a PaaS/IaaS is an already approved for use CSP; then no resources should be spent assessing safeguards in these PaaS/IaaS layers.\n  o If a PaaS/IaaS is not on the approved list; then a full stack PBMM assessment is required (minimum).\n  o Departments and Agencies that are NOT “lead security agencies” are expected to accept the results of previous CSP security vetting’s that were done by CCCS. These results can be requested for reference by contacting contac@cyber.gc.ca\n\n• “Met Inherited” for the CCCS assessor workbook SaaS layer and the TBS SaaS Assessment tool (aka, “Do not assess”)\n  o If a tier 0 SaaS has the recommended cloud security certifications (see GC cloud tiered assurance model); then no resources should be spent on assessing if a cells safeguard are in place. Departments and Agencies that are NOT “lead security agencies” can take advantage of a cloud security certification attestations in place of full safeguard assessments. However, if you suspect an issue with the quality of the cells safeguard, follow up as required.\n  o If a tier 0 SaaS does not meet the GC cloud assurance models expectations; then a full SaaS assessment is required.\n\n• “None” for any control (aka “Must be assessed”)\n  o The evidence needed for assessing this safeguard must be collected, as decision making for this control using vendor attestation is inappropriate. \n  o Assessment procedures will be scripted for ease of use collection. \n  o Some risk factors will be considered more impactful then others. \n  o Whenever possible, data driven feeds are used to assist in a safeguard’s assessment. For example, SC-8. \n\n• “Out of Scope” for Consumer\n  o The safeguard under question does not apply to the consumer; and/or there is no low-cost/pragmatic implementation available.\n\n• “None” for Consumer \n  o It is the responsibility of the GC consumer and a GC security practitioner to implement and govern over these safeguards.\n  o In many cases these responsibilities can be met by using behaviour directing controls (PL-4, must use a GC asset to access system, etc.) and event based process controls (AC-1, creating a new account, requesting an API key, setting up MFA during account creation, etc.). "]
["Other","If you are having troubles running .xlsm files, then visit the trust center of office 365 by selecting “File”, “Options”, “Trust Centre”, “Trust Center Settings” and finally “Trusted Locations” to see if you can get the file running by placing it in a trusted location. Please review the included screenshots for further help."]
[]
["Revision History"]
["Date","Author","Description"]
["2021-10-05","TBS-CIOB, Cyber Security","MVP 3 Change Log:\n• Added MFA Feature Request.\n• Added ESA Consumer SCTM.\n• Bug Fix: Data Residency error messaging improved. \n• B1, S2, S24 changed from enhanced to minimum. \n• S32 changed from minimum to enhanced. \n• S4 noting that CCCS runs the enterprise cloud assessment program and not CSE. \n• S3, S5, P1 merged into S2\n• S8 merged into L1\n• API2 merged into API1\n• P2 merged into L2\n"]
["2021-05-20","TBS-CIOB, Cyber Security","MVP 2.1 Change Log:\n• Code improvements."]
["2021-04-16","TBS-CIOB, Cyber Security","MPV 2 Change Log:\n• Instructions worksheet updated.\n\n• Fixed a bug in the (GC) HTTPS evaluator decision aid that labelled TLS 1.3 “phase out” ciphers as a negative indicator. “Phase out” ciphers are not considered “known good indicators”. \n\n• Each row in the TBS SaaS Assessment worksheet has been given a unique identifier. When referring to rows inside this excel file, please use each rows unique identifier. \n\n• Removed functionality that would set a cells “Override” column to “met”. This requires assessors to visit each row’s state during the assessment process.\n\n• The consumer shared responsibility section in the CCCS Assessor Work Book has an added “Consumer Out of Scope” column. If an “X” is in this column, the consumer of the CSP is not expected to implement this safeguard in the context of the consumer.\n\n• The SaaS shared responsibility section in the CCCS Assessor Work Book has an added ‘Suggest Met if Tier 0 and Happy Path’ column. If an “X” is in this column, the SaaS layer decision aid will suggest ‘met (inherited)’ when the SaaS CSP has the cloud security certifications listed in Tier 0 of the GC Cloud Assurance Model. If the SaaS CSP does NOT meet the cloud security certifications listed in Tier 0, the decision aid suggests a full stack SaaS assessment.\n\n• The ITSG-33 profile section in the CCCS Assessor Work Book has a added “GC ULL - Tailor From Here” column. If an “X” is in this column, then this ITSG-33 control will be included in the default scope of the assessment. When tailoring the profile (if required), remove the “X” from this column and update the worksheet. This will remove this control from the SaaS’s share responsibility section.\n\n• Added SA-15 (7) to the CCCS Assessor Work Book worksheet. This control was added to give visibility into the software composition analysis (SCA) tooling and static code analysis tooling SaaS CSP’s are using. This control is also in scope for the consumers shared responsibility section when homegrown code is created to interact with the SaaS (API usage, data scraping, etc.). If no homegrown code, then the assessor can place an “X” in the “Consumer Out of Scope” cell. \n\n• Added AC-9 (4) to the CCCS Assessor Work Book worksheet. This control was added to communicate and evaluate account take over prevention and detection controls at the SaaS layer.\n\n• Added a worksheet called “Sample Contract Clauses”. If contract clauses are applicable, then add “Yes” to the “User Defined Include” column. When finished, select the “TBS SaaS Assessment tool” -> “Get Contract Clauses” button (in the ribbon) to send the selected clauses via email. Currently (not ideal), the decision aids run when the “Get Contract Clauses” button is run.\n\n• Added a worksheet called “Feature Requests”. If a feature request is applicable, then select the correct row and then “TBS SaaS Assessment Tool” -> “Get Feature Request” (in the ribbon) to prepare an email to send to the CSP. \n\n• Only ITSG-33 control SC-8, and TBS SaaS Assessment control S27, can be considered fully met using the (GC) HTTPS evaluator decision aid. The (GC) HTTPS evaluator decision aid produces outputs specific to these control’s expectations. If zero negative findings, then the suggested state is “met”. If the (GC) HTTPS evaluator decision aid is used in other decision aids (CA-3, SC-12, SC-13, etc.), then the decision aid can only produce a maximum finding of “Partial” as the assessor is required to fully assess those cells. \n\n• Added additional advice and guidance in Triage worksheet when “TBS SaaS Assessment Tool” -> “Run Readiness Check” button is run:\n  o When a “Protected” data classification is detected, suggest enrollment with the Industrial Security Sector of PSPC.\n  o  When a “security assessment” has not been provided, suggest the use of multiple assessment approaches."]
["2021-02-25","TBS-CIOB, Cyber Security","MVP 1 Change Log:\n1. Added triage and knowledge transfer worksheet. \n2. Added suggested state functionality.\n3. Added a video explainer."]

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["When to use?","Use when triaging the level of effort required to authorize a CSP for use in the GC. "]
["Full name of vendor"]
["Short name of vendor"]
["Website of SaaS web address?",null," "]
["Data Classification"]
["In what country will the data be at rest?",null,null,null," "]
["Business impact if integrity compromised?"]
["Business impact if availability of service goes down?"]
["Cloud Deployment Type  (Public Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, etc.)?"]
["How many departments will be using this procurement?"]
["Has CCCS completed a supply chain integrity check for this CSP?",null,null," "]
["Completed and approved security assessment link?"]
["Completed and approved Security Requirements Check List (SRCL) link?"]
["Type of service (SaaS, IaaS, etc.)"]
["Application Layer"]
["Has ISO 27001?"]
["Has ISO 27017?"]
["Has SOC 2 Type II?"]
["Has self-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix? "]
["Has ISO 27018?"]
["Platform Layer"]
["Is already an approved GC Cloud Service Provider?"]
["Has ISO 27001?"]
["Has ISO 27017?"]
["Has SOC 2 Type II?"]
["Has self-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix? "]
["Has ISO 27018?"]
["Infrastructure Layer"]
["Is already an approved GC Cloud Service Provider?"]
["Has ISO 27001?"]
["Has ISO 27017?"]
["Has SOC 2 Type II?"]
["Has self-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix? "]
["Has ISO 27018?"]

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["MVP 3 is for experimental purposes only."]
["When to use?",null,"Use when triaging the level of effort required to authorize a CSP for use in the GC. "]
[null,null,"Starting Default for Tailoring:"]
["ID","Domain","Category","Question (G)","Description","Controls Mapping","SPIN 2017-01 Reference","TBS References","Other References","Source","GC ESA Tools and Templates","Minimum (tier 0) or Enhanced (not tier 0)","Suggest Met If T0 and good","User Defined State"," Suggested State","Decision Aid","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for vendor \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)","Coordinator's Final Comments \nTo be included in the report. "]
["B1","Business","Terms of Service","Does the service provider’s Terms of Service and SLA clearly define how the service protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all customer information entrusted to them, including:\n- expected and minimum availability performance percentage over a clearly defined period\n- defined, scheduled outage windows\n- service levels for patch and vulnerability management that includes a defined the maximum exposure window\n- ownership of data\n- service provider use of the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service?","CSPs are expected to define the levels of service (for example, a service level agreement) for their cloud services, which will help departments determine whether their availability and resiliency requirements will be addressed. \n","CP-2 Contingency plan\nCP-9 Information system backup","6.2.9","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNew Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Minimum","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["I1","Information","Data Protection","Does the service provider provide the ability to safeguard GC information and assets from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disposal, transmission, or destruction throughout their life cycle?","In accordance with Appendix C of the Directive on Departmental Security Management, departments must safeguard their information and assets, including those hosted in CSP environments, from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disposal, transmission, or destruction throughout their life cycle. These safeguards must: \n•protect GC data while in transit, in use and at rest\n•be commensurate with the security category of the information and assets\n•include an assurance of their appropriate implementation\n\nDoes the service provider implement privacy by design best practices?",null,6.2,null,null,"SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["I2","Information","Data protection","Does the service provider implement privacy by design and measures to remove customer data using industry practices and allow the GC to securely export and retrieve its data in an agreed upon format?\n","CSPs are expected to prohibit unauthorized access to, use, or alteration of GC data hosted in their cloud service environments. This restriction includes implementing measures to support an exit strategy, which includes: \n•the removal of all GC data by an agreed method and time frame, in alignment with CSE’s ITSP.40.006 v2 IT Media Sanitization guidance\n•the ability for the GC to retrieve its data in an agreed format and time frame until the exit process is complete\n","MP-6 Media sanitization\nSA-4 Acquisition process\n","6.2.10","None specified","ITSP.40.006 v2","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["I3","Information","Data Residency","Does the service provider allow its customers to specify the locations where their data can and cannot be stored and processed?","Departments are expected to apply the Direction for Electronic Data Residency, ITPIN No: 2017-02 when implementing safeguards for GC electronic data residency. ","No related security control","6.2.2","Direction for Electronic Data Residency","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist\n\nNew Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S1","Security","Documentation","Does the service provider document and publish clear and transparent details on their product and the implemented security features, and how to best configure them?\n","CSPs are expected to clearly document the security controls and features implemented within their cloud services to help the GC understand the security controls within its scope of responsibility. Such controls include those inherited by the CSP. For example, a software provider using an infrastructure provider to deliver a software as a service (SaaS) offering will inherit security controls from the infrastructure provider. In this case, the CSP is expected to obtain assurance that the underlying infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or platform as a service (PaaS) offering being leveraged for the SaaS offering has: \n•implemented the appropriate controls within its scope \n•obtained valid third-party industry certifications or audit reports ","CA-2 Security assessments","6.1.3","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Clear and transparent details on a product's security features\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S2","Security","Third-Party Assurance","Does the service provider undergo formal regular assessment against an internationally recognised information security standard or framework by an independent third-party (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001, AICPA SOC 2 Type II assessment)? Are the third-party attestations viewable by customers?","Departments can leverage independent reporting such as the following to establish third-party assurance when physical inspection and audit by departments is not feasible or practical:\n•ISO/IEC 27001\n•ISO/IEC 27017\n•ISO/IEC 27018\n•Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)\n•Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS)\n•Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Security, Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) \n•AICPA Service Organization Controls (SOC) audit reports or certifications\n\nA third-party certification requires an independent third party that is bound to be objective and to apply professional standards to the evidence it reviews and produces. \n\nCSPs are expected to clearly document the security controls and features implemented within their cloud services to help the GC understand the security controls within its scope of responsibility. Such controls include those inherited by the CSP. For example, a software provider using an infrastructure provider to deliver a software as a service (SaaS) offering will inherit security controls from the infrastructure provider. In this case, the CSP is expected to obtain assurance that the underlying infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or platform as a service (PaaS) offering being leveraged for the SaaS offering has: \n•implemented the appropriate controls within its scope \n•obtained valid third-party industry certifications or audit reports \n\nTo support this process, the GC will assess CSP security control implementation evidence centrally, in collaboration with appropriate lead security agencies. These assessments will highlight residual risks and suggest additional risk mitigations.\n\nDoes the service provider implement privacy by design best practices?","CA-2 Security assessments","6.1.3","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGC Cloud Risk Management Approach and Procedures document\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist\n\nNew Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Enhanced","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S3","Security","Third-Party Assurance","Has the assessment been performed by a knowledgeable and authorized entity?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S4","Security","Third-Party Assurance","Has the service provider completed the CCCS CSP Assessment program?","Departments that are seeking to consume cloud services can leverage the results of GC-assessed CSPs (as per section 6.1.3 of this document) to support risk-based decisions. These assessments can be reviewed in conjunction with the security assessments performed for security controls that departments are responsible for implementing.\n","CA-2 Security assessments\nCA-6 Security authorization","6.1.4","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S5","Security","Third-Party Assurance","Is there a completed CAIQ or CMM report for the service provider in the CSA STAR?",null,null,"6.1.3 ",null,null,"SPIN 2017-01\n\nNew Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S6","Security","Supply Chain Risk Management","Does the service provider implement supply chain risk management practices within their environment?","CSPs are expected to apply supply chain risk management practices to maintain confidence in the security of the sources of information systems and the IT components used to provide their cloud services. \n","MP-6 Media sanitization\nSA-4 Acquisition process\n","6.2.10","None specified","ITSP.40.006 v2","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S7","Security","Supply Chain Risk Management","Does the service provider have any dependency on any third parties (e.g. outsourcers, subcontractors or another service provider) that introduce additional jurisdictional risks? \n","If yes, ask the service provider to provide the following details for each third party involved in the delivery of the service:\na. The registered head office of the third party;\nb. The country or countries that their services are delivered from; and \nc. The access that they have to client data stored, processed and transmitted by the cloud service.",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S8","Security","Information Assurance and Asset Protection","Does the service provider provide the ability to safeguard GC information and assets from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disposal, transmission, or destruction throughout their life cycle?","In accordance with Appendix C of the Directive on Departmental Security Management, departments must safeguard their information and assets, including those hosted in CSP environments, from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disposal, transmission, or destruction throughout their life cycle. These safeguards must: \n•protect GC data while in transit, in use and at rest\n•be commensurate with the security category of the information and assets\n•include an assurance of their appropriate implementation","RA-2 Security categorization\nSA-8 Security engineering principles\nSA-11 Develop security testing and evaluation\nSC-28 Protection of data at rest","6.2","DDSM, Appendix C","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S9","Security","Asset and Configuration Management","Does the service provider have the ability to provide enterprise visibility across multiple instances?","Necessary for IT to obtain visibility into and regain control of instances provisioned by business units.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S10","Security","Continuous Monitoring","Does the service provider offer continuous monitoring services as part of their cloud service?","CSPs are expected to continuously monitor their cloud services in order to detect changes in the security posture of the cloud service environment, including:\n•monitoring their security controls\n•assessing security controls regularly\n•demonstrating that the security posture is continuously acceptable\n","CA-7 Continuous monitoring","6.1.5","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S11","Security","Multi-tenancy","Does these service provider isolate compute and data between customers?","Almost always a function of the underlying delivery platform, which may be one of the major IaaS cloud providers.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S12","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider provide the ability for the customer to implement additional data protection measures (e.g. encryption, tokenization, etc.)?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S13","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider encrypt data at rest, in accordance with GC-approved cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic key sizes and crypto periods?","Protects against the unlikely scenario of a disk drive escaping provider control.","SC-28 Protection of data at rest",6.2,"DDSM, Appendix C","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S14","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider support integration with cloud security access broker (CASB) capabilities?","Ensure support in existing CASB for new SaaS applications during PoC evaluation phase.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S15","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider offer customer-controlled encryption key management (e.g. Bring Your Own Key)?","Robust key management processes and procedures are also essential to protect encryption keys from being compromised or lost, which could result in unauthorized disclosure or loss of information.\n\nService is native but keys are provisioned by customers only, not by the provider. May be hardware-backed.\n\nBecause the subscription has access to keys, it's largely irrelevant where the keys are generated.\n","CA-3 System interconnections\nSC-7 Boundary protection\nSC-8 Transmission confidentiality and integrity\nSC-12 Cryptographic key establishment and management\nSC-13 Cryptographic protection","6.2.4","None specified","ITSP.40.111\nITSP.40.062 \nITSG-22\nITSG-38","Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S16","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider offer the ability to quarantine unstructured data if malware is detected?","Prevents the further spread of malware.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S17","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider offer content scanning and hygiene (anti-malware, sandboxes)?","Applicable only to services that allow users to store files. Never a substitute for endpoint anti-malware.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S18","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider offer tools for sensitive data monitoring and data loss prevention (DLP)?","A CASB may be preferred. Individual per-SaaS DLP is likely to be inconsistent from one application to another.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S19","Security","Data protection","Does the service provider have a process for addressing information spillage?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S20","Security","Endpoint protection","Does the service provider utilise hardened endpoints to manage the cloud service environment?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S21","Security","Denial of Service Attacks","Does the service provider utilise protocols and technologies that can protect against DDoS attacks? Can the department specify or configure resource usage limits?","Provider should withstand common DoS attacks without data loss or significant outages.",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S22","Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the service provider provide identity provisioning, governance and administration?","Necessary to synchronize and provision identity information. Can occur through provisioning APIs or SCIM standard.\n\nAdditional considerations:\n- access controls on objects in storage\n- role-based access management\n- adaptive access control\n- granular authorization policies\n- ability to set default sharing scopes (internal, external)\n- ability to set expirations on shares and links\n- ability to provide geofencing\n- ability to operate through a forward or reverse proxy",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S23","Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the service provider managed privileged access to the cloud services including restricting access based on the principles of least privilege?","Access must be restricted to personnel based on the principles of least privilege, need to know and segregation of duties, and be supported through appropriate security controls. Restricting access includes:\n•establishing appropriate use restrictions and device configurations\n•taking into consideration the threat environment when accessing cloud services \n\nThe SaaS product should implement levels of privilege, and have authorization mechanisms in place to enforce the separation of privileges between different types of account.\n","AC-2 Account Management\nAC-3 Access Enforcement\nAC-5 Separation of duties\nAC-6 Least privilege\nIA-2 Identification and authentication (organizational users)\nIA-3 Device identification and authentication \nIA-8 Identification and authentication (non-organizational users)","6.2.3","Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance","ITSP.30.031 V2","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Privilege separation",null,"Minimum","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S24","Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the service provider enable integration of GC enterprise identity and authentication services including support for single sign-on?","Departments must identify and authenticate individuals and devices to an appropriate level of assurance before being granted access to information and services hosted in cloud services. Such authentication is in accordance with the Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance and aligns with GC enterprise identity and authentication services. \n\nNecessary for single-sign on (SSO), with (at least) SAML2 support","AC-2 Account Management\nAC-3 Access Enforcement\nAC-5 Separation of duties\nAC-6 Least privilege\nIA-2 Identification and authentication (organizational users)\nIA-3 Device identification and authentication \nIA-8 Identification and authentication (non-organizational users)","6.2.3","Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance","ITSP.30.031 V2","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S25","Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the service provider have the ability for the GC to enable stronger authentication for privileged access?","For privileged user access to cloud-based services, the use of stronger authentication mechanisms (for example, multi-factor authentication) must be configured. Additional security measures, such as the use of privileged access workstations and dedicated management networks, may further mitigate the risks associated with privileged access. \n\nRefer to CSE guidance in ITSP.30.031 V2 User Authentication Guidance for Information Technology Systems. \n\n\nThe SaaS product should implement a method of requiring multi factor authentication to the service. Enabling multi factor authentication helps lower the impact of credential theft.\n\nPowerful accounts must be afforded strong protection. ","AC-2 Account Management\nAC-3 Access Enforcement\nAC-5 Separation of duties\nAC-6 Least privilege\nIA-2 Identification and authentication (organizational users)\nIA-3 Device identification and authentication \nIA-8 Identification and authentication (non-organizational users)","6.2.3","Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance","ITSP.30.031 V2","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Multi-factor authentication\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S26","Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the service provider implement and manage secure remote administration to its cloud services? ","Additional security measures, such as the use of privileged access workstations and dedicated management networks, may further mitigate the risks associated with privileged access.\n\nRefer to CSE guidance in ITSP.30.031 V2 User Authentication Guidance for Information Technology Systems.","AC-17(1), AC-17(2), AC-17(3), AC-17(4), AC-17(6), AC-2 (1) (7), AC-3 (7)\n","6.2.3",null,null,"SPIN 2017-01\n\nCloud Security Principle 9: Secure user management\n\nCloud Security Principle 10: Identity and authentication\n\nCloud Security Principle 12: Secure service administration\n\n\n",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S27","Security","Network Security","Does the service provider protect data in transit, in accordance with CSE-approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols, including protecting external data in transit using TLS?","Data transiting networks must be adequately protected through the use of appropriate encryption and network safeguards. Cloud-based services should make use of CSE-approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols, as outlined in:\n•CSE’s ITSP.40.111 Cryptographic Algorithms for Unclassified, Protected A, and Protected B Information\n•CSE’s ITSP.40.062 Guidance on Securely Configuring Network Protocols\n\nData should be protected as it transits between the client and the SaaS product.\n\nTransport Layer Security (TLS) is a protocol which provides privacy between communicating applications and their users, or between communicating services. When a server and client communicate, well-configured TLS ensures that no third party can eavesdrop or tamper with any message.\n\nCertificates used within the external TLS connection should follow good practice.\n\nShould be TLS 1.2 or higher with perfect forward secrecy and no certificate pinning (so that traffic inspection may operate normally).","CA-3 System interconnections\nSC-7 Boundary protection\nSC-8 Transmission confidentiality and integrity\nSC-12 Cryptographic key establishment and management\nSC-13 Cryptographic protection","6.2.4","None specified","ITSP.40.111\nITSP.40.062 \nITSG-22\nITSG-38","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Data-in-transit protection between clients and service\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S28","Security","Network Security","Does the service provider provide the ability for the GC to establish private redundant connectivity to the cloud service?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S29","Security","Risk Management","Does the service provider offer security health check or scoring tools?","SaaS providers that are often strategic have begun offering mechanisms for customers to measure their security posture.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S30","Security","Secure Development","Does the service provider follow industry best practices for the secure development and implementation of the cloud services?","Cloud-based services are expected to be designed and developed following industry best practices (for example, SAFECode Fundamental Practices for Secure Software Development, ISO/IEC 27034 and OWASP) in order to minimize security issues that could:\n•compromise GC information\n•cause a loss of service\n•enable other malicious activity \n","SA-3 System development lifecycle\nSA-8 Security Engineering Principles\nSA-10 Developer Configuration Management \nSA-11 Developer Security Testing \nSA-15 Development process, standards, and tools\nSI-10 Information Input Validation\nPL-8 Information System Architecture","6.2.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum","x","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S31","Security","Vulnerability Management","Does the service provider have a clear patch and vulnerability management system in place to remedy any publicly reported issues in their service, or libraries that the service makes use of?","The SaaS provider has a clearly defined policy for patching internal systems as well as dealing with security issues.\n","RA-5 Vulnerability scanning\nCA-8 Penetration Testing\nSI-2 Flaw remediation\nSI-5 Security alerts, advisories, and directives","6.2.6","None specified","ITSB-96","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Clear incident response to patching and security issues",null,"Minimum","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S32","Security","Vulnerability Management","Does the service provider allow the GC to perform security testing or scanning of the service to ensure that it has been securely deployed?",null,null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S33","Security","Information System Monitoring","Does the service provider enable an adequate level of logging and reporting to support continuous monitoring of system events and performance including ability to:\n\n- collect logs of events\n- configure audit logging and set retention policies for data\n- perform user activity logging, reporting and alerting?\n\n\n\n","CSPs are responsible for continuously monitoring system events and performance, and including a security audit log function in all information systems, enables the detection of incidents in support of continued delivery of services. It is essential that an adequate level of logging and reporting is configured for the scope of the cloud-based service within the GC’s responsibility.\n\n\nThe SaaS product generates all relevant security-critical logs. Types of log may include security logs and resource logs.\n","AU-2 Audit events\nAU-6 Audit review, analysis, and reporting\nAU-12 Audit generation\nSI-4 Information system monitoring","6.3.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist\n\nNCSC SaaS Security Principle - Logging and event collection",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S34","Security","Information System Monitoring","Does the service provider make logs available to the client? Does the service provider have integration with 3rd party Security incident and event monitoring (SIEM) services that logs and monitors all logical access to customer data? Does it include user and entity behavior analysis (UEBA) capabilities?","The SaaS product makes available security-critical events to your audit and monitoring service.","AU-2 Audit events\nAU-6 Audit review, analysis, and reporting\nAU-12 Audit generation\nSI-4 Information system monitoring",null,null,null,"NCSC SaaS Security Principle - Availability of logs\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S35","Security","Information System Monitoring","Does the service provider have an integrated ticketing system?","Eliminates the requirement for incident responders to check multiple locations for closing help desk requests.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S36","Security","Security Incident Management","Does the service provider have a formal incident response and management process and plans that clearly define:\n\n- how they detect and respond to security incidents \n- protocols to engage the service provider\n- how they will provide support should a security incident arise? \n","CSPs are expected to notify the GC when a security incident or breach of GC data or their cloud services impacts the cloud-based GC service. Such notifications should be distributed to:\n•relevant departmental contacts (for example, cloud-based service owner)\n•GC-CIRT\n\nFor example, does the service provider:\n\na. Notify customers when an incident that may affect the security of their information or interconnected systems is detected or reported?\nb. Specify a point of contact and channel for customers to report suspected information security incidents?\nc. Define the roles and responsibilities of each party during an information security incident?\nd. Provide customers with access to evidence (e.g. time stamped audit logs and/or forensic snapshots of virtual machines etc.) to enable them to perform their own investigation of the incident?\ne. Provide sufficient information to enable the agency to cooperate effectively with an investigation by a regulatory body, such as the Privacy Commissioner or the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)?\nf. Define which party is responsible for the recovery of data and services after an information security incident has occurred?\ng. Share post incident reports with affected customers to enable them to understand the cause of the incident and make an informed decision about whether to continue using the cloud service?\nh. Specify in the contract limits and provisions for insurance, liability and indemnity for information security incidents? (Note: it is recommended that agencies carefully review liability and indemnity clauses for exclusions.)\n","IR-4 Incident handling\nIR-5 Incident monitoring\nIR-6 Incident reporting\nIR-8 Incident response plan","6.3.2","GC CSEMP","None specified","SPIN 2017-01","SOP for Cloud Event Management","Minimum","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S37","Security","Security Incident Management","Does the service provider have a process and plans that clearly defines how they notify the GC when there is an incident or privacy breach?\n\n","CSPs are expected to notify the GC when a security incident or breach of GC data or their cloud services impacts the cloud-based GC service. Such notifications should be distributed to:\n•relevant departmental contacts (for example, cloud-based service owner)\n•GC-CIRT\n\n","IR-4 Incident handling\nIR-5 Incident monitoring\nIR-6 Incident reporting\nIR-8 Incident response plan","6.3.2","GC CSEMP","None specified","SPIN 2017-01","SOP for Cloud Event Management","Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S38","Security","Service Continuity","Does the service provider offer data backup or archiving services as part of their standard service offering to protect against data loss or corruption? \n\nDoes the service provider have the ability for the GC to implement a resilient architecture including supporting the business Recovery Point Objective?","Cloud-based services should be designed to take into consideration suitable geographic dispersal and data replication capabilities to meet business continuity objectives. Such services can include holding a local copy of backup data in case of failure of the cloud service or related communications. A documented and tested process is required for backing up the data within the cloud-based service. Departments can work with SSC when developing their disaster recovery plans for alternative storage and processing should a CSP experience a catastrophic event.\n","CP-2 Contingency plan\nCP-9 Information system backup","6.2.9","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nNew Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S39","Security","Physical and Environmental Protection","Does the service provider demonstrate that they provide:\n•physical protection of commercial facilities that host GC data and IT assets\n•controlled maintenance of information systems and their components to protect their integrity and ensure their ongoing availability\n•protection of assets that store or process GC data against all forms of tampering, loss, damage or seizure?","CSPs are expected to demonstrate measures to ensure asset protection and resilience, such as:\n•physical protection of commercial facilities that host GC data and IT assets\n•controlled maintenance of information systems and their components to protect their integrity and ensure their ongoing availability\n•protection of assets that store or process GC data against all forms of tampering, loss, damage or seizure \n\nPhysical protection measures:\n•must be applied in accordance with, or use an adequate risk-based approach aligned with the physical security controls outlined in the Government of Canada Security Control Profile for Cloud-Based GC IT Services\n•must be applied in accordance with, or use an adequate risk-based approach aligned with the practices in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) guidance and standards on physical security\n•are subject to the provisions of any international information-sharing agreements\n\nCSP conformance with GC physical security requirements will:\n•be ascertained centrally by the GC, in collaboration with appropriate lead security agencies\n•be supported by the third-party assurance process outlined in section 6.1.3 of this document\n","MA-2 Controlled maintenance\nPE family","6.2.8","DDSM, Appendix C","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Enhanced","X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S40","Security","Personnel Security","Does the service provider undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff? Are the screening security measures align with the definition and practices in the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening?","In order to perform duties on behalf of the GC, CSPs are expected at all times to demonstrate the measures they perform to grant and maintain the required level of security screening for CSP personnel pursuant to their access privileges to protected information. Security screening:\n•must be applied in accordance with, or use an adequate risk-based approach aligned with the definition and practices in the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening \n•is subject to the provisions of any international information-sharing agreements\n\nCSP conformance with the Standard on Security Screening will be:\n•ascertained centrally by the GC, in collaboration with appropriate lead security agencies\n•be supported by the third-party assurance process (as per section 6.1.3 of this document)\n","PS-3 Personnel screening\nPS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security\n","6.2.7","Standard on Security Screening","Screening Gap Analysis Tool","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["S41","Security","Industrial Security Program","Is the service provider screened under the Industrial Security Program?",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["API1","Integration","API integration","If APIs are available, does the service provider protect both internal and external APIs through an authentication method?","Integration may not always be configurable via a graphical interface, and instead may require writing a small amount of code.\n\nAll externally exposed API queries which return protected or integrity-sensitive information should require successful authentication before they can be called.\n\nPublished APIs for accessing customer data should require authentication to avoid accidental or malicious exposure.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Minimum",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["API2","Integration","API integration","If APIs are available, does the service provider protect both internal and external APIs through an authentication method?","All externally exposed API queries which return protected or integrity-sensitive information should require successful authentication before they can be called.\n\nPublished APIs for accessing customer data should require authentication to avoid accidental or malicious exposure.","N/A",null,null,null,"NCSC SaaS Security Principle - API authentication and protection\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["API3","Integration","API integration","Does the service provider provide an API inspection option?","API inspection can interrogate data at rest in SaaS applications and can assess events and incidents stored in SaaS application logs.",null,null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"Enhanced",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["P1","Privacy","Third-Party Assurance","Does the service provider undergo formal regular assessment against an internationally recognised information security standard or framework by an independent third-party (e.g. ISO/IEC 27018)? Are the third-party attestations viewable by customers?","Departments can leverage independent reporting such as the following to establish third-party assurance when physical inspection and audit by departments is not feasible or practical:\n•ISO/IEC 27001\n•ISO/IEC 27017\n•ISO/IEC 27018\n•Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)\n•Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS)\n•Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Security, Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) \n•AICPA Service Organization Controls (SOC) audit reports or certifications\n\nA third-party certification requires an independent third party that is bound to be objective and to apply professional standards to the evidence it reviews and produces. \n\nCSPs are expected to clearly document the security controls and features implemented within their cloud services to help the GC understand the security controls within its scope of responsibility. Such controls include those inherited by the CSP. For example, a software provider using an infrastructure provider to deliver a software as a service (SaaS) offering will inherit security controls from the infrastructure provider. In this case, the CSP is expected to obtain assurance that the underlying infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or platform as a service (PaaS) offering being leveraged for the SaaS offering has: \n•implemented the appropriate controls within its scope \n•obtained valid third-party industry certifications or audit reports \n\nTo support this process, the GC will assess CSP security control implementation evidence centrally, in collaboration with appropriate lead security agencies. These assessments will highlight residual risks and suggest additional risk mitigations.\n","N/A","6.1.3","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGC Cloud Risk Management Approach and Procedures document\n",null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["P2","Privacy","Privacy by Design","Does the service provider implement privacy by design best practices?",null,"N/A",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","TBD"]

{"sheet":"CCCS Assessor Work Book","index":3,"n_rows":364,"n_cols":37,"rows_kept":364,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,0,0,19]]}
["For experimental purposes only. This worksheet was placed here by TBS for experimental purposes only. It’s placement here is not endorsed by CCCS."]
["ID","Name","Class","Title","Definition","Supplemental Guidance","CCCS Medium Profile for Cloud","CSP Full Stack","Stacked PaaS","Stacked SaaS","IaaS / PaaS","SaaS","Met/\nNot Met/\nPartial/\nInherited","CCCS Low Profile for Cloud","GC ULL\n\nTailor profile from here\n\nTHIS IS NOT A CCCS PROFILE","Consumer  User Defined State","Consumer Suggested State","Consumer out of scope\n(X if out of scope)","Consumer Decision Aid","SaaS  \nUser Defined State","SaaS Suggested State","Suggest Met If T0 and happy path","SaaS Decision Aid","PaaS \nUser Defined State","PaaS Suggested State","PaaS \nDecision Aid","IaaS \nUser Defined State","IaaS Suggested State","IaaS Decision Aid","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for vendor \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)","Coordinator's Final Comments \nTo be included in the report. "]
[]
["AC-1","Access Control Policy and Procedures","Technical","Access Control Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with access control responsibilities:\n(a)\tAn access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated access controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a) Access control policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b) Access control procedures at least annually.\n","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management","(A) The organization identifies and selects which types of information system accounts support organizational missions/business functions.\n(B) The organization assigns account managers for information system accounts.\n(C) The organization establishes conditions for group and role membership.\n(D) The organization specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account.\n(E) The organization requires approvals by responsible managers for requests to create information system accounts.\n(F) The organization creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with information system account management procedures.\n(G) The organization monitors the use of information system accounts.\n(H) The organization notifies account managers:\n(a) When accounts are no longer required;\n(b) When users are terminated or transferred; and\n(c) When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes.\n(I) The organization authorizes access to the information system based on:\n(a) A valid access authorization;\n(b) Intended system usage; and\n(c) Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions.\n(J) The organization reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements at least annually.\n(K) The organization establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.","Information system account types include, for example, individual, shared, group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and service. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented by organizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, mission/business owner, or information technology security co-ordinator) responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-of-origin. In defining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements (e.g., scheduled maintenance, system upgrades) and mission/business requirements, (e.g., time zone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure to consider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local accounts used for special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Such accounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions for disabling or deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or temporary accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated. Some types of information system accounts may require specialized training. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-10, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AU-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PL-4, SC-13","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(1)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Automated System Account Management","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information system accounts.","The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminated or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic notification to report atypical system account usage.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(2)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Removal of Temporary / Emergency Accounts","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS\nThe information system automatically disables temporary and emergency accounts after no more than 30 days for both temporary and emergency accounts.","This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary and emergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather than at the convenience of the systems administrator.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(3)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Disable Inactive Accounts","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS\nThe information system automatically disables inactive accounts after 90 days.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(4)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Automated Audit Actions","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS\nThe information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions, and notifies responsible managers. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(5)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Inactivity Logout","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT\nThe organization requires that users log out at the end of the users’ standard work period unless otherwise defined in formal organizational policy. Related controls: SC-23",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(7)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Role-Based Schemes","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES\n(a)\tThe organization establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;\n(b)\tThe organization monitors privileged role assignments; and\n(c) The organization disables (or revokes) privileged user assignments within 24 hours or sooner when privileged role assignments are no longer appropriate.","Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management, account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web administration.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(9)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Restrictions on Use of Shared Groups / Accounts","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS\nThe organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-2(10)\t","Account Management ","Technical","Account Management | Shared / Group Account Credential Termination","\tACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL TERMINATION\nThe information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave the group.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-3","Access Enforcement ","Technical","Access Enforcement","(A)\tThe information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.","Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, attribute-based policies) and access enforcement mechanisms (e.g.: access control lists, access control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records, domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services in support of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22, AU-9, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PE-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-4","Information Flow Enforcement ","Technical","Information Flow Enforcement","(A)\tThe information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between interconnected systems based on deny all, approve by exception information flow policies.","Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures and content. Transferring information between information systems representing different security domains with different security policies introduces risk that such transfers violate one or more domain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. Organizations should consider mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing access only); (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows; and (iii) implementing trustworthy re-grading mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security labels.\nOrganizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within information systems and between interconnected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or message-filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. Related controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA-8, SC-2, SC-5, SC-7, SC-18.\n","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-4(21)\t","Information Flow Enforcement ","Technical","Information Flow Enforcement | Physical / Logical Separation of Information Flows","\tINFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS\nThe information system separates information flows logically or physically using session encryption to accomplish separation of all sessions.","Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.","X","X","X",null,"X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-5","Separation of Duties ","Technical","Separation of Duties","(A) The organization:\n(a) Separate organization-defined duties of individuals including at least separation of operational, development, security monitoring, and management functions;\n(b) Documents separation of duties of individuals; and \n(c) Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.\n","Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3, PE-4, PS-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege","(A)\tThe organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.","Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and information systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6(1)\t","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege | Authorize Access to Security Functions","\tLEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS\nThe organization explicitly authorizes access to all security functions not publicly accessible and all security-relevant information not publicly available.","Security functions include, for example, establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, for example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators, system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and other privileged users. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6(2)\t","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege | Non-Privileged Access for Non-Security Functions","\tLEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NON-SECURITY FUNCTIONS\nThe organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to any security function, use non-privileged accounts or roles, when accessing non-security functions.","This control enhancement limits an information system’s exposure to threats when users are operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control policies such as RBAC and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non-privileged account. Related control: PL-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6(5)\t","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege | Privileged Accounts","\tLEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS\nThe organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to the minimum number of personnel required to securely administer, manage, and protect the information systems.","Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described as system administrators for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users from having access to privileged information/functions. Organizations may differentiate in the application of this control enhancement between allowed privileges for local accounts and for domain accounts provided organizations retain the ability to control information system configurations for key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk. Related control: CM-6.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6(9)\t","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege | Auditing Use of Privileged Functions","\tLEAST PRIVILEGE | AUDITING USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS\nThe information system audits the execution of privileged functions.","Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse, and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat (APT). Related control: AU-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-6(10)\t","Least Privilege ","Technical","Least Privilege | Prohibit Non-Privileged Users from Executing Privileged Functions","\tLEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS\nThe information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.","Privileged functions include, for example, establishing information system accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-7","Unsuccessful Login Attempts ","Technical","Unsuccessful Logon Attempts","(A) The information system enforces a limit of not more than three consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a 15-minute time period.\n(B) The information system automatically locks the account/node for a minimum of three (3) hours or until unlocked by an administrator. ","Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by the information system are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time period established by the organization. If a delay algorithm is selected, the organization may choose to employ different algorithms for different information system components based on the capabilities of those components. Response to unsuccessful login attempts may be implemented at both the operating system and the application levels. This control applies to all accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization in AC-14.\nThis security control/enhancement requires careful balance between usability and security. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the appropriate balance between the two seemingly conflicting requirements is achieved.\nIf possible, an increasing time-out period should be used to deter determined attackers. For example, an original time-out of 5 minutes can become 10 minutes after the next 3 unsuccessful attempts, then 20 minutes, then 40 minutes, etc.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-8","System Use Notification ","Technical","System Use Notification","(A)\tThe information system displays to users a organization-defined system use notification message or banner before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices in accordance with organization's network use policies.\n(B)\tThe information system retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system.\n(C)\tThe information system for publicly accessible systems:\n(a)\tDisplays system use information before granting further access;\n(b)\tDisplays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and\n(c)\tIncludes a description of the authorized uses of the system.","System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners displayed in multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the demographics of information system users. Organizations should also consult with legal services for review and approval of warning banner content","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-9(4)",null,null,"Previous Logon (Access) Notification | Additional Logon Information","PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION\nThe information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access), the following information:\n1.\tAll successful login events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n2.\tAll unsuccessful login events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n3.\tAll second factor unsuccessful login events are made available to end users for 90 days. \n4.\tAll password change events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n5.\tAll successful AND unsuccessful password change events are made available to end users for 90 days. \n6.\tAll second factor administration events (adding, removing of second factor mechanisms) are made available to end users for 90 days\n7.\tAll account update events (payment related events, profile changes) are made available to end users for 90 days. ","This requirement is available as a feature request. ",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-10","Concurrent Session Control ","Technical","Concurrent Session Control","(A)\tThe information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for all accounts unless justified for operation requirements to 3 sessions for privileged access and 2 sessions for non-privileged access.","Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user, domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-11","Session Lock ","Technical","Session Lock","(A)\tThe information system prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after 15 minutes of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user.\n(B)\tThe information system retains the session lock until the user re-establishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.","Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level. Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays. Related control: AC-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-11(1)\t","Session Lock ","Technical","Session Lock | Pattern-Hiding Displays","\tSESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS\nThe information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.","Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, for example, patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey sensitive information.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-12","Session Termination","Technical","Session Termination","(A)\tThe information system automatically terminates a user session after a maximum of 24 hours of inactivity or upon request by the user.","This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination terminates all processes associated with a user’s logical session except those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on information system use. Related controls: SC-10, SC-23","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-14","Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication ","Technical","Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication","(A)\tThe organization identifies user actions that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions.\n(B)\tThe organization documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.","This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no identification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, for example, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received. Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational information systems without identification and authentication and thus, the values for assignment statements can be none. Related controls: CP-2, IA-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access","(A)\tThe organization establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed.\n(B)\tThe organization authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.\n(AA)\tThe organization ensures that all employees working off site safeguard information as per the organization's minimum security requirements (NOTE: Item (AA) is not applicable to CSPs).","Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations often employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity over remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs does not make the access non-remote; however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls (e.g., employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity protection) may provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as internal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs with encrypted tunnels can affect the organizational capability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to information systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations may use interconnection security agreements to authorize remote access connections, such agreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections is addressed in AC-3. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, MA-4, PE-17, PL-4, SC-10, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(1)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Automated Monitoring / Control","\tREMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL\nThe information system monitors and controls remote access methods.","Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows organizations to detect cyber-attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets). Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(2)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Protection of Confidentiality / Integrity using Encryption","\tREMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION\nThe information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. The cryptography must be compliant with the requirements of SC-13.","Guidance on the encryption strength of mechanism can be obtained from CSE upon request. ","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(3)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Managed Access Control Points","\tREMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS\nThe information system routes all remote accesses through approved managed network access control points.","Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses reduces the attack surface for organizations.  Related control: SC-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(4)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Privileged Commands / Access","\tREMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS\n(a)\tThe organization authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only for approved operational requirements; and\n(b)\tThe organization documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.","Related control: AC-6.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(9)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Disconnect / Disable Access","\tREMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS\nThe organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to the information system within a period no greater than 15 minutes.","This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality of missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to organizational information systems.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-17(100)\t","Remote Access ","Technical","Remote Access | Remote Access to Privileged Accounts using Dedicated Management Console","\tRemote access to privileged accounts is performed on dedicated management consoles governed entirely by the system’s security policies and used exclusively for this purpose (e.g. Internet access not allowed).",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-18","Wireless Access","Technical","Wireless Access","(A)\tThe organization establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for wireless access.\n(B)\tThe organization authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.","Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio (UHF/VHF), 802.11, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) / Transport Layer Security (TLS), Protected EAP (PEAP)), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SI-4, SC-9","X","X","X",null,"X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-18(1)\t","Wireless Access","Technical","Wireless Access | Authentication and Encryption","\tWIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION\nThe information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of devices to wireless networks (e.g., Wi-Fi) and users to enterprise services and encryption.","Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.","X","X","X",null,"X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-18(4)\t","Wireless Access","Technical","Wireless Access | Restrict Configurations by Users","\tWIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS\nThe organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure wireless networking capabilities.","Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure wireless networking capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms employed within organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SC-15.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-19","Access Control for Mobile Devices","Technical","Access Control for Mobile Devices","(A)\tThe organization establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices.\n(B)\tThe organization authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.","A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include smart phones, E-readers, and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associated with a single individual and the device is usually in close proximity to the individual; however, the degree of proximity can vary depending upon on the form factor and size of the device. The processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or merely a subset of desktop systems, depending upon the nature and intended purpose of the device. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different technical characteristics and capabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes/types of such devices. Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include, for example, configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, firewall), scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). Organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements in this control. Many safeguards and countermeasures for mobile devices are reflected in other security controls in the catalog allocated in the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some degree of overlap in the requirements articulated by the security controls within the different families of controls. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled. Related controls: AC-3, AC-7, AC-18, AC-20, CA-9, CM-2, IA-2, IA-3, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-4, SC-7, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-20","Use of External Information Systems ","Technical","Use of External Information Systems","(A)\tThe organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information systems, allowing authorized individuals to access the information system from external information systems.\n(B)\tThe organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information systems, allowing authorized individuals to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information systems.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-20(1)\t","Use of External Information Systems ","Technical","Use of External Information Systems | Limits of Authorized Use","\tUSE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE\nThe organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only when the organization:\n(a)\tVerifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization’s information security policy and security plan; or\n(b)\tRetains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external information system.","This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstances where individuals using external information systems (e.g., contractors, partners) need to access organizational information systems. In those situations, organizations need confidence that the external information systems contain the necessary security safeguards (i.e., security controls), so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational information systems. Verification that the required security controls have been implemented can be achieved, for example, by third-party, independent assessments, attestations, or other means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations. Related control: CA-2.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-20(2)\t","Use of External Information Systems ","Technical","Use of External Information Systems | Portable Storage Devices","\tUSE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES\nThe organization restricts unless approval obtained for operational reasons the use of organization-controlled mobile devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.","Limits on the use of organization-controlled mobile devices in external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such devices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-21","User-Based Collaboration and Information Sharing","Technical","Information Sharing","(A)\tThe organization facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine if access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required; and\n(B) The organization employs organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.","This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner (e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, personally identifiable information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program/compartment. Related control: AC-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AC-22","Publicly Accessible Content ","Technical","Publicly Accessible Content","(A)\tThe organization designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system.\n(B)\tThe organization trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain confidentially sensitive information.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that confidentially sensitive information is not included.\n(D)\tThe organization reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for confidentially sensitive information at least quarterly and removes such information, if discovered.","This control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the general public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on non-organization information systems is covered by organizational policy. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AT-2, AT-3, AU-13","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AT-1","Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures ","Operational","Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with security awareness and training responsibilities:\n(a)\tA security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\t Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy and associated security awareness and training controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSecurity awareness and training policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\t Security awareness and training procedures at least annually..","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures. ","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AT-2","Security Awareness","Operational","Security Awareness Training","(A)\tThe organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors):\n(a)\tAs part of initial training for new users;\n(b)\tWhen required by information system changes; and\n(c)At least annually thereafter.","Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to respond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information security awareness events. Related controls: AT-3, AT-4, PL-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AT-2(2)\t","Security Awareness","Operational","Security Awareness Training | Insider Threat","\tSECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT\nThe organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.","Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviours such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources, bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in accordance with established organizational policies and procedures. Related controls: PL-4, PS-3, PS-6.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AT-3","Role Based Security Training","Operational","Role-Based Security Training","(A)\tThe organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities:\n(a)\tBefore authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;\n(b)\tWhen required by information system changes; and\n(c)At least annually thereafter.","Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators, personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel having access to system-level software with adequate security-related technical training specifically tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical security controls. Such training can include, for example, policies, procedures, tools, and artifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizations also provide the training necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and supply chain security within the context of organizational information security programs. Related controls: AT-2, AT-4, PL-4, PS-7, SA-3, SA-12, SA-16","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AT-4","Security Training Records ","Operational","Security Training Records","(A)\tThe organization documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and\n(B)\tThe organization retains individual training records for at least one year.","Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the option of the organization. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-1","Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures ","Technical","Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with audit responsibilities;\n(a)\tAn audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\t Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tAudit and accountability policy at least every three years; and\n(b)\tAudit and accountability procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-2","Auditable Events ","Technical","Audit Events","(A)\tThe organization determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events: Successful and unsuccessful account logon events, account management events, object access, policy change, privilege functions, process tracking, and system events.  For Web applications: all administrator activity, authentication checks, authorization checks, data deletions, data access, data changes, and permission changes.\n(B)\tThe organization coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events.\n(C)\tThe organization provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.\n(D)\tThe organization determines what organizationally-defined audited events (a subset of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.) and the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event.","An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. Audit events can include, for example, password changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege usage, or third-party credential usage. In determining the set of auditable events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time. For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability to log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements, including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and control enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Audit records can be generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and can facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations consider in the definition of auditable events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed, transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) and actions that occur in service-oriented architectures. \nThe information system audits the following privileged user/process events at a minimum: \n(a) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete security objects (Security objects include audit data, system configuration files and file or users’ formal access permissions.) \n(b) Successful and unsuccessful logon attempts\n(c) Privileged activities or other system level access (see notes for AU-2 (4))\n(d) Starting and ending time for user access to the system\n(e) Concurrent logons from different workstations\n(f) All program initiations  (see notes for AU-2 (4))\nIn addition, the information system audits the following unprivileged user/process events at a minimum:\n(a) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete security objects\n(b) Successful and unsuccessful logon attempts\n(c) Starting and ending time for user access to the system\n(d) Concurrent logons from different workstations\nRelated controls: AC-6, AC-17, AU-3, AU-12, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-2(3)\t","Auditable Events ","Technical","Audit Events | Reviews and Updates","\tAUDIT EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES\nThe organization reviews and updates the audited events annually or whenever there is a change in the threat environment.","Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited may change. Reviewing and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensure that the current set is still necessary and sufficient.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-3","Content of Audit Records","Technical","Content of Audit Records","(A)\tThe information system generates audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the event.","Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-3(1)\t","Content of Audit Records","Technical","Content of Audit Records | Additional Audit Information","\tCONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION\nThe information system generates audit records containing the following additional information: session, connection, transaction, or activity duration; for client-server transactions, the number of bytes received and bytes sent; additional informational messages to diagnose or identify the event; characteristics that describe or identify the object or resource being acted upon.","Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use of audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.\nAdditional guidance for enhancement (1): Audit events should always be capable of being associated with an individual identity. Associating audit events with a group or role is insufficient.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-4","Audit Storage Capacity ","Technical","Audit Storage Capacity","(A)\tThe organization allocates audit record storage capacity [required to implement AU-11].","Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss or reduction of auditing capability. Related controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-11, SI-4",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-5","Response To Audit Processing Failures ","Technical","Response to Audit Processing Failures","(A) The information system alerts organization-defined personnel or roles in the event of an audit processing failure; and\n(B) The information system overwrites the oldest audit records.","Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g., by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories combined), or both. Related controls: AU-4, SI-12","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-6","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting ","Technical","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting","(A)\tThe organization reviews and analyzes information system audit records at least every 7 days for indications of compromise identified in SI-4(5).\n(B)\tThe organization reports findings to organization-defined personnel or roles.","Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers information security-related auditing performed by organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoring of account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance, physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Findings can be reported to organizational entities that include, for example, incident response team, help desk, information security group. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and analyzing audit information or unable to conduct such activities (e.g., in certain national security applications or systems), the review/analysis may be carried out by other organizations granted such authority. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AT-3, AU-7, AU-16, CA-7, CM-5, CM-10, CM-11, IA-3, IA-5, IR-5, IR-6, MA-4, MP-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, RA-5, SC-7, SC-18, SC-19, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-6(1)\t","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting ","Technical","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Process Integration","\tAUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATION\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities.","Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review, analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring, and contingency planning. Related control: AU-12.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-6(3)\t","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting ","Technical","Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Correlate Audit Repositories","\tAUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT REPOSITORIES\nThe organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gain organization-wide situational awareness.","Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information system) and supports cross-organization awareness. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-7","Audit Reduction and Report Generation ","Technical","Audit Reduction and Report Generation","(A)\tThe information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.\n(B)\tThe information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.","Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same information system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. Audit reduction capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to identify anomalous behaviour in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the information system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be a significant issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient. Related control: AU-6","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-7(1)\t","Audit Reduction and Report Generation ","Technical","Audit Reduction and Report Generation | Automatic Processing","\tAUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING\nThe information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on all audit fields specified in AU-2, AU-3 and AU-3(1).","Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations, event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or sub-network) or selectable by specific information system component. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-8","Time Stamps ","Technical","Time Stamps","(A)\tThe information system uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records.\n(B)\tThe information system records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) within 1 second precision.","Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time. Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and reference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or within tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different system components. Time service can also be critical to other security capabilities such as access control and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support those capabilities. Related controls: AU-3, AU-12","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-8(1)\t","Time Stamps ","Technical","Time Stamps | Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source","\tTIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE\n(a)\tThe information system compares the internal information system clocks at least every 24 hours with an organization-defined authoritative time source; and\n(b)\tThe information system synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than 1 millisecond.","This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-9","Protection of Audit Information ","Technical","Protection of Audit Information","(A)\tThe information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.","Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information is addressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-9(2)\t","Protection of Audit Information ","Technical","Protection of Audit Information | Audit Backup on Separate Physical Systems / Components","\tPROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS\nThe information system backs up audit records at least weekly onto a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.","This control enhancement helps to ensure that a compromise of the information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-11.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-9(4)\t","Protection of Audit Information ","Technical","Protection of Audit Information | Access by Subset of Privileged Users","\tPROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS\nThe organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only an organization-defined subset of privileged users.","Individuals with privileged access to an information system and who are also the subject of an audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requires that privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges, thus limiting the users with audit-related privileges. Related control: AC-5.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-11","Audit Record Retention","Technical","Audit Record Retention","(A) The CSP retains audit records for at least 90 days to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.\n(B) The client retains audit records and logs for at least 3 months online and at least 6 months in storage.\n(C) The client retains all audit records and logs associated with a security incident for at least 5 years.\n","Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to legal requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of action. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, MP-6","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["AU-12","Audit Generation","Technical","Audit Generation","(A)\tThe information system provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. of all information system and network components where audit capability is deployed/available.\n(B)\tThe information system allows organization-defined personnel or roles to select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system.\n(C)\tThe information system generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d. with the content defined in AU-3.","Audit records can be generated from many different information system components. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of generating audit records. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-1","Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and Procedures","Management","Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to all personnel or roles with security assessment responsibilities:\n(a)\tA security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSecurity assessment and authorization policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tSecurity assessment and authorization procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policies and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family. The security assessment and authorization policies and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policies and procedures.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-2","Security Assessments ","Management","Security Assessments","(A)\tThe organization develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:\n(a)\tSecurity controls and control enhancements under assessment;\n(b)\tAssessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and\n(c)\tAssessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities.\n(B)\tThe organization assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation at least annually to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements.\n(C)\tThe organization produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment.\n(D)\tThe organization provides the results of the security control assessment to organization-defined individuals or roles.","Organizations assess security controls in organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoing security authorizations; (ii) policy requirement for periodic assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv) system development life cycle activities. security assessments: (i) ensure that information security is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early in the development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation procedures. Organizations can several types of assessment activities such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring to maintain the security posture of information systems during the entire life cycle. Security assessment reports document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether the security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security control requirements. Security assessment results are provided to the individuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example, assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing officials. Organizations ensure that security assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, and obtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented with additional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations, organizations assess security controls periodically during continuous monitoring. Organizations establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational continuous monitoring strategies. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control. Related controls: CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-2(1)\t","Security Assessments ","Management","Security Assessments | Independent Assessors","\tSECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS\nThe organization employs assessors or assessment teams with an external independent organization to conduct security control assessments.","Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems under assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions of advocacy for the organizations acquiring their services. Independent assessments can be obtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to entities outside of the organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations, for example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliability of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than direct support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions, thereby reducing the need to repeat assessments.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-2(2)\t","Security Assessments ","Management","Security Assessments | Specialized Assessments","\tSECURITY ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS\nThe organization includes as part of security control assessments that they will be announced and done at least annually and include at least vulnerability scanning and penetration testing.","Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification and validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment methods in coordination with the organizational risk management strategy. Organizations can incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation processes. Related controls: PE-3, SI-2.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-2(3)\t","Security Assessments ","Management","Security Assessments | External Organizations","\tSECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS\nThe CSP accepts the results of an assessment of the CSP's information system within the scope of the cloud services provided excluding tenant components performed by an external, independent organization when the assessment meets all applicable requirements.","Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities that organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with regard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or mandates imposed upon organizations by organizational policies, directives, and standards.","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-3","Information System Connections ","Management","System Interconnections","(a)The organization authorizes connection from information system to other information system through the use of interconnection Security Agreements. \n(b) The organization documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated.\n(c) The organization reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements annually.","This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems (i.e., system interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such as email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced when information systems are connected to other systems with different security control requirements and security controls, both within organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with information system connections and the appropriate controls employed. If interconnecting systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do not need to develop Interconnection Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the interface characteristics between those interconnecting systems in their respective security plans. If interconnecting systems have different authorizing officials within the same organization, organizations can either develop Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface characteristics between systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations may also incorporate Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical devices), there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such connections may require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional security controls. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-20, AU-2, AU-12, AU-16, CA-7, IA-3, SA-9, SC-7, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-3(3)\t","Information System Connections ","Management","System Interconnections | Classified Non-National Security System Connections","\tSYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS\nThe organization prohibits the direct connection of any internal network or system to an external network without the use of security controls approved by the information owner.","Organizations typically do not have control over external networks (e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified non-national security systems and external networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing, or transmitting sensitive Information.","X","X","X",null,"X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-3(5)\t","Information System Connections ","Management","System Interconnections | Restrictions on External Network Connections","\tSYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS\nThe organization employs allow-all, deny-by-exception; deny-all policy for allowing any systems to connect to external information systems.","Organizations can constrain information system connectivity to external domains (e.g., websites) by employing one of two policies with regard to such connectivity: (i) allow-all, deny by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of the two policies); or (ii) deny-all, allow by exception, also known as whitelisting (the stronger of the two policies). For either policy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, are acceptable. Related control: CM-7.","X","X","X",null,"X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-5","Plan of Action and Milestones","Management","Plan of Action and Milestones","(A)\tThe organization develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the organization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system; and\n(B)\tThe organization updates existing plan of action and milestones at least monthly based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring activities.","Plans of action and milestones are key sections of the operations security plan, which is are key documents in the security authorization packages and may be subject to organizational reporting. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-6","Security Authorization ","Management","Security Authorization","(A)\tThe organization assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information system.\n(B)\tThe organization ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before commencing operations.\n(C)\tThe organization updates the security authorization at least every three years or when a significant change occurs.","Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals and other organizations based on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business operations supported by those systems. Through the security authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding and accepting such information security-related risks. Organizations should conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring programs. Through the employment of comprehensive continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e., security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-date status of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation. To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering reauthorization decisions. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-7","Continuous Monitoring ","Management","Continuous Monitoring","(A)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes establishment of organization-defined metrics to be monitored.\n(B)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes establishment of at least monthly monitoring and assessments of at least operating system scans, database, and web application scan.\n(C)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.\n(D)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.\n(E)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and monitoring.\n(F)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information.\n(G)\tThe organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes reporting the security status of organization and the information system to organization-defined personnel or roles at organization-defined frequency.","Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and information security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a continuing basis through reports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to make more effective and timely risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware inventories, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-2, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-7(1)\t","Continuous Monitoring ","Management","Continuous Monitoring | Independent Assessment","\tCONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT\nThe organization employs assessors or assessment teams with full independence from the organizational unit responsible for day to day security operations to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.","Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based on continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their services.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-8","Penetration Testing ","Management","Penetration  Testing","(A)\tThe organization conducts penetration testing at least annually on organization-defined information systems or system components.","Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on information systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or determine the degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries within a set of specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing attempts to duplicate the actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber-attacks against organizations and provides a more in-depth analysis of security-related weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations can also use the results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system and can exercise both physical and technical security controls. A standard method for penetration testing includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest identification of potential vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed to determine exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement before the commencement of penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration testing rules of engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be employed by adversaries carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing. Related control: SA-12","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-8(1)\t","Penetration Testing ","Management","Penetration  Testing | Independent Penetration Testing Agent for Team","\tPENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION AGENT OR TEAM\nThe organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to perform penetration testing on the information system or system components.","Independent penetration agents or teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that penetration agents or teams are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the information systems that are the targets of the penetration testing. Supplemental guidance for CA-2 (1) provides additional information regarding independent assessments that can be applied to penetration testing. Related control: CA-2.","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CA-9","Internal System Connections ","Management","Internal System Connections","(A)\tThe organization authorizes internal connections of information system components or classes of components to the information system.\n(B)\tThe organization documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated.","This control applies to connections between organizational information systems and (separate) constituent system components (i.e., intra-system connections) including, for example, system connections with mobile devices, notebook/desktop computers, printers, copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each individual internal connection, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of components with common characteristics and/or configurations, for example, all digital printers, scanners, and copiers with a specified processing, storage, and transmission capability or all smart phones with a specific baseline configuration. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-18, AC-19, AU-2, AU-12, CA-7, CM-2, IA-3, SC-7, SI-4","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-1","Configuration Management Policy and Procedures ","Operational","Configuration Management Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with configuration management responsibilities:\n(a)\tA configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and associated configuration management controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tConfiguration management policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tConfiguration management procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general (or the IT program) and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-2","Baseline Configuration ","Operational","Baseline Configuration","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the information system.","This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems and system components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems. Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed-upon sets of specifications for information systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations serve as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information systems. Baseline configurations include information about information system components (e.g., standard software packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile devices; current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications; and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those components within the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating new baselines as organizational information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture. \nA baseline configuration should include all current patches for the operating system and applications installed. The baseline should also deactivate all unused ports, services and software and use an hardened configuration (e.g., guest accounts deactivated, access control to all system files and directories applied, default passwords changed)\nRelated controls: CM-3, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, SA-10.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-2(1)\t","Baseline Configuration ","Operational","Baseline Configuration | Reviews and Updates","BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES\nThe organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system:\n(a)at least annually; or\n(b) When required due to significant changes as defined in NIST SP 800-37 rev1; and\n(c) As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.\n","Related control: CM-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-2(2)\t","Baseline Configuration ","Operational","Baseline Configuration | Automation Support for Accuracy / Currency","\tBASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available baseline configuration of the information system.","Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers, network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patch levels. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-8 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities. Related controls: CM-7, RA-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-2(3)\t","Baseline Configuration ","Operational","Baseline Configuration | Retention of Previous  Configurations","\tBASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONS\nThe organization retains the two most recent precious versions of baseline configurations of the information system to support rollback.","Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, and configuration records.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-2(7)\t","Baseline Configuration ","Operational","Baseline Configuration | Configure Systems, Components, or Devices for High-Risk Areas","\tBASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS\n(a)\tThe organization issue organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices with organization-defined configurations to individuals traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and\n(b)\tThe organization applies organization-defined security safeguards to the devices when the individuals return.","When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. For example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals departing on and returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations are of concern, defining required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the device after travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, for example, computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening (e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices upon return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physical tampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on mobile devices is covered in the media protection family.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-3","Configuration Change Control ","Operational","Configuration Change Control","(A)\tThe organization determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses.\n(C)\tThe organization documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system.\n(D)\tThe organization implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system.\n(E)\tThe organization retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for at least 90 days.\n(F)\tThe organization audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system.\n(G)\tThe organization coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through a central communication process that includes organizational governance bodies that convenes at least annually.","Configuration change controls for organizational information systems involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorized changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve proposed changes to systems. For new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations on the Configuration Control Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are made to organizational information systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes. Related controls: CA-7, CM-2, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-9, SA-10, SI-2, SI-12","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-3(4)\t","Configuration Change Control ","Operational","Configuration Change Control | Security Representative","\tCONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE\nThe organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the organization-defined configuration change control element.","Information security representatives can include, for example, senior agency information security officers, information system security officers, or information system security managers. Representation by personnel with information security expertise is important because changes to information system configurations can have unintended side effects, some of which may be security-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security state of organizational information systems. The configuration change control element in this control enhancement reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-3(6)\t","Configuration Change Control ","Operational","Configuration Change Control | Cryptography Management","\tCONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENT\nThe organization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide any cryptographic-based safeguards are under configuration management.","Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key, private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures in place to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expiration of those certificates. Related control: SC-13.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-4","Security Impact Analysis","Operational","Security Impact Analysis","(A)\tThe organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.","Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses. Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security categories of the information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-9, SA-4, SA-5, SA-10, SI-2","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-5","Access Restrictions for Change ","Operational","Access Restrictions for Change","(A)\tThe organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.","Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems. Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Organizations maintain records of access to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes. Access restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example, physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries, abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times, making unauthorized changes easy to discover). Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-5(1)\t","Access Restrictions for Change ","Operational","Access Restrictions for Change | Automated Access Enforcement / Auditing","\tACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING\nThe information system enforces access restrictions and supports auditing of the enforcement actions.","Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, AU-6, CM-3, and CM-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-5(5)\t","Access Restrictions for Change ","Operational","Access Restrictions for Change | Limit Production / Operational Privileges","\tACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION / OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES\n(a)\tThe organization limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment; and\n(b)\tThe organization reviews and re-evaluates privileges at least quarterly.","In many organizations, information systems support multiple core missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a particular information system component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by the system where the component resides. The complex, many-to-many relationships between systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers. Related control: AC-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-5(6)\t","Access Restrictions for Change ","Operational","Access Restrictions for Change | Limit Library Privileges","\tACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES\nThe organization limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries.","Software libraries include privileged programs. Related control: AC-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-6","Configuration Settings ","Operational","Configuration Settings","(A)\tThe organization establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using checklists from one or more of the following \nCenter for Internet Security (CIS), National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements.\n(B)\tThe organization implements the configuration settings.\n(C)\tThe organization identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for any configurable information system components.\n(D)\tThe organization monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.","Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security posture and/or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which security-related configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframe computers, servers (e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations, input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameters impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) registry settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports, protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The established settings become part of the systems configuration baselineCommon secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown and hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides (STIG)) provide recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal government organizations, and others in the public and private sectors. The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration) provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. Related controls: AC-19, CM-2, CM-3, CM-7, SI-4.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-6(1)\t","Configuration Settings ","Operational","Configuration Settings | Automated Central Management / Application / Verification","\tCONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT / APPLICATION / VERIFICATION\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings for organization-defined information system components.","Related controls: CA-7, CM-4.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-6(2)\t","Configuration Settings ","Operational","Configuration Settings | Respond to Unauthorized Changes","\tCONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES\nThe organization employs organization-defined security safeguards to respond to unauthorized changes to organization-defined configuration settings.","Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing. Related controls: IR-4, SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-7","Least Functionality","Operational","Least Functionality","(A)\tThe organization configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities.\n(B)\tThe organization prohibits or restricts the use of identified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services following one or more standards from Center for Internet Security (CIS), National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST), or Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).","Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but not both). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individual components of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates for elimination (e.g., Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing). Organizations consider disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g., USB, FTP, IPv6, HTTP) on information systems to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunnelling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services. Related controls: AC-6, CM-2, RA-5, SA-5, SC-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-7(1)\t","Least Functionality","Operational","Least Functionality | Periodic Review","\tLEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW\nThe organization reviews the information system at least annually to identify unnecessary and/or non-secure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and\nThe organization disables all functions, ports, protocols, and services within the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or nonsecure.","The organization can either make a determination of the relative security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the assessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples of less than secure protocols. Related controls: AC-18, CM-7, IA-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-7(5)\t","Least Functionality","Operational","Least Functionality | Authorized Software / Whitelisting","\tLEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING\n(a)\tThe organization identifies authorized software programs in baseline configuration and information system component inventory;\n(b)\tThe organization employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system; and\n(c)\tThe organization reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs at least annually or when there is a change.","The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. In addition to whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software programs using, for example, cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or hash functions. Verification of white-listed software can occur either prior to execution or at system start-up. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, CM-8, SA-10, SC-34, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-8","Information System Component Inventory ","Operational","Information System Component Inventory","(A)\tThe organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that accurately reflects the current information system.\n(B)\tThe organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system.\n(C)\tThe organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting.\n(D)\tThe organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that includes unique asset identifier, NetBIOS name, baseline configuration name, OS Name, OS Version, system owner information.\n(E)\tThe organization reviews and updates the information system component inventory at least monthly.","Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system component inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. In such situations, organizations ensure that the resulting inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability (e.g., information system association, information system owner). Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of information system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications, software license information, software version numbers, component owners, and for networked components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-8(1)\t","Information System Component Inventory ","Operational","Information System Component Inventory | Updates During Installations  / Removals","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS\nThe organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and information system updates.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-8(2)\t","Information System Component Inventory ","Operational","Information System Component Inventory | Automated Maintenance","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.","Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-2 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities. Related control: SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-8(3)\t","Information System Component Inventory ","Operational","Information System Component Inventory | Automated Unauthorized Component Detection","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION\n(a)\tThe organization employs automated mechanisms continuously, using automated mechanisms with a maximum five-minute delay in detection to detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within the information system; and\n(b)\tThe organization takes the organization-defined actions when unauthorized components are detected such as disables network access by such components; isolates the components; notifies organization-defined personnel or roles.","This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems or in other separate devices. Isolation can be achieved, for example, by placing unauthorized information system components in separate domains or subnets or otherwise quarantining such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, RA-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-8(5)\t","Information System Component Inventory ","Operational","Information System Component Inventory | No Duplicate Accounting of Components","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATE ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS\nThe organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information system are not duplicated in other information system component inventories.","This control enhancement addresses the potential problem of duplicate accounting of information system components in large or complex interconnected systems.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-9","Configuration Management Plan ","Operational","Configuration Management Plan","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures.\n(B)\tThe organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items.\n(C)\tThe organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items under configuration management; and\n(D)\tThe organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","Configuration management plans satisfy the requirements in configuration management policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system development life cycle activities at the information system level. Configuration management plans are typically developed during the development/acquisition phase of the system development life cycle. The plans describe how to move changes through change management processes, how to update configuration settings and baselines, how to maintain information system component inventories, how to control development, test, and operational environments, and how to develop, release, and update key documents. Organizations can employ templates to help ensure consistent and timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Such templates can represent a master configuration management plan for the organization at large with subsets of the plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes include designation of key management stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct security impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the information system items (hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) to be configuration-managed. As information systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control. Related controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, SA-10","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-10","Software Usage Restrictions ","Operational","Software Usage Restrictions","(A)\tThe organization uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and copyright laws.\n(B)\tThe organization tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses to control copying and distribution.\n(C)\tThe organization controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.","Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g., simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending on organizational needs. Related controls: AC-17, CM-8, SC-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-10(1)\t","Software Usage Restrictions ","Operational","Software Usage Restrictions | Open Source Software","\tSOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE\nThe organization establishes organization-defined restrictions on the use of open source software.","Open source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that it provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. However, there are also various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, the constraints on derivative use of such software.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CM-11","User Installed Software ","Operational","User-Installed Software","(A)\tThe organization establishes organization-defined policies governing the installation of software by users.\n(B)\tThe organization enforces software installation policies through  organization-defined methods.\n(C)\tThe organization monitors policy compliance continuously via 7(5).","If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing software and downloading applications from organization-approved “app stores.” Prohibited software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious. The policies organizations select governing user-installed software may be organization-developed or provided by some external entity. Policy enforcement methods include procedural methods (e.g., periodic examination of user accounts), automated methods (e.g., configuration settings implemented on organizational information systems), or both. Related controls: AC-3, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-4","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-1","Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures","Operational","Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures","(A) The organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with contingency planning responsibilities:\n(a) A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b) Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and associated contingency planning controls.\n(B) The organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a) Contingency planning policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b) Contingency planning procedures at least annually.\n(AA) The organization develops an audit cycle for the contingency plan program as the basis of regular reporting.\n","This control is intended to produce the policy and procedures that are required for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the contingency planning family. The contingency planning policy and procedures are consistent with organizational policies, directive, and standards. Existing organizational policies and procedures may make additional specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The contingency planning policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for the organization. Contingency planning procedures can be developed for the security program in general and for a particular information system, when required. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in the development of the contingency planning policy.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan","(A)\tThe organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that:\n(a)\tIdentifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements;\n(b)\tProvides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;\n(c)\tAddresses contingency roles, responsibilities, and assigned individuals with contact information;\n(d)\tAddresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure; \n(e)\tAddresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and\n(f)\tIs reviewed and approved by organization-defined personnel or roles.\n(B)\tThe organization distributes copies of the contingency plan to key personnel or roles and organizational elements identified in the contingency plan.\n(C)\tThe organization coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities.\n(D)\tThe organization reviews the contingency plan for the information system at least annually.\n(E)\tThe organization updates the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing.\n(F)\tThe organization communicates contingency plan changes to key personnel or roles and organizational elements identified in the contingency plan.\n(G)\tThe organization protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business functions. Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness of contingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of the system development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, and firmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency. Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of operations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. In addition to information system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a reduction in mission and/or business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising the confidentiality or integrity of information systems. Actions addressed in contingency plans include, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fallback to a manual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved for when systems are under attack. By closely coordinating contingency planning with incident handling activities, organizations can ensure that the necessary contingency planning activities are in place and activated in the event of a security incident. Related controls: AC-14, CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(1)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Coordinate with Related Plans","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS\nThe organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements responsible for related plans.","Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plan, and Occupant Emergency Plans.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(2)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Capacity Planning","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING\nThe organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency operations.","Capacity planning is needed because different types of threats (e.g., natural disasters, targeted cyber-attacks) can result in a reduction of the available processing, telecommunications, and support services originally intended to support the organizational missions/business functions. Organizations may need to anticipate degraded operations during contingency operations and factor such degradation into capacity planning.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(3)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Resume Essential Missions / Business Functions","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS\nThe organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within 24 hours of contingency plan activation.","Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of essential missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the information system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(4)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Resume All Missions / Business Functions","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS\nThe organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within organization-defined time period of contingency plan activation.","Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of all missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the information system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(5)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Continue Essential Missions / Business Functions","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS\nThe organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.","Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites). Related control: PE-12.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(6)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Alternate Processing / Storage Site","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE\nThe organization plans for the transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate processing and/or storage sites with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity through information system restoration to primary processing and/or storage sites.","Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites). Related control: PE-12.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-2(8)\t","Contingency Plan ","Operational","Contingency Plan | Identify Critical Assets","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS\nThe organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions and business functions.","Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed (above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to help ensure that organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information technology services, information system components, information technology products, and mechanisms. Operational aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed operations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in identifying critical assets. Related controls: SA-14, SA-15.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-3","Contingency Training","Operational","Contingency Training","(A)\tThe organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities within 10 days of assuming a contingency role or responsibility.\n(B)\tThe organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities when required by information system changes.\n(C)\tThe organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities at least annually.","Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected; system administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems at alternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specific training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish communications with other entities for purposes of coordination on contingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific continuity requirements in the contingency plan. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-2, IR-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-4","Contingency Plan Testing and Exercises","Operational","Contingency Plan Testing","(A)\tThe organization tests the contingency plan for the information system at least annually for moderate impact systems; at least every three years for low impact systems using organization-defined tests to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews the contingency plan test results.\n(C)\tThe organization initiates corrective actions, if needed.","Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and tabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective actions. Related controls: CP-2, CP-3, IR-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-4(1)\t","Contingency Plan Testing and Exercises","Operational","Contingency Plan Testing | Coordinate with Related Plans","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS\nThe organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.","Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Business Recovery Plans, Incident Response Plans, and Emergency Action Plans. This control enhancement does not require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such elements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements are responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements. Related control: IR-8.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-4(2)\t","Contingency Plan Testing and Exercises","Operational","Contingency Plan Testing | Alternate Processing Site","\tCONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE\n(a)\tThe organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site to familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and\n(b)\tThe organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site to evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency operations.","Related control: CP-7.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-6","Alternate Storage Site ","Operational","Alternate Storage Site","(A)\tThe organization establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and retrieval of information system backup information.\n(B)\tThe organization ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.","Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary storage sites. An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and data in the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7, CP-9, CP-10, MP-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-6(1)\t","Alternate Storage Site ","Operational","Alternate Storage Site | Separation from Primary Site","\tALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE\nThe organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.","Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber-attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber-attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control: RA-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-6(2)\t","Alternate Storage Site ","Operational","Alternate Storage Site | Recovery Times / Point Objectives","\tALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES\nThe organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives. ",null,"X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-6(3)\t","Alternate Storage Site ","Operational","Alternate Storage Site | Accessibility","\tALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY\nThe organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.","Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is disrupted. Related control: RA-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-7","Alternate Processing Site","Operational","Alternative Processing Site","(A)\tThe organization establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential missions/business functions within organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.\n(B)\tThe organization ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption.\n(C)\tThe organization ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.","Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary processing sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the event that the primary processing site is not available. Items covered by alternate processing site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect the requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MA-6","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-7(1)\t","Alternate Processing Site","Operational","Alternative Processing Site | Separation from Primary Site","\tALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE\nThe organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.","Threats that affect alternate processing sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber-attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber-attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control: RA-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-7(2)\t","Alternate Processing Site","Operational","Alternative Processing Site | Accessibility","\tALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY\nThe organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.","Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Related control: RA-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-7(3)\t","Alternate Processing Site","Operational","Alternative Processing Site | Priority of Service","\tALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE\nThe organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).","Priority-of-service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with service providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their availability requirements and the availability of information resources at the alternate processing site.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-7(4)\t","Alternate Processing Site","Operational","Alternative Processing Site | Preparation for Use","\tALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE\nThe organization prepares the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as the operational site supporting essential missions and business functions.","Site preparation includes, for example, establishing configuration settings for information system components at the alternate processing site consistent with the requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and other logistical considerations are in place. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-8","Telecommunications Services ","Operational","Telecommunications Services","(A)\tThe organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of all information system operations covered by the contingency plan (CP-2) for essential missions and business functions within the recovery time objectives specified in the service agreement when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.","This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for primary and alternate processing and storage sites. Alternate telecommunications services reflect the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time periods for primary/alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example, additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of ground-based communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, CP-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-8(1)\t","Telecommunications Services ","Operational","Telecommunications Services | Priority of Service Provisions","\tTELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS\n(a)\tThe organization develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives); and\n(b)\tThe organization requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.","Organizations consider the potential mission/business impact in situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with similar priority-of-service provisions.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-8(2)\t","Telecommunications Services ","Operational","Telecommunications Services | Single Points of Failure","\tTELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE\nThe organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services. ",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-8(3)\t","Telecommunications Services ","Operational","Telecommunications Services | Separation of Primary / Alternate Providers","\tTELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS\nThe organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.","Threats that affect telecommunications services are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services meeting the separation needs addressed in the risk assessment.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-8(5)\t","Telecommunications Services ","Operational","Telecommunications Services | Alternate Telecommunication Service Testing","\tTELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING\nThe organization tests alternate telecommunication services at least annually.",null,"X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup","(A)\tThe organization conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system daily incremental; weekly full.\n(B)\tThe organization conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system daily incremental; weekly full.\n(C)\tThe organization conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related documentation daily incremental; weekly full.\n(D)\tThe organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage locations.\n(AA)\tThe organization determines retention periods for essential business information and archived backups.","System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the scope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up information. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, MP-4, MP-5, SC-13","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9(1)\t","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup | Testing for Reliability / Integrity","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY\nThe organization tests backup information at least annually to verify media reliability and information integrity.","Related control: CP-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9(2)\t","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup | Test Restoration using Sampling","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING\nThe organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information system functions as part of contingency plan testing.","Related control: CP-4.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9(3)\t","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup | Separate Storage for Critical Information","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION\nThe organization stores backup copies of all operating system and critical software code in a separate facility or in a fire-rated container that is not collocated with the operational system.","Critical information system software includes, for example, operating systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems. Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware, software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites typically serve as separate storage facilities for organizations. Related controls: CM-2, CM-8.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9(5)\t","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup | Transfer to Alternate Storage Site","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE\nThe organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site at organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time and recovery point objectives.","Information system backup information can be transferred to alternate storage sites either electronically or by physical shipment of storage media.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-9(7)\t","Information System Backup","Operational","Information System Backup | Dual Authorization","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATION\nThe organization enforces dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of organization-defined backup information.","Dual authorization ensures that the deletion or destruction of backup information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals deleting/destroying backup information possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the proposed deletion/destruction of backup information reflects organizational policies and procedures. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-10","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution","Operational","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution","(A)\tThe organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.","Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities to restore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states. Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/time and reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare the systems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures. Related controls: CA-2, CA-6, CA-7, CP-2, CP-4, CP-6, CP-7, CP-9, SC-24","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-10(2)\t","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution","Operational","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution | Transaction Recovery","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERY\nThe information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.","Transaction-based information systems include, for example, database management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction recovery include, for example, transaction rollback and transaction journaling.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["CP-10(4)\t","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution","Operational","Information System Recovery and Reconstitution | Restore within Time Period","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD\nThe organization provides the capability to restore information system components within organization-defined restoration time-periods from configuration-controlled and integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.","Restoration of information system components includes, for example, re-imaging which restores components to known, operational states. Related control: CM-2.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-1","Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures ","Technical","Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization Develops, documents, and disseminates to all personnel:\n(a)\tAn identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls.\n(B)\tThe organization Reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tIdentification and authentication policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tIdentification and authentication procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures. ","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)","(A)\tThe information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of organizational users).","Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations deem to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are explicitly identified and documented in AC-14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts (e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case of multifactor authentication, or some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems is defined as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is obtained by direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type of network access that involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Internal networks include local area networks and wide area networks. In addition, the use of encrypted VPNs for network connections between organization-controlled endpoints and non-organization controlled endpoints may be treated as internal networks from the perspective of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information traversing the network. Multifactor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The factors are defined as: (i) something you know (e.g., password, personal identification number [PIN]); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric). Multifactor solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and identity smart cards. In addition to identifying and authenticating users at the information system level (i.e., at logon), organizations also employ identification and authentication mechanisms at the application level, when necessary, to provide increased information security. Identification and authentication requirements for other than organizational users are described in IA-8. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(1)\t","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Network Access to Privileged Accounts","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS\nThe information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged accounts.","Related control: AC-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(3)\t","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Local Access to Privileged Accounts","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS\nThe information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged accounts.","Related control: AC-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(6)\t","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Network Access to Privileged Accounts - Separate Device","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE\nThe information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access and the device meets the requirements identified in CCCS ITSP.30.031.","Related control: AC-6.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(8)\t","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Network Access to Privileged Accounts - Replay Resistant","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT\nThe information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged accounts.","Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(9)","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Network Access to Non-Privileged Accounts - Replay Resistant","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT\nThe information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to non-privileged accounts.","Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators.",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-2(11)\t","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Remote Access  - Separate Device","\tIDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | REMOTE ACCESS - SEPARATE DEVICE\nThe information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system being accessed and the device meets the requirements in CCCS's ITSP.30.031.","For remote access to privileged/non-privileged accounts, the purpose of requiring a device that is separate from the information system being accessed as one of the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising authentication credentials stored on the system. For example, adversaries deploying malicious code on organizational information systems can potentially compromise such credentials resident on the system and subsequently impersonate authorized users. Related control: AC-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-3","Device Identification and Authentication ","Technical","Device Identification and Authentication","(A)\tThe information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organization-defined specific and/or types of devices before establishing network connections.","Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and authentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and EAP, Radius server with EAP-TLS authentication, Kerberos) to identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems. Because of the challenges of applying this control on large scale, organizations are encouraged to only apply the control to those limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support this capability. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-3, IA-4, IA-5","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-4","Identifier Management ","Technical","Identifier Management","(A)\tThe organization manages information system identifiers by receiving authorization from organization-defined personnel or roles to assign an individual, group, role, or device identifier.\n(B)\tThe organization manages information system identifiers by selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device.\n(C)\tThe organization manages information system identifiers by assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device.\n(D)\tThe organization manages information system identifiers by preventing reuse of identifiers for at least two years.\n(E)\tThe organization manages information system identifiers by disabling the identifier after 90 days for user identifiers.","Common device identifiers include, for example, MAC, IP addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used in physical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices. Related controls: AC-2, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, SC-37","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-4(2)\t","Identifier Management ","Technical","Identifier Management | Supervisor Authorization","\tIDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION\nThe organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier includes supervisor authorization.",null,"X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-4(3)\t","Identifier Management ","Technical","Identifier Management | Multiple Forms of Certification","\tIDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION\nThe organization requires multiple forms of certification of individual identification such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics be presented to the registration authority.","Requiring multiple forms of identification reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent identification to establish an identity, or at least increases the work factor of potential adversaries.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-4(4)\t","Identifier Management ","Technical","Identifier Management | Identify User Status","\tIDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS\nThe organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as employee, integrees, foreign nationals, or contractors.","Characteristics identifying the status of individuals include, for example, contractors and foreign nationals. Identifying the status of individuals by specific characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful to know that one of the individuals on an email message is from an external organization. Related control: AT-2.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management","(A) The organization manages information system authenticators by verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, or device receiving the authenticator.\n(B) The organization manages information system authenticators by establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization.\n(C) The organization manages information system authenticators by ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use.\n(D) The organization manages information system authenticators by establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators.\n(E) The organization manages information system authenticators by changing the default content of authenticators prior to information system installation.\n(F) The organization manages information system authenticators by establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for authenticators.\n(G) The organization manages information system authenticators by changing/refreshing authenticators in accordance with CCCS’s ITSP.30.031.\n(H) The organization manages information system authenticators by protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.\n(I) The organization manages information system authenticators by requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to protect authenticators.\n(J) The organization manages information system authenticators by changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.\n","Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, biometrics, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for example, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators for temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, for example, certificates and passwords. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-2, IA-4, IA-8, PL-4, PS-5, PS-6, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17, SC-28","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(1)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | Password-Based Authentication"," AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION\n(a) The information system, for password-based authentication, enforces minimum password complexity of case sensitive, minimum of eight characters, and at least one each of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters;\n(b) The information system, for password-based authentication, enforces that at least one of the characters are changed when new passwords are created;\n(c) The information system, for password-based authentication, stores and transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords;\n(d) The information system, for password-based authentication, enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of one-day minimum, sixty-day maximum;\n(e) The information system, for password-based authentication prohibits password reuse for 24 generations; and\n(f) The information system, for password-based authentication allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.\n","This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of individuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner, when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of the requirements in the enhancement. Cryptographically-protected passwords include, for example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect to the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not apply to temporary passwords. To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords, organizations may also consider salting passwords. Related control: IA-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(2)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | PKI-Based Authentication","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION\n(a)\tThe information system, for PKI-based authentication, validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information;\n(b)\tThe information system, for PKI-based authentication, enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;\n(c)\tThe information system, for PKI-based authentication, maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and\n(d)\tThe information system, for PKI-based authentication, implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case of inability to access revocation information via the network.","Status information for certification paths includes, for example, certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. Related control: IA-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(3)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | In-Person or Trusted Third-Party Registration","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATION\nThe organization requires that the registration process to receive be conducted in person before an organization-defined registration authority with authorization by organization-defined personnel or roles.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(4)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | Automated Support for Password Strength Determination","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATION\nThe organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong to satisfy password length, complexity, rotation and lifetime restrictions established by IA-5(1).","This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong passwords and the characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the enforcement of which is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1). Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(6)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | Protection of Authenticators","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS\nThe organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.","For information systems containing multiple security categories of information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of information on the systems.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(7)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | No Embedded Unencrypted Static Authenticators","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORS\nThe organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications or access scripts or stored on function keys.","Organizations exercise caution in determining whether embedded or stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This is irrespective of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else (e.g., a password).","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(8)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | Multiple Information System Accounts","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCOUNTS\nThe organization implements organization-defined security safeguards to manage the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems.","When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems, there is the risk that the compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other accounts if individuals use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example: (i) having different authenticators on all systems; (ii) employing some form of single sign-on mechanism; or (iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-5(11)\t","Authenticator Management ","Technical","Authenticator Management | Hardware Token-Based Authentication","\tAUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION\nThe information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy CCCS's ITSP.30.031 token quality requirements.","Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of PKI-based tokens.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-6","Authenticator Feedback ","Technical","Authenticator Feedback","(A)\tThe information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.","The feedback from information systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may be less significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example, displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for a very limited time before fully obscuring it. Related control: PE-18","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-7","Cryptographic Module Authentication ","Technical","Cryptographic Module Authentication","(A)\tThe information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards for such authentication.","Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-8","Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)","(A)\tThe information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users).","Non-organizational users include information system users other than organizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified and authenticated for accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented in AC-14. Authentication of non-organizational users accessing federal information systems may be required to protect federal, proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems). Organizations use risk assessments to determine authentication needs and consider scalability, practicality, and security in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk. IA-2 addresses identification and authentication requirements for access to information systems by organizational users. Related controls: AC-2, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, RA-3, SA-12, SC-8","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IA-8(100)","Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) ","Technical","Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Identity and Credential Assurance Levels","\tIn accordance with the TBS Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance (including Appendix B and C) [Reference 60], the organization determines the required identity and credential assurance levels and selects appropriate controls using the standardized assurance levels specified in Appendix B, and implements the minimum requirements for establishing an identity assurance level specified in Appendix C.\n","The TBS Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance [Reference 60] establishes requirements for organizations to adopt a common methodology for assessing their identity and credential risks and selecting appropriate controls or arrangements to mitigate those risks using a standardized assurance level framework. The standard is supported by the TBS Guideline on Defining Authentication Requirements [Reference 61] and the TBS Guideline on Identity Assurance [Reference 62]. These guidelines are intended to be used in conjunction with CSE ITSB-31: User Authentication for IT Systems [Reference 18].",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-1","Incident Response Policy and Procedures","Operational","Incident Response Policy and Procedures","(A) The organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with incident management responsibilities:\n(a) An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b) Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated incident response controls.\n(B) The organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a) Incident response policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b) Incident response procedure at least annually.\n(AA) The organization’s incident response policy and procedures facilitate the incorporation of heightened levels of readiness during emergency and heightened IT threat situations.\n","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures. ","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-2","Incident Response Training","Operational","Incident Response Training","(A)\tThe organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities within 30 days of assuming an incident response role or responsibility.\n(B)\tThe organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities when required by information system changes.\n(C)\tThe organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities at least annually.","Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities, both from external and internal sources. Related controls: AT-3, CP-3, IR-8","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-3","Incident Response Testing and Exercises","Operational","Incident Response Testing","(A)\tThe organization tests the incident response capability for the information system at least annually using tests and exercises defined in NIST SP 800-61 to determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.","Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing can also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response. Related controls: CP-4, IR-8","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-3(2)\t","Incident Response Testing and Exercises","Operational","Incident Response Testing | Coordination with Related Plans","\tINCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS\nThe organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.","Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-4","Incident Handling ","Operational","Incident Handling","(A)\tThe organization implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery.\n(B)\tThe organization coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities.\n(C)\tThe organization incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing/exercises, and implements the resulting changes accordingly.","Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems. Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, and reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function). Related controls: AU-6, CM-6, CP-2, CP-4, IR-2, IR-3, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-4(1)\t","Incident Handling ","Operational","Incident Handling | Automated Incident Handling Processes","\tINCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.","Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes include, for example, online incident management systems.","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-4(3)\t","Incident Handling ","Operational","Incident Handling | Continuity of Operations","\tINCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS\nThe organization identifies organization-defined classes of incidents and actions to take in response to classes of incidents to ensure continuation of organizational missions and business functions. ","Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due to design/implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted malicious attacks. Appropriate incident response actions include, for example, graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology whereby the system operates differently, employing deceptive measures, alternate information flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-5","Incident Monitoring","Operational","Incident Monitoring","(A)\tThe organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.","Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example, maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator reports. Related controls: AU-6, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-6","Incident Reporting ","Operational","Incident Reporting","(A)\tThe organization requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident response capability within 2 hours.\n(B)\tThe organization reports security incident information to organization-defined authorities.","The intent of this control is to address specific incident reporting requirements within an organization and their subordinate organizations. Suspected security incidents include, for example, the receipt of suspicious email communications that can potentially contain malicious code. The types of security incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, IR-8","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-6(1)\t","Incident Reporting ","Operational","Incident Reporting | Automated Reporting","\tINCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.","Related control: IR-7.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-7","Incident Response Assistance ","Operational","Incident Response Assistance","(A)\tThe organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of the information system for the handling and reporting of security incidents.","Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required. Related controls: AT-2, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, SA-9","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-7(1)\t","Incident Response Assistance ","Operational","Incident Response Assistance | Automation Support for Availability of Information / Support","\tINCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident response-related information and support.","Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-7(2)\t","Incident Response Assistance ","Operational","Incident Response Assistance | Coordination with External Providers","\tINCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS\n(a)\tThe organization establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability and external providers of information system protection capability; and\n(b)\tThe organization identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers.","External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-8","Incident Response Plan ","Operational","Incident Response Plan","(A)\tThe organization develops an incident response plan that:\n(a)\tProvides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;\n(b)\tDescribes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;\n(c)\tProvides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;\n(d)\tMeets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;\n(e)\tDefines reportable incidents;\n(f)\tProvides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;\n(g)\tDefines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability; and\n(h)\tIs reviewed and approved by organization-defined personnel or roles.\n(B)\tThe organization distributes copies of the incident response plan to all personnel with a role or responsibility for implementing the incident response plan.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews the incident response plan at least annually incorporating lessons from past incidents.\n(D)\tThe organization updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing.\n(E)\tThe organization communicates incident response plan changes to all personnel with a role or responsibility for implementing the incident response plan.\n(F)\tThe organization protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and objectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems. Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, MP-5","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-9","Information Spillage Response","Operational","Information Spillage Response","(A)\tThe organization responds to information spills by identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination.\n(B)\tThe organization responds to information spills by alerting incident response personnel as documented within the Incident Management Plan of the information spill using a method of communication not associated with the spill.\n(C)\tThe organization responds to information spills by isolating the contaminated information system or system component.\n(D)\tThe organization responds to information spills by eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component.\n(E)\tThe organization responds to information spills by identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently contaminated.\n(F)\tThe organization responds to information spills by performing other actions documented within the Incident Management Plan.","Information spillage refers to instances where sensitive information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process such information. Such information spills often occur when information that is initially thought to be of lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to be of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specific nature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) of individuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination is isolated and eradicated","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-9(1)\t","Information Spillage Response","Operational","Information Spillage Response | Responsible Personnel","\tINFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL\nThe organization assigns incident response personnel as documented within the Incident Management Plan with responsibility for responding to information spills.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-9(2)\t","Information Spillage Response","Operational","Information Spillage Response | Training","\tINFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING\nThe organization provides information spillage response training annually.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-9(3)\t","Information Spillage Response","Operational","Information Spillage Response | Post-Spill Operations","\tINFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS\nThe organization implements organization-defined procedures to ensure that organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.","Corrective actions for information systems contaminated due to information spillages may be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct organizational business.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["IR-9(4)\t","Information Spillage Response","Operational","Information Spillage Response | Exposure to Unauthorized Personnel","\tINFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL\nThe organization employs organization-defined security safeguards for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.","Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed to spilled information aware of the organizational policies, directives and standards regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-1","System Maintenance Policy and Procedures","Operational","System Maintenance Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to all personnel:\n(a)\tA system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy and associated system maintenance controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSystem maintenance policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tSystem maintenance procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-2","Controlled Maintenance","Operational","Controlled Maintenance","(A) The organization schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements.\n(B) The organization approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location.\n(C) The organization requires that organization-defined personnel or roles explicitly approve the removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs.\n(D) The organization sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs.\n(E) The organization checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions.\n(F) The organization include date and time of maintenance, name of the individual performing the maintenance; name of escort (if applicable), description of the maintenance performed; equipment removed or replaced (including identification numbers, if applicable) in organizational maintenance records.","This control addresses the information security aspects of the information system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component (including applications) conducted by any local or nonlocal entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, in-house, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components not directly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes, for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing the maintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed; and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by the security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain issues associated with replacement components for information systems. Related controls: CM-3, CM-4, MA-4, MP-6, PE-16, SA-12, SI-2","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-3","Maintenance Tools","Operational","Maintenance Tools","(A)\tThe organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.","This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools are potential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers. This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, such as the software implementing “ping,” “ls,” “ipconfig,” or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch. Related controls: MA-2, MA-5, MP-6","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-3(1)\t","Maintenance Tools","Operational","Maintenance Tools | Inspect Tools","\tMAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS\nThe organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.","If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling. Related control: SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-3(2)\t","Maintenance Tools","Operational","Maintenance Tools | Inspect Media","\tMAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA\nThe organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the information system.","If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic and test programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures. Related control: SI-3.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-3(3)\t","Maintenance Tools","Operational","Maintenance Tools | Prevent Unauthorized Removal","\tMAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL\nThe organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:\n(a)\tVerifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;\n(b)\tSanitizing or destroying the equipment;\n(c)\tRetaining the equipment within the facility; or\n(d)\tObtaining an exemption from the information owner explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.","Organizational information includes all information specifically owned by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as information stewards.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-4","Non-Local Maintenance","Operational","Nonlocal Maintenance","(A)\tThe organization approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities.\n(B)\tThe organization allows the use of non-local maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and as documented in the security plan for the information system.\n(C)\tThe organization employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions.\n(D)\tThe organization maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities.","Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part by other controls. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-2, MA-5, MP-6, PL-2, SC-7, SC-10, SC-17","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-4(1)\t","Non-Local Maintenance","Operational","Nonlocal Maintenance | Auditing and Review","\tNONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW\n(a)\tThe organization audits nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions as defined in the organizations formal audit policy (AU-2, AU-6, AU-12); and\n(b)\tThe organization reviews the records of the maintenance and diagnostic sessions.","Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-4(2)\t","Non-Local Maintenance","Operational","Nonlocal Maintenance | Document Nonlocal Maintenance","\tNONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE\nThe organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies and procedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-4(3)\t","Non-Local Maintenance","Operational","Nonlocal Maintenance | Comparable Security / Sanitization","\tNONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION\n(a)\tThe organization requires that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the system being serviced; or\n(b)\tThe organization removes the component to be serviced from the information system and prior to nonlocal maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed, inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before reconnecting the component to the information system.","Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the information system being serviced. Related controls: MA-3, SA-12, SI-3, SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-4(6)\t","Non-Local Maintenance","Operational","Nonlocal Maintenance | Cryptographic Protection","\tNONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION\nThe information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.","Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-5","Maintenance Personnel","Operational","Maintenance Personnel","(A)\tThe organization establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel.\n(B)\tThe organization ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system have required access authorizations.\n(C)\tThe organization designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required access authorizations.","This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software maintenance on organizational information systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel, such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may require privileged access to organizational information systems, for example, when required to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods. Related controls: AC-2, IA-8, MP-2, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, RA-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-5(1)\t","Maintenance Personnel","Operational","Maintenance Personnel | Individuals without Appropriate Access","\tMAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESS\n(a)\tThe organization implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security clearances or are not Canadian citizens, that include the following requirements:\n-\tMaintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of maintenance and diagnostic activities on the information system by approved organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified;\n-\tPrior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile information storage components within the information system are sanitized and all non-volatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured; and\n(b)\tThe organization develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.","This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not Canadian citizens, visual and electronic access to any sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information systems. Related controls: MP-6, PL-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MA-6","Timely Maintenance","Operational","Timely Maintenance","(A)\tThe organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for all system components requiring vendor support and/or spare parts as needed to support availability commitments.","Organizations specify the information system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or Canada when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place. Related controls: CM-8, CP-2, CP-7, SA-14, SA-15","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-1","Media Protection Policy and Procedures","Operational","Media Protection Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to all personnel:\n(a)\tA media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tMedia protection policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tMedia protection procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family. The media protection policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-2","Media Access","Operational","Media Access","(A)\tThe organization restricts access to all types of digital and/or non-digital media containing information not cleared for public release","Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example, denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team. Related controls: AC-3, IA-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PL-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-3","Media Marking","Operational","Media Marking","(A) The organization marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information.\n(B) The organization exempt no removable media types from marking as long as the media remain within organization-defined controlled areas.","The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable security attributes. The term security labelling refers to the application/use of security attributes with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security marking is generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of information system media reflects applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Related controls: AC-16, PL-2, RA-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-4","Media Storage","Operational","Media Storage","(A)\tThe organization physically controls and securely stores all types of digital and non-digital media with sensitive information within organization-defined controlled areas and in accordance with organizational policies and standards.\n(B)\tThe organization protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.","Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, for example, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media. Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no adverse impact on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or Canada if accessed by other than authorized personnel, fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection. Related controls: CP-6, CP-9, MP-2, MP-7, PE-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-5","Media Transport","Operational","Media Transport","(A)\tThe organization protects and controls all media with sensitive information during transport outside of controlled areas using organization-defined security safeguards in accordance with organizational policies and standards.\n(B)\tThe organization maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas.\n(C)\tThe organization documents activities associated with the transport of information system media.\n(D)\tThe organization restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized personnel.","Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers), that are transported outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physical and/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or classification of the information residing on the media and consistent with organizational policies, directives and standards. Safeguards to protect media during transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used. Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes. For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals from outside the organization (e.g., Canada Post or a commercial transport or delivery service). Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport activities to authorized personnel, and tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities associated with the transport of information system media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records. Related controls: AC-19, CP-9, MP-3, MP-4, RA-3, SC-8, SC-13, SC-28.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-5(4)\t","Media Transport","Operational","Media Transport | Cryptographic Protection","\tMEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION\nThe information system implements cryptographic mechanisms compliant with the requirements of Control SC-13 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.","This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices (e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). Related control: SC-13.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-6","Media Sanitization ","Operational","Media Sanitization","(A)\tThe organization sanitize organization-defined information system media prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using organization-defined sanitization techniques and procedures in accordance with applicable organizational policies and standards.\n(B)\tThe organization employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information.","This control applies to all information system media, both digital and non-digital, subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include media found in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components, and mobile devices. The sanitization process removes information from the media such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, and destruction, prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal. Organizations determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing that destruction is sometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization. Organizations use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable, or deemed to have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization of non-digital media includes, for example, removing a classified appendix from an otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a document by obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing them from the document. Related controls: MA-2, MA-4, RA-3, SC-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-6(1)\t","Media Sanitization ","Operational","Media Sanitization | Review / Approve / Track / Document / Verify","\tMEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW / APPROVE / TRACK / DOCUMENT / VERIFY\nThe organization reviews, approves, tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization and disposal actions.","Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure compliance with records-retention policies. Tracking/documenting actions include, for example, listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, types of media sanitized, specific files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date and time of the sanitization actions, personnel who performed the sanitization, verification actions taken, personnel who performed the verification, and disposal action taken. Organizations verify that the sanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal. Related control: SI-12.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-6(2)\t","Media Sanitization ","Operational","Media Sanitization | Equipment Testing","\tMEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING\nThe organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures at least annually to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.","Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted by qualified and authorized external entities (e.g., other agencies or external service providers).","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-6(3)\t","Media Sanitization ","Operational","Media Sanitization | Non-destructive Techniques","\tMEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES\nThe organization applies non-destructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior to connecting such devices to the information system under  organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage devices.","This control enhancement applies to digital media containing sensitive information. Portable storage devices can be the source of malicious code insertions into organizational information systems. Many of these devices are obtained from unknown and potentially untrustworthy sources and may contain malicious code that can be readily transferred to information systems through USB ports or other entry portals. While scanning such storage devices is always recommended, sanitization provides additional assurance that the devices are free of malicious code to include code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. Organizations consider non-destructive sanitization of portable storage devices when such devices are first purchased from the manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or when organizations lose a positive chain of custody for the devices. Related control: SI-3.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-7","Media Use","Operational","Media Use","(A) The organization prohibits the use of unauthorized removable media on all components using technical safeguards.","Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information systems, for example, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, rules of behaviour) to restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write to such devices. Organizations may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices including, for example, devices provided by the organization, devices provided by other approved organizations, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, for example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portable storage devices, and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write to such devices. Related controls: AC-19, PL-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-7(1)\t","Media Use","Operational","Media Use | Prohibit Use without Owner","\tMEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER\nThe organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.","Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion). Related control: PL-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-8","Media Downgrading ","Operational","Media Downgrading","(A)\tThe organization establishes organization-defined information system media downgrading process that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with organization-defined strength and integrity.\n(B)\tThe organization ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with the security category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the access authorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information.\n(C)\tThe organization identifies organization-defined information system media requiring downgrading.\n(D)\tThe organization downgrades the identified information system media using the established process.","This control applies to all information system media, digital and non-digital, subject to release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is considered removable. The downgrading process, when applied to system media, removes information from the media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable wider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the media (e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["MP-8(1)\t","Media Downgrading ","Operational","Media Downgrading | Documentation of Process","\tMEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS\nThe organization documents information system media downgrading actions.","Organizations can document the media downgrading process by providing information such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification number of the downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or performed the downgrading action.","X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-1","Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures","Operational","Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with physical and environmental protection responsibilities:\n(a)\tA physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tPhysical and environmental protection policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tPhysical and environmental protection procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family. The physical and environmental protection policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-2","Physical Access Authorizations","Operational","Physical Access Authorizations","(A)\tThe organization develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the information system resides.\n(B)\tThe organization issues authorization credentials for facility access.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals at least annually.\n(D)\tThe organization removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.","This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed (including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with organizational directives, standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that have not been designated as publicly accessible. Related controls: PE-3, PE-4, PS-3","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-3","Physical Access Control","Operational","Physical Access Control","(A)\tThe organization enforces physical access authorizations at all physical access points to the facility by:\n(a)\tVerifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and\n(b)\tControlling ingress/egress to the facility using controlled areas that meet the requirements of the GC Industrial Security Program;\n(B)\tThe organization maintains physical access audit logs for all physical access points to the facility.\n(C)\tThe organization provides  organization-defined security safeguards to control access to areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible.\n(D)\tThe organization escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity at all times while in the data center.\n(E)\tThe organization secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices.\n(F)\tThe organization inventories organization-defined physical access devices at least annually.\n(G)\tThe organization changes combinations and keys at least annually and/or when keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.","Control of access to restricted-access areas and other organizational space is to be provided in a manner which does not contravene the applicable life safety requirements of building codes, fire codes and related codes, standards and guidelines. This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including, for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff or information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations, and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities include, for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or system components in secured areas. Physical access control systems comply with applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural (e.g., a written log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated, or some combination thereof. Physical access points can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or components requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational information systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible with organizations safeguarding access to such devices. Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-4, PE-5, PS-3, RA-3.","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-3(1)\t","Physical Access Control","Operational","Physical Access Control | Information System Access","\tPHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS\nThe organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to the physical access controls for the facility at organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system.","This control enhancement provides additional physical security for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, and data and communications centres). Related control: PS-2.","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-4","Access Control for Transmission Medium","Operational","Access Control for Transmission Medium","(A)\tThe organization controls physical access to all distribution and transmission lines within organizational facilities using in accordance with, or uses an adequate risk-based approach aligned with the practices with TBS and RCMP physical security standards.","Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution and transmission lines help to prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In addition, physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access to system distribution and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii) disconnected or locked spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays. Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-5, SC-7, SC-8","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-5","Access Control for Output Devices","Operational","Access Control for Output Devices","(A)\tThe organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.","Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example, placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorized individuals only, and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational personnel. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and audio devices are examples of information system output devices. Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-18.","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-6","Monitoring Physical Access","Operational","Monitoring Physical Access","(A)\tThe organization monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and respond to physical security incidents.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews physical access logs at least monthly and upon occurrence of organization-defined events or potential indications of events.\n(C)\tThe organization coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response capability.","Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses. Related controls: CA-7, IR-4, IR-8","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-6(1)\t","Monitoring Physical Access","Operational","Monitoring Physical Access | Intrusion Alarms / Surveillance Equipment","\tMONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS / SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT\nThe organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.",null,"X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-6(4)\t","Monitoring Physical Access","Operational","Monitoring Physical Access | Monitoring Physical Access to Information Systems","\tMONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS\nThe organization monitors physical access to the information system in addition to the physical access monitoring of the facility as identified under PE-3(1).","This control enhancement provides additional monitoring for those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, communications centres). Related controls: PS-2, PS-3.","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-8","Access Records ","Operational","Visitor Access Records","(A)\tThe organization maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for at least 1 year; and\n(B)\tThe organization reviews visitor access records at least monthly.","Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records are not required for publicly accessible areas","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-9","Power Equipment and Power Cabling","Operational","Power Equipment and Cabling","(A)\tThe organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system from damage and destruction.","Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cabling outside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data centre, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites. Related control: PE-4","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-10","Emergency Shutoff","Operational","Emergency Shutoff","(A)\tThe organization provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations.\n(B)\tThe organization places emergency shutoff switches or devices in organization-defined location by information system or system component to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel.\n(C)\tThe organization protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.","This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centres, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Related control: PE-15","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-11","Emergency Power","Operational","Emergency Power","(A)\tThe organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate transition of the information system to long-term alternate power in the event of a primary power source loss.","Related controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-7","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-12","Emergency Lighting","Operational","Emergency Lighting","(A)\tThe organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.","This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centres, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-13","Fire Protection","Operational","Fire Protection","(A)\tThe organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.","This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centres, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-13(2)\t","Fire Protection","Operational","Fire Protection | Suppression Devices / Systems","\tFIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS\nThe organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that provide automatic notification of any activation to organization-defined personnel or roles and local fire department.","Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified information.","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-13(3)\t","Fire Protection","Operational","Fire Protection | Automatic Fire Suppression","\tFIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION\nThe organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.",null,"X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-14","Temperature and Humidity Controls","Operational","Temperature and Humidity Controls","(A)\tThe organization maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system resides at  organization-defined acceptable levels.\n(B)\tThe organization monitors temperature and humidity levels continuously.","This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources, for example, data centres, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Related control: AT-3","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-14(2)\t","Temperature and Humidity Controls","Operational","Temperature and Humidity Controls | Monitoring with Alarms / Notifications","\tTEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS\nThe organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.",null,"X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-15","Water Damage Protection","Operational","Water Damage Protection","(A)\tThe organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and known to key personnel.","This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centres, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire organizations. Related control: AT-3","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-16","Delivery and Removal","Operational","Delivery and Removal","(A)\tThe organization authorizes, monitors, and controls all information system components entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of those items.","Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating the areas from the information system and media libraries. Related controls: CM-3, MA-2, MA-3, MP-5, SA-12","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-17","Alternate Work Site ","Operational","Alternate Work Site","(A)\tThe organization employs security controls commensurate with that of the primary site at alternate work sites.\n(B)\tThe organization assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites.\n(C)\tThe organization provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case of security incidents or problems.","While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites, alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate work sites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. Related controls: AC-17, CP-7","X","X",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PE-18","Location of Information System Components","Operational","Location of Information System Components","(A)\tThe organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize potential damage from [non-adversarial threat actor category Ta1] and to minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.","Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire, tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electrical interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through the use of wireless sniffers or microphones). Related controls: CP-2, PE-19, RA-3",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-1","Security Planning Policy and Procedures","Management","Security Planning Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with security planning responsibilities\n(a)\tA security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated security planning controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSecurity planning policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tSecurity planning procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family. The security planning policy and procedures reflect organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-2","System Security Plan","Management","System Security Plan","(A)\tThe organization develops a security plan for the information system that:\n(a)\tIs consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;\n(b)\tExplicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;\n(c)\tDescribes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and business processes;\n(d)\tProvides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale;\n(e)\tDescribes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with or connections to other information systems;\n(f)\tProvides an overview of the security requirements for the system;\n(g)\tIdentifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;\n(h)\tDescribes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements including a rationale for tailoring decisions; and\n(i)\tIs reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation.\n(B)\tThe organization distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to personnel or roles with security planning responsibilities.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews the security plan for the information system at least annually.\n(D)\tThe organization updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments.\n(E)\tThe organization protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and control enhancements. Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security controls and control enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not provide detailed, technical descriptions of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans contain sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment and selection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals and other organizations. Security plans need not be single documents; the plans can be a collection of various documents including documents that already exist. Effective security plans make extensive use of references to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., design and implementation specifications) where more detailed information can be obtained. This reduces the documentation requirements associated with security programs and maintains security-related information in other established management/operational areas related to enterprise architecture, system development life cycle, systems engineering, and acquisition. For example, security plans do not contain detailed contingency plan or incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or by reference, sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans. Related controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-20, CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, CM-9, CP-2, IR-8, MA-4, MA-5, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-7, SA-5, SA-17.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-2(3)\t","System Security Plan","Management","System Security Plan | Plan / Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities","\tSYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES\nThe organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system with organization-defined individuals or groups before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.","Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing. Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and non-emergency (i.e., planned or non-urgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or other documents, as appropriate. Related controls: CP-4, IR-4.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-4","Rules of Behaviour","Management","Rules of Behavior","(A)\tThe organization establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information system the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behaviour with regard to information and information system usage.\n(B)\tThe organization receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, understood, and agreed to abide by the rules of behaviour, before authorizing access to information and the information system.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews and updates the rules of behaviour at least every 3 years.\n(D)\tThe organization requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behaviour to read and resign when the rules of behaviour are revised/updated.","This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizations consider rules of behaviour based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, for example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users. Establishing rules of behaviour for some types of non-organizational users including, for example, individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with the systems. Rules of behaviour for both organizational and non-organizational users can also be established in AC-8, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of this control) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behaviour. Organizations can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behaviour. Related controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-8, AC-9, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AT-2, AT-3, CM-11, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MP-7, PS-6, PS-8, SA-5","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-4(1)\t","Rules of Behaviour","Management","Rules of Behavior | Social Media and Networking Restrictions","\tRULES OF BEHAVIOUR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING RESTRICTIONS\nThe organization includes in the rules of behaviour, explicit restrictions on the use of social media/networking sites and posting organizational information on public websites.","This control enhancement addresses rules of behaviour related to the use of social media/networking sites: (i) when organizational personnel are using such sites for official duties or in the conduct of official business; (ii) when organizational information is involved in social media/networking transactions; and (iii) when personnel are accessing social media/networking sites from organizational information systems. Organizations also address specific rules that prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining and/or inferring non-public organizational information (e.g., system account information, personally identifiable information) from social media/networking sites.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-7","Security Concepts of Operation","Management","Security Concept of Operations","(A)\tThe organization develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of information security.\n(B)\tThe organization Reviews and updates the CONOPSat least annually. ","The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate. Changes to the CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security plan, the information security architecture, and other appropriate organizational documents (e.g., security specifications for procurements/acquisitions, system development life cycle documents and systems/security engineering documents). Related control: PL-2",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PL-8","Information Security Architecture","Management","Information System Architecture","(A)\tThe organization develops an information security architecture for the information system that:\n(a)\tDescribes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;\n(b)\tDescribes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the enterprise architecture; and\n(c)\tDescribes any information security assumptions about and dependencies on, external services.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the information security architecture at least annually or when changes to the information system or its environment warrant to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture.\n(C)\tThe organization ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational procurements/acquisitions.","This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and development of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide information security architecture, which is integral to and developed as part of the enterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, the placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the protection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information system services, and any other specific protection needs.\nIn today’s modern architecture, it is becoming less common for organizations to control all information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the information security architecture is important to developing a comprehensive mission/business protection strategy. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control a baseline configuration for organizational information systems is critical to implementing and maintaining effective information security architecture. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture for the information system, and that the security architecture is integrated with or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture through the organization-wide information security architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for in-house system development). SA-17, which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of information systems or information system components to external entities, and there is a need to demonstrate/show consistency with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information security architecture. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, PL-2, SA-5, SA-17","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-1","Personnel Security Policy and Procedures","Operational","Personnel Security Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with personnel security responsibilities:\n(a)\tA personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel security controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tPersonnel security policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tPersonnel security procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family. The personnel security policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-2","Position Categorization","Operational","Position Risk Designation","(A)\tThe organization categorizes all positions based on the injury the individuals could cause by malicious acts resulting from the privileges associated with the position.\n(B)\tThe organization selects the appropriate screening for individuals filling those positions.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews and revises categorizations at least annually.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-3","Personnel Screening","Operational","Personnel Screening","(A)\tThe organization screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system in accordance with organizational standards.\n(B)\tThe organization rescreens individuals according to the TBS Standard on Security Screening and any related provisions of the Industrial Security Program.","Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-3(3)\t","Personnel Screening","Operational","Personnel Screening | Information with Special Protection Measures","\tPERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURES\nThe organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection:\n(a)\tHave valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official organizational duties; and\n(b)\tSatisfy the TBS Standard on Security Screening and any related provisions of the Industrial Security Program.","Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for example, Protected Information and Sources and Methods Information (SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background screening requirements.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-4","Personnel Termination ","Operational","Personnel Termination","(A)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment disables information system access within the same day.\n(B)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual.\n(C)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of items identified in the TBS Standard on Security Screening and any related provisions of the Industrial Security Program.\n(D)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property.\n(E)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by terminated individual.\n(F)\tThe organization, upon termination of individual employment notifies terminated personnel's manager within 24 hours.","Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, for example, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, for example, in cases related to job abandonment, illnesses, and non-availability of supervisors. Exit interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations consider disabling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior to the individuals being notified. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-5, PS-6","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-5","Personnel Transfer ","Operational","Personnel Transfer","(A)\tThe organization reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization.\n(B)\tThe organization initiates reassignment of access to data within 5 days of the formal transfer action.\n(C)\tThe organization modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer.\n(D)\tThe organization notifies transferring personnel’s manager within 5 days.","This control applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals are permanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within organizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii) changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for access to official records to which individuals had access at previous work locations and in previous information system accounts. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-6","Access Agreements ","Operational","Access Agreements","(A)\tThe organization develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the access agreements at least annually.\n(C)\tThe organization ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems: \n(a)\tSign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and\n(b)\tRe-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems when access agreements have been updated or at least annually.","Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements, acceptable use agreements, rules of behaviour, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understood, and agreed to abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless specifically prohibited by organizational policy. Related control: PL-4, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-8","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-7","Third-Party Personnel Security","Operational","Third-Party Personnel Security","(A)\tThe organization establishes personnel security control requirements including security roles and responsibilities for third-party providers.\n(B)\tThe organization requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security control policies and procedures established by the organization.\n(C)\tThe organization documents personnel security requirements.\n(D)\tThe organization requires third-party providers to notify organization-defined personnel or roles of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within organization-defined time period.\n(E)\tThe organization monitors provider compliance.\n","Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors, and other organizations providing information system development, information technology services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly include personnel security control requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or information system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party personnel changes ensure appropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers and terminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include, for example, functions, roles, and nature of credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or terminated. Related controls: PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, SA-9, SA-21","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["PS-8","Personnel Sanctions","Operational","Personnel Sanctions","(A)\tThe organization employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures.\n(B)\tThe organization notifies  organization-defined personnel or roles within one working day when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.","Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Sanctions processes are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and procedures for organizations. Organizations consult with their legal counsel regarding matters of employee sanctions. Related controls: PL-4, PS-6","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-1","Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures ","Management","Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with risk assessment responsibilities:\n(a)\tA risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tRisk assessment policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tRisk assessment procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-2","Security Categorization","Management","Security Categorization","(A)\tThe organization categorizes information and the information system.\n(B)\tThe organization documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security plan for the information system.\n(C)\tThe organization ensures that the security categorization decision is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or authorizing official’s designated representative.","Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and information systems are compromised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate the development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted. Related controls: CM-8, MP-4, RA-3, SC-7","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-3","Risk Assessment ","Management","Risk Assessment","(A)\tThe organization conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits.\n(B)\tThe organization documents risk assessment results in a security assessment report.\n(C)\tThe organization reviews risk assessment results at least annually or when a significant change occurs.\n(D)\tThe organization disseminates risk assessment results to organization-defined personnel or roles.\n(E)\tThe organization updates the risk assessment at least every 3 years or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the system.","Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals and other organizations based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing entities)Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework of ITSG-33, including categorization, security control selection, security control implementation, security control assessment, information system authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control must be partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete the first two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important role in security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance, which includes security control supplementation. Related controls: RA-2.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning","(A)\tThe organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications monthly for operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and database management systems and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported.\n(B)\tThe organization employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:\n(a)\tEnumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;\n(b)\tFormatting checklists and test procedures; and\n(c)\tMeasuring vulnerability impact.\n(C)\tThe organization analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments.\n(D)\tThe organization remediates legitimate vulnerabilities within 30 days for high-risk vulnerabilities and 90 days for moderate-risk vulnerabilities from the date of discovery in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk.\n(E)\tThe organization shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with organization-defined personnel or roles to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).","Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required vulnerability scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for custom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example: (i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly operating information flow control mechanisms","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(1)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Update Tool Capability","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY\nThe organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.","The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as new vulnerabilities are discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updating process helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified and addressed as quickly as possible. Related controls: SI-3, SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(2)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Update by Frequency / Prior to New Scan / When Identified","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / PRIOR TO NEW SCAN / WHEN IDENTIFIED\nThe organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned prior to a new scan.","Related controls: SI-3, SI-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(3)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Breadth / Depth of Coverage","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH / DEPTH OF COVERAGE\nThe organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can identify the breadth and depth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked).",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(5)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Privileged Access","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS\nThe information system implements privileged access authorization to operating systems, web applications, databases for selected all scans.","In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be more intrusive or the information system component that is the subject of the scanning may contain highly sensitive information. Privileged access authorization to selected system components facilitates more thorough vulnerability scanning and also protects the sensitive nature of such scanning.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(6)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Automated Trend Analyses","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scans over time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities.","Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["RA-5(8)\t","Vulnerability Scanning","Management","Vulnerability Scanning | Review Historic Audit Logs","\tVULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS\nThe organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in the information system has been previously exploited.","Related control: AU-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-1","System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures ","Management","System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with system and services acquisition responsibilities:\n(a)\tA system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy and associated system and services acquisition controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSystem and services acquisition policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\t System and services acquisition procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family. The system and services acquisition policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organizational level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-2","Allocation of Resources ","Management","Allocation of Resources","(A)\tThe organization determines information security control requirements for the information system or information system service in mission/business process planning.\n(B)\tThe organization determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process.\n(C)\tThe organization establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and budgeting documentation.","Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of the system/service. ","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-3","System Development Lifecycle","Management","System Development Lifecycle","(A)\tThe organization manages the information system using organization-defined system development life cycle that incorporates information security considerations.\n(B)\tThe organization defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle.\n(C)\tThe organization identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities.\n(D)\tThe organization integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.","A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical missions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components (including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, security engineers, and information system security officers in system development life cycle activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information systems. It is equally important that developers include individuals on the development team that possess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are effectively integrated into the information system. Security awareness and training programs can help ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The effective integration of security requirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure that important security considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that those considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies. Related controls: AT-3, SA-8.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-4","Acquisition Process","Management","Acquisition Process","(A)\tThe organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or information system service in accordance with applicable organizational policies, directives and standards, and organizational mission/business needs:\n(a)\tSecurity functional requirements;\n(b)\tSecurity strength requirements;\n(c)\tSecurity assurance requirements;\n(d)\tSecurity-related documentation requirements;\n(e)\tRequirements for protecting security-related documentation;\n(f)\tDescription of the information system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate; and\n(g)\tAcceptance criteria.\n(AA)\tThe client organization includes security-related documentation, requirements and/or specifications, explicitly or by reference, in information system acquisition contracts based on an assessment of risk.\n(BB)\tThe client organization includes the development and evaluation-related requirements and/or specifications, explicitly or by reference, in information system acquisition contracts based on an assessment of risk and in accordance with applicable organizational policies, directives and standards.","Information system components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an information system. Information system components include commercial information technology products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security functions, and security mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, and resistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; and (ii) evidence from development and assessment activities providing grounds for confidence that the required security functionality has been implemented and the required security strength has been achieved. Security documentation requirements address all phases of the system development life cycleSecurity functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring process. The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of parameter values through the use of assignment and selection statements and the specification of platform dependencies and implementation information. Security documentation provides user and administrator guidance regarding the implementation and operation of security controls. The level of detail required in security documentation is based on the security category or classification level of the information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security capability, functions, or mechanisms to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the organizational risk management strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationally mandated configuration settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Acceptance criteria for information systems, information system components, and information system services are defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement. Related controls: CM-6, PL-2, PS-7, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA-11, SA-12.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-4(1)\t","Acquisition Process","Management","Acquisition Process | Functional Properties of Security Controls","\tACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security controls to be employed.","Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality (i.e., security capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls. Related control: SA-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-4(2)\t","Acquisition Process","Management","Acquisition Process | Design / Implementation Information for Security Controls","\tACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes security-relevant external system interfaces and high-level design at organization-defined level of detail.","Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) and the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the information system. Related control: SA-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-4(8)\t","Acquisition Process","Management","Acquisition Process | Continuous Monitoring Plan","\tACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness that contains at least the minimum requirement as defined in CA-7.","The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information system, system component, or information system service continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous monitoring strategies and programs implemented by organizations. Related control: CA-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-4(9)\t","Acquisition Process","Management","Acquisition Process | Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services in Use","\tACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.","The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design phases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to do so). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of security controls after the information system, system component, or information system service has been implemented. SA-9 describes requirements for external information system services with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided from external sources. Related controls: CM-7, SA-9.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-5","Information System Documentation","Management","Information System Documentation","(A)\tThe organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:\n(a)\tSecure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service; \n(b)\tEffective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and\n(c)\tKnown vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) functions.\n(B)\tThe organization obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:\n(a)\tUser-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security functions/mechanisms;\n(b)\tMethods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner; and\n(c)\tUser responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service.\n(C)\tThe organization documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and organization-defined actions in response.\n(D)\tThe organization protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.\n(E)\tThe organization distributes documentation to developer or tester roles.","This control helps organizational personnel understand the implementation and operation of security controls associated with information systems, system components, and information system services. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality/completeness of the content provided. The inability to obtain needed documentation may occur, for example, due to the age of the information system/component or lack of support from developers and contractors. In those situations, organizations may need to recreate selected documentation if such documentation is essential to the effective implementation or operation of security controls. The level of protection provided for selected information system, component, or service documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system. Documentation that addresses information system vulnerabilities may also require an increased level of protection. Secure operation of the information system, includes, for example, initially starting the system and resuming secure system operation after any lapse in system operation. Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PL-2, PL-4, PS-2, SA-3, SA-4","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-8","Security Engineering Principles","Management","Security Engineering Principles","(A)\tThe organization applies information system security engineering principles in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.","Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the extent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems. Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii) establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how to build secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs; (vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions. Related controls: SA-3, SA-4, SA-17, SC-2, SC-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-9","External Information System Services","Management","External Information System Services","(A)\tThe organization requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational information security control requirements and employ applicable security controls if GC data is processed or stored within the external system.\n(B)\tThe organization defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services.\n(C)\tThe organization employs GC continuous monitoring strategies, processes, methods, and techniques for external systems where GC data is processed or stored to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.","External information system services are services that are implemented outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a level of confidence that each participating provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust varies based on the relationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations of performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified instances of non-compliance. Related controls: CA-3, IR-7, PS-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-9(1)\t","External Information System Services","Management","External Information System Services | Risk Assessments / Organizational Approvals","\tEXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS / ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS\n(a)\tThe organization conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services; and\n(b)\tThe organization ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is approved by the Chief Information Officer or delegate as detailed in organizational orders.","Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as firewalls, or key management services. Related controls: CA-6, RA-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-9(2)\t","External Information System Services","Management","External Information System Services | Identification of Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services","\tEXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES\nThe organization requires providers of all external information systems and service to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.","Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be particularly useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols. Related control: CM-7.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-9(4)\t","External Information System Services","Management","External Information System Services | Consistent Interests of Consumers and Providers","\tEXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS\nThe organization employs organization-defined security safeguards to ensure that the interests of any external service provider that is responsible to process, transmit, or store GC information are consistent with and reflect organizational interests.","As organizations increasingly use external service providers, the possibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational safeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with which organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits to service provider facilities.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-9(5)\t","External Information System Services","Management","External Information System Services | Processing, Storage, and Service Location","\tEXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATION\nThe organization restricts the location of information processing,  information/data, and information system services to locations within Canada based on ITPIN 2017-02 for Direction on Data Residency (https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/information-technology/policy-implementation-notices/direction-electronic-data-residency.html).","The location of information processing, information/data storage, or information system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the ability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure that data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affected by the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or the locations from which information system services emanate.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-10","Developer Configuration Management ","Management","Developer Configuration Management","(A)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform configuration management during system, component, or service development, implementation, and operation.\n(B)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to all items under configuration management;\n(C)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;\n(D)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security impacts of such changes; and\n(E)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to the Chief Information Officer or delegate.","This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorized modification or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information system, information system component, or information system service requires configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Configuration items that are placed under configuration management (if existence/use is required by other security controls) include: the formal model; the functional, high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation; source code and hardware schematics; the running version of the object code; tools for comparing new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source code with previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission/business needs of organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide configuration management support during the operations and maintenance phases of the life cycle. Related controls: CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SA-12, SI-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-10(1)\t","Developer Configuration Management ","Management","Developer Configuration Management | Software / Firmware Integrity Verification","\tDEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.","This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized changes to software and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can also address counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided by developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates to such components. Related control: SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-11","Developer Security Testing ","Management","Developer Security Testing and Evaluation","(A)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to create and implement a security assessment plan.\n(B)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform all testing is defined during initial phases at organization level at organization-defined depth and coverage. Further testing can be defined as required.\n(C)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.\n(D)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement a verifiable flaw remediation process.\n(E)\tThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.","Developmental security testing/evaluation occurs at all post-design phases of the system development life cycle. Such testing/evaluation confirms that the required security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security policy, and meeting established security requirements. Security properties of information systems may be affected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components. These interconnections or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing applications and operating systems) may adversely affect previously implemented security controls. This control provides additional types of security testing/evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws. Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Developers can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Security assessment plans provide the specific activities that developers plan to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of software and firmware components, the degree of rigour to be applied, and the types of artifacts produced during those processes. The depth of security testing/evaluation refers to the rigour and level of detail associated with the assessment process (e.g., black box, gray box, or white box testing). The coverage of security testing/evaluation refers to the scope (i.e., number and type) of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for security assessment plans, flaw remediation processes, and the evidence that the plans/processes have been diligently applied. Methods for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements. Related controls: CA-2, CM-4, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SI-2","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-11(1)\t","Developer Security Testing ","Management","Developer Security Testing and Evaluation | Static Code Analysis","\tDEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | STATIC CODE ANALYSIS\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.","Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce security coding practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in the development process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects to enable developers to fix such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis can include, for example, aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commonly referred to as ignored or false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-11(2)\t","Developer Security Testing ","Management","Developer Security Testing and Evaluation | Threat and Vulnerability Analyses","\tDEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSES\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.","Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, system components, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses at this phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have been accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated. Related control: RA-5.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-11(8)\t","Developer Security Testing ","Management","Developer Security Testing and Evaluation | Dynamic Code Analysis","\tDEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODE ANALYSIS\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.","Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software programs, using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed. A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuzz testing, induces program failures by deliberately introducing malformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design specifications for the applications. To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and hence the assurance provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage analysis (checking the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as percent of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called during execution of the test suite) and/or concordance analysis.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-15","Development Process, Standards, and Tool","Management","Development Process, Standards, and Tools","(A) The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that:\n(a) Explicitly addresses security requirements;\n(b) Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;\n(c) Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and\n(d) Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development.\n(B) The organization reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations at least annually to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy organization-defined security requirements.","Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Related controls: SA-3, SA-8.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SA-15(7) ",null,null,"Development Process, Standards, and Tools, Automated Vulnerability Analysis","DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS\nThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:\n(a)\tPerform an automated vulnerability analysis using software composition analysis (SCA) tooling and static code analysis tooling;\n(b)\tDetermine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities;\n(c)\tDetermine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and\n(d)\tDeliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-1","System and Communications Protection Policy and Procedures","Technical","System and Communications Protection Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with system and communications protection responsibilities:\n(a)\tA system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection policy and associated system and communications protection controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSystem and communications protection policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\tSystem and communications protection procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family. The system and communications protection policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-2","Application Partitioning ","Technical","Application Partitioning","(A)\tThe information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.","Information system management functionality includes, for example, functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate. This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods (e.g., using a logical separation, web administrators would use 2-factor authentication and normal users of the web application would use username/password authentication). Separation of system and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains and with additional access controls. Related controls: SA-4, SA-8, SC-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-4","Information in Shared Resources ","Technical","Information in Shared Resources","(A)\tThe information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.","This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those resources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of data that has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, MP-6","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-5","Denial of Service Protection ","Technical","Denial of Service Protection","(A)\tThe information system protects against or limits the effects of the following denial of service attempts that attack bandwidth, transactional capacity and storage by employing geo-replication, IP address blocking, and network-based DDoS protections.","A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the effects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect information system components on internal organizational networks from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial of service attacks. Related controls: SC-6, SC-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-6","Resource Availability ","Technical","Resource Availability","(A)\tThe information system protects the availability of resources by allocating organization-defined resources by priority; quota, or organization-defined security safeguards.","Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying or interfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection","(A)\tThe information system monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system.\n(B)\tThe information system implements sub-networks for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal organizational networks.\n(C)\tThe information system connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security architecture.","Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application gateways residing on protected sub-networks). Sub-networks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature of commercial telecommunications services in the implementation of security controls associated with the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements. Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions. Related controls: AC-4, AC-17, CA-3, CM-7, CP-8, IR-4, RA-3, SC-5, SC-13","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(3)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Access Points","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS\nThe organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.","Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates more comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(4)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | External Telecommunications Services","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES\n(a)\tThe organization implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;\n(b)\tThe organization establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;\n(c)\tThe organization protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across each interface;\n(d)\tThe organization documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need and duration of that need; and\n(e)\tThe organization reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy at least annually and removes exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need.","Related control: SC-8.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(5)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Deny by Default / Allow by Exception","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION\nThe information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).","This control enhancement applies to both inbound and outbound network communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications traffic policy ensures that only those connections which are essential and approved are allowed.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(7)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Prevent Split Tunneling for Remote Devices","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT SPLIT TUNNELLING FOR REMOTE DEVICES\nThe information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks.","This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g., notebook computers) through configuration settings to disable split tunnelling in those devices, and by preventing those configuration settings from being readily configurable by users. This control enhancement is implemented within the information system by the detection of split tunnelling (or of configuration settings that allow split tunnelling) in the remote device, and by prohibiting the connection if the remote device is using split tunnelling. Split tunnelling might be desirable by remote users to communicate with local information system resources such as printers/file servers. However, split tunnelling would in effect allow unauthorized external connections, making the system more vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational information. The use of VPNs for remote connections, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls, may provide the organization with sufficient assurance that it can effectively treat such connections as non-remote connections from the confidentiality and integrity perspective. VPNs thus provide a means for allowing non-remote communications paths from remote devices. The use of an adequately provisioned VPN does not eliminate the need for preventing split tunnelling.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(8)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Route Traffic to Authenticated Proxy Servers","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERS\nThe information system routes organization-defined internal communications traffic to  all untrusted networks outside the control of the organization through authenticated proxy servers at managed interfaces.","External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A proxy server is a server (i.e., information system or application) that acts as an intermediary for clients requesting information system resources (e.g., files, connections, web pages, or services) from other organizational servers. Client requests established through an initial connection to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide additional protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices are one of the most common proxy servers providing access to the Internet. Proxy servers support logging individual Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions and blocking specific Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), domain names, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Web proxies can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized and unauthorized websites. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(12)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Host-Based Protection","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION\nThe organization implements organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms at organization-defined information system components.","Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(13)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Isolation of Security Tools / Mechanisms / Support Components","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS / MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS\nThe organization isolates organization-defined information security tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components by implementing physically separate sub-networks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.","Separate sub-networks with managed interfaces are useful, for example, in isolating computer network defences from critical operational processing networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques of organizations. \nThe service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.\nRelated controls: SA-8, SC-2, SC-3.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-7(18)\t","Boundary Protection ","Technical","Boundary Protection | Fail Secure","\tBOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE\nThe information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary protection device. ","Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information system mechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices at managed interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing on protected sub-networks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do not enter into insecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures of boundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices to enter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases. Related controls: CP-2, SC-24.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-8","Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity","Technical","Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity","(A)\tThe information system protects the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information.","This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines). Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by employing protected distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption techniques). Organizations relying on commercial providers offering transmission services as commodity services rather than as fully dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly specialized to individual customer needs), may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the implementation of needed security controls for transmission confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations determine what types of confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial telecommunication service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary security controls and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles, organizations implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept the additional risk. Related controls: AC-17, PE-4","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-8(1)\t","Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity","Technical","Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity | Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection","\tTRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION\nThe information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information and detect changes to information during transmission unless otherwise protected by physical security safeguards applied in applied in accordance with, or uses an adequate risk-based approach aligned with the practices specified in TBS and RCMP physical security standards and any related provisions of the Industrial Security Program. The cryptography must be compliant with the requirements of control SC-13.","Encrypting information for transmission protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related control: SC-13.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-10","Network Disconnect ","Technical","Network Disconnect","(A)\tThe information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after no longer than 30 minutes for RAS-based sessions or no longer than 60 minutes for non-interactive user sessions of inactivity.","This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-12","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management","Technical","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management","(A)\tThe organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography employed within the information system in accordance with CSE-approved cryptography.","Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations define key management requirements in accordance with applicable organizational policies, directives, and standards, specifying appropriate options, levels, and parameters. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust anchors are in such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems. The cryptography must be compliant with the requirements of control SC-13. Related controls: SC-13, SC-17","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-12(1)\t","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management","Technical","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management | Availability","\tCRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | AVAILABILITY\nThe organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys by users.",null,"X",null,null,null,"X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-12(2)\t","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management","Technical","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management | Symmetric Keys","\tCRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | SYMMETRIC KEYS\nThe organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using CSE compliant key management technology and processes.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-12(3)\t","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management","Technical","Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management | Asymmetric Keys","\tCRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | ASYMMETRIC KEYS\nThe organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using CSE-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI medium assurance certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved medium assurance or high assurance certificates and hardware security tokens that protect the user’s private key.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-13","Cryptographic Protection","Technical","Cryptographic Protection","(A)\tThe information system implements CSE approved cryptography in accordance with applicable organizational policies, directives and standards.","Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions including, for example, the protection of sensitive information, the provision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number generation and hash generation. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography. This control does not impose any requirements on organizations to use cryptography. However, if cryptography is required based on the selection of other security controls or policies, organizations document each type of cryptographic use and the type of cryptography required (e.g., protection of classified information: FIPS-validated cryptography). Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-7, AC-17, AC-18, AU-9, AU-10, CM-11, CP-9, IA-3, IA-7, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-4, SC-8, SC-12, SC-28, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-15","Collaborative Computing Devices ","Technical","Collaborative Computing Devices","(A)\tThe information system prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with no exceptions.\n(B)\tThe information system provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.","Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to users when collaborative computing devices are activated. Related control: AC-21","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-17","Public Key Infrastructure Certificates ","Technical","Public Key Infrastructure Certificates","(A)\tThe organization issues public key certificates under an organization-defined certificate policy or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.","For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores to ensure only approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificates with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services. Related control: SC-12","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-18","Mobile Code ","Technical","Mobile Code","(A)\tThe organization defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.\n(B)\tThe organization establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.\n(C)\tThe organization authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.","Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript, PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, CM-2, CM-6, SI-3","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-18(3)\t","Mobile Code ","Technical","Mobile Code | Prevent Downloading / Execution","\tMOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION\nThe information system prevents the download and execution of all unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies defined under SC-18.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-18(4)\t","Mobile Code ","Technical","Mobile Code | Prevent Automatic Execution","\tMOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION\nThe information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in software applications and such as but not limited to email, scriptable document/file editing applications that support documents with embedded code (e.g., MS Office applications/documents), etc. and prompts the user for permission. and enforces organization-defined actions prior to executing the code.","Actions enforced before executing mobile code, include, for example, prompting users prior to opening electronic mail attachments. Preventing automatic execution of mobile code includes, for example, disabling auto execute features on information system components employing portable storage devices such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Video Disks (DVDs), and Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-19","Voice Over Internet Protocol ","Technical","Voice over Internet Protocol","(A)\tThe organization establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously.\n(B)\tThe organization authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.","Related controls: CM-6, SC-7, SC-15","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-20","Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source) ","Technical","Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)","(A)\tThe information system provides additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along with the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries.\n(B)\tThe information system provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.","This control enables external clients including, for example, remote Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include, for example, DNS Security (DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child zones includes, for example, the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-21, SC-22","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-21","Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) ","Technical","Secure Name / Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)","(A)\tThe information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.","Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own, or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to enable clients to verify the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: SC-20, SC-22","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-22","Architecture and Provisioning for Name / Address Resolution Service ","Technical","Architecture and Provisioning for Name / Address Resolution Service","(A)\tThe information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation.","Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server. Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network sub-networks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with internal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particular roles (e.g., by address ranges, explicit lists). Related controls: SC-2, SC-20, SC-21, SC-24","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-23","Session Authenticity ","Technical","Session Authenticity","(A)\tThe information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.","This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for example, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information into sessions. Related controls: SC-8, SC-10, SC-11","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-23(1)\t","Session Authenticity ","Technical","Session Authenticity | Invalidate Session Identifiers at Logout","\tSESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT\nThe information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination.","This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from capturing and continuing to employ previously valid session IDs.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-28","Protection of Information At Rest ","Technical","Protection of Information at Rest","(A)\tThe information system protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information not cleared for public release and all data with a higher than low integrity requirement.","This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the use of cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) technologies. Organizations may also employ other security controls including, for example, secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest cannot otherwise be achieved and/or continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, PE-3, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-28(1)\t","Protection of Information At Rest ","Technical","Protection of Information at Rest | Cryptographic Protection","\tPROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION\nThe information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of all information not cleared for public release and all data with a higher than low integrity requirements.","Selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. This control enhancement applies to significant concentrations of digital media in organizational areas designated for media storage and also to limited quantities of media generally associated with information system components in operational environments (e.g., portable storage devices, mobile devices). Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or fields). Organizations employing cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also consider cryptographic key management solutions. Related controls: AC-19, SC-12.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-23(3)","Session Authenticity ","Technical","Session Authenticity | Unique Session Identifiers with Randomization","The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session with SC-13 approved randomness and recognizes only session identifiers that are system-generated.","This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from reusing previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation of unique session identifiers helps to protect against brute-force attacks to determine future session identifiers. Related control: SC-13.",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SC-39","Process Isolation ","Technical","Process Isolation","(A)\tThe information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing process.","Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information system process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available in most commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-1","System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures","Operational","System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures","(A)\tThe organization develops, documents, and disseminates to personnel or roles with system and information integrity responsibilities:\n(a)\tA system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and\n(b)\tProcedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls.\n(B)\tThe organization reviews and updates the current:\n(a)\tSystem and information integrity policy at least every 3 years; and\n(b)\t System and information integrity procedures at least annually.","This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family. The system and information integrity policy and procedures reflect applicable organizational policies, directives, and. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-2","Flaw Remediation ","Operational","Flaw Remediation","(A)\tThe organization identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws.\n(B)\tThe organization tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation.\n(C)\tThe organization installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within 30 days of release of the release of the updates.\n(D)\tThe organization incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.","Organizations identify information systems affected by announced software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities. Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations take advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree and type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and also the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, for example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-8, MA-2, IR-4, RA-5, SA-10, SA-11, SI-11","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-2(2)\t","Flaw Remediation ","Operational","Flaw Remediation | Automated Flaw Remediation Status","\tFLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS\nThe organization employs automated mechanisms at least monthly to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.","Related controls: CM-6, SI-4.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-2(3)\t","Flaw Remediation ","Operational","Flaw Remediation | Time to Remediate Flaws / Benchmarks for Corrective Actions","\tFLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS\n(a)\tThe organization measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and\n(b)\tThe organization establishes benchmarks of 30 days for high risk flaws, 90 days for moderate risk flaws for taking corrective actions.","This control enhancement requires organizations to determine the current time it takes on the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws have been identified, and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity of the potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-3","Malicious Code Protection ","Operational","Malicious Code Protection","(A)\tThe organization employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code.\n(B)\tThe organization updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.\n(C)\tThe organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:\n(a)\tPerform periodic scans of the information system at least weekly and real-time scans of files from external sources at endpoints and network entry/exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational security policy; and\n(b) Block and quarantine malicious code; send alert to the key role as defined in the system and information integrity policy in response to malicious code detection.\n(D)\tThe organization addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.","Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using steganography. Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for example, web accesses, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus signature definitions and reputation-based technologies. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software integrity controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. This could include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber-attacks that could affect organizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files. Related controls: CM-3, MP-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13, SC-7, SC-26, SC-44, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-3(1)\t","Malicious Code Protection ","Operational","Malicious Code Protection | Central Management","\tMALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT\nThe organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.","Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of malicious code protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed flaw malicious code protection security controls. Related controls: AU-2, SI-8.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-3(2)\t","Malicious Code Protection ","Operational","Malicious Code Protection | Automatic Updates","\tMALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES\nThe information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.","Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Related control: SI-8.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-3(7)\t","Malicious Code Protection ","Operational","Malicious Code Protection | Non Signature-Based Detection","\tMALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION\nThe information system implements non-signature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.","Non-signature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the use of heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behaviour of malicious code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does not preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring","(A)\tThe organization monitors the information system to detect:\n(a)\tAttacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with organization-defined monitoring objectives; and\n(b)\tUnauthorized local, network, and remote connections;\n(B)\tThe organization identifies unauthorized use of the information system through organization-defined techniques and methods.\n(C)\tThe organization deploys monitoring devices: (i) strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential information; and (ii) at ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization.\n(D)\tThe organization protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.\n(E)\tThe organization heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or Canada based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.\n(F)\tThe organization obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance with organizational policies, directives and standards.\n(G)\tThe organization provides organization-defined information system monitoring information to organization-defined personnel or roles at an organization-defined frequency.","Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system boundary (i.e., part of perimeter defence and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability is achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for example, selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, with such devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and AC-17. The granularity of monitoring information collected is based on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, HTTP traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs. A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g., local area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can be either wired or wireless. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-8, AC-17, AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9, AU-12, CA-7, IR-4, PE-3, RA-5, SC-7, SC-26, SC-35, SI-3, SI-7","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(1)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | System-Wide Intrusion Detection System","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM\nThe organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information system-wide intrusion detection system.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(2)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Automated Tools for Real-Time Analysis","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS\nThe organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.","Automated tools include, for example, host-based, network-based, transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools or Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) technologies that provide real time analysis of alerts and/or notifications generated by organizational information systems.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(4)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC\nThe information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic continuously for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.","Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information system inbound and outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal traffic that indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or propagating among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or signalling to external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify potentially compromised information systems or information system components.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(5)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | System-Generated Alerts","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS\nThe information system alerts  organization-defined personnel or roles and client governance bodies when organization-defined compromise or potential compromise indicators occur.","Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, for example, audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers. Alerts can be transmitted, for example, telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by text messaging. Organizational personnel on the notification list can include, for example, system administrators, mission/business owners, system owners, or information system security officers. Related controls: AU-5, PE-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(7)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Automated Response to Suspicious Events","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTS\nThe information system notifies organization-defined incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) of detected suspicious events and takes organization-defined least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events.","Least-disruptive actions may include, for example, initiating requests for human responses.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(11)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Analyze Communications Traffic Anomalies","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC ANOMALIES\nThe organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system and selected organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., sub-networks, subsystems) to discover anomalies.","Anomalies within organizational information systems include, for example, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports in use, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(14)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Wireless Intrusion Detection","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTION\nThe organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.","Wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of organization-controlled facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are not limited to those areas within facilities containing information systems, but also include areas outside of facilities as needed, to verify that unauthorized wireless access points are not connected to the systems. Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(16)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Correlate Monitoring Information","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATION\nThe organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the information system.","Correlating information from different monitoring tools can provide a more comprehensive view of information system activity. The correlation of monitoring tools that usually work in isolation (e.g., host monitoring, network monitoring, anti-virus software) can provide an organization-wide view and in so doing, may reveal otherwise unseen attack patterns. Understanding the capabilities/limitations of diverse monitoring tools and how to maximize the utility of information generated by those tools can help organizations to build, operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs. Related control: AU-6.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(20)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Privileged User","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USER\nThe organization implements a privilege user authorization process in accordance with Identity and Access Management policies.",null,"X","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-4(23)\t","Information System Monitoring ","Operational","Information System Monitoring | Host-Based Devices","\tINFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES\nThe organization implements system logging tools at components running general purpose operating systems.","Information system components where host-based monitoring can be implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology product developers.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-5","Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives ","Operational","Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives","(A)\tThe organization receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from organization-defined external organizations on an ongoing basis.\n(B)\tThe organization generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary.\n(C)\tThe organization disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: organization-defined personnel, roles, elements, and external organizations including affected clients.\n(D)\tThe organization implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of non-compliance.","Compliance to security directives is essential due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects on organizational operations and assets, individuals and other organizations should the directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example, external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and other peer/supporting organizations. Related control: SI-2","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-6","Security Functional Verification ","Operational","Security Function Verification","(A)\tThe information system verifies the correct operation of organization-defined security functions.\n(B)\tThe information system performs this verification organization-defined system transitional states including at least system startup and restart and at least monthly.\n(C)\tThe information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles including system administrators and security personnel of failed security verification tests.\n(D)\tThe information system takes  organization-defined action(s) when anomalies are discovered and notifies system administrators and security personnel.","Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system start-up, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications such as lights. Related controls: CA-7, CM-6","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-7","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity","Operational","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity","(A)\tThe organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information on production systems as a minimum.","Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BIOS). Information includes metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integrity-checking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) and associated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted applications. Related controls: SA-12, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-7(1)\t","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity","Operational","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Integrity Checks","\tSOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKS\nThe information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined software, firmware, and information at start-up and at least every 30 days.","Security-relevant events include, for example, the identification of a new threat to which organizational information systems are susceptible, and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include, for example, system start-up, restart, shutdown, and abort.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-7(7)\t","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity","Operational","Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Integration of Detection and Response","\tSOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE\nThe organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized organization-defined security-relevant changes to the information system into the organizational incident response capability.","This control enhancement helps to ensure that detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical records is important both for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an extended period of time and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include, for example, unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or unauthorized elevation of information system privileges. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-8","Spam Protection ","Operational","Spam Protection","(A)\tThe organization employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages.\n(B)\tThe organization updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.","Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile devices, and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including, for example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-8(1)\t","Spam Protection ","Operational","Spam Protection | Central Management of Protection Mechanisms","\tSPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT\nThe organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.","Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of spam protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed spam protection security controls. Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-7.","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-8(2)\t","Spam Protection ","Operational","Spam Protection | Automatic Updates","\tSPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES\nThe information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.",null,"X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-10","Information Input Validation ","Operational","Information Input Validation","(A)\tThe information system checks the validity of organization-defined information inputs.","Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Pre-screening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X","X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-11","Error Handling ","Operational","Error Handling","(A)\tThe information system generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.\n(B)\tThe information system reveals error messages only to organization-defined personnel or roles.","Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages. The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by adversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting information. Related controls: AU-2, AU-3, SC-31","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,"X",null,"TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-12","Information Output Handling and Retention ","Operational","Information Handling and Retention","(A)\tThe organization handles and retains information within the information system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable organizational policies, directives and standards.","Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. Related controls: AC-16, AU-5, AU-11, MP-2, MP-4","X","X","X","X","X","X",null,"X","X","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD",null,"TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]
["SI-16","Memory Protection","Operational","Memory Protection","(A)\tThe information system implements organization-defined security safeguards to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.","Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism. Related controls: AC-25, SC-3","X","X","X","X","X",null,null,null,"X","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","X","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD","TBD"]

{"sheet":"Consumer Dashboard","index":4,"n_rows":10,"n_cols":12,"rows_kept":10,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
[null,"Identity, Credential & Access Management\nRequirements","Data Protection\nRequirements","Network Connectivity\nRequirements","Configuration Management\nRequirements","Security Monitoring\nRequirements","Incident Management\nRequirements","Audit and Accountability\nRequirements","Contingency Planning\nRequirements","Totals","%"]
["Met",{"$f":"COUNTIF('ICAM reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('DP reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('NC reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CM reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('SM reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('IR reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('AU reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CP reqs'!F:F,\"Met\")","v":0},{"$f":"SUM(B2:I2)","v":0},{"$f":"J2/J6","v":0},"Considered Met"]
["Partial",{"$f":"COUNTIF('ICAM reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('DP reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('NC reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CM reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('SM reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('IR reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('AU reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CP reqs'!F:F,\"Partial\")","v":0},0,{"$f":"J3/J6","v":0},"Considered Partially Met"]
["Not Applicable",{"$f":"COUNTIF('ICAM reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('DP reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('NC reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CM reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('SM reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('IR reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('AU reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CP reqs'!F:F,\"NA\")","v":0},0,{"$f":"J4/J6","v":0},"Considered Not Applicable"]
["None",{"$f":"COUNTIF('ICAM reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":14},{"$f":"COUNTIF('DP reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":7},{"$f":"COUNTIF('NC reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":3},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CM reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":6},{"$f":"COUNTIF('SM reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":4},{"$f":"COUNTIF('IR reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":5},{"$f":"COUNTIF('AU reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":2},{"$f":"COUNTIF('CP reqs'!F:F,\"None\")","v":5},46,{"$f":"J5/J6","v":1},"Considered Not Done"]
["Total",{"$f":"SUM(B2:B5)","v":14},7,3,6,4,5,2,{"$f":"SUBTOTAL(109,I1:I5)","v":5},{"$f":"SUM(J1:J5)","v":46}]
["When to use?","Use when triaging the level of effort required to authorize a CSP for use in the GC. "]
[]
["Change Log"]
["2021-10-05","On this day, X went from Met to Not Met."]

{"sheet":"ICAM reqs","index":5,"n_rows":21,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":21,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,1,4,4]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on ICAM."]
["Security objective","The organization limits access to the SaaS-based solution to authorized users, applications, and services based on the principle of least privilege.\nMany of the security controls in this design pattern may be inherited from the SaaS application or underlying layers, or from internal identity services and related processes and procedures through automated security mechanisms."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
["Other","GC Password Guidance - https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/password-guidance.html\nMulti-factor Authentication Considerations and Strategy for GC Enterprise IT Services - https://www.gcpedia.gc.ca/gcwiki/images/9/9e/GC_MFA_Strategy.pdf\nUser Authentication Guidance for Information Technology Systems - https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/2454/html/28582\n\nEstablish and administer privileged user accounts, in accordance Section B.2.3.2 of the Directive on Security Management, Appendix B: Mandatory Procedures on IT Security Controls - https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32611&section=procedure&p=B\n\nPrivileged accounts are considered to be those which have one or more of the following abilities or accesses:\n•\tthe ability to change key system configuration settings;\n•\tthe ability to change or circumvent security controls;\n•\taccess to audit and security monitoring information;\n•\taccess to data, files and accounts used by other users, including backups and media; and\n•\taccess to troubleshoot a system."]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["Security requirement","ID","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirement","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["The organization must manage solution-specific user and service accounts.","ICAM-1","ISO, BO","AC-2","• AC-2(A): The organization must define the types of accounts and roles that are required to support the business capabilities.\n• AC-2(B)(E): The business owner must approve the creation of user accounts for user services and service accounts, and changes to the access privileges assigned to these accounts.\n• AC-2(B)(E): The internal service organization must approve the creation of SaaS application primary or subscription accounts and changes to the access privileges assigned to these accounts.\n• AC-2(C): The organization must define conditions for membership to roles.\n• AC-2(D): The organization must authorize users, roles membership, and access authorizations for each account.\n• AC-2(F): The organization must define conditions and procedures to create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts.\n• AC-2(H): The organization must implement mechanisms to notify account managers:\n (a) when accounts are no longer required; \n (b) when users are terminated or transferred; and \n (c) when individual solution usage or need-to-know changes.\n• AC-2(I): Account managers must authorize access to the solution based on: \n (a) a valid access authorization; \n (b) intended solution usage; and \n (c) other attributes as required by the organization or business capabilities.\n• AC-2(J): The organization must review active accounts at least annually for compliance to account requirements.\n• AC-2(3): The solution must automatically disable accounts after 90 days of inactivity.","None"]
["The organization must define separation of duties and access authorization requirements for the solution, and configure roles and privileges to satisfy these requirements.","ICAM-2","• Internal service organization, Business Owner","AC-5","• The business owner is responsible for defining separation of duties and access authorization requirements for user services accounts.\n• The internal service organization is responsible for defining separation of duties and access authorization requirements for primary or subscription accounts.\n• The internal service organization is responsible for implementing all defined access control mechanisms. ","None"]
["The organization must employ the principle of least privilege when configuring access authorizations.","ICAM-3","• Internal service organization, Business Owner","AC-6","To satisfy this requirement, the organization must first determine the separation of duties and access authorization requirements and then configure user privileges accordingly.","None"]
["The organization must configure rules for invalid login attempts.","ICAM-4","Internal service organization","AC-7","The rules to apply are as follows:\n• AC-7(A): A maximum number of 3 invalid login attempts over a period of 15 minutes.\n• AC-7(B): When the maximum number of invalid login attempts is reached, lock the account for a period of 30 minutes.","None"]
["The organization must configure a system use notification to be displayed as part of the user login process.","ICAM-5","Internal service organization","AC-8","The internal service organization, in consultation with the business owner, must define an appropriate notification.\n","None"]
["The organization must configure a last successful login notification to be displayed as part of the user login process.","ICAM-6","Internal service organization","AC-9","The internal service organization must configure the last successful login notification as follows:\n• AC-9: Display last login date and time.\n• AC-9(1): Display the number of unsuccessful login since the last successful login.\n• AC-9(2): Based on the assessment of threats and risks, the period for which the unsuccessful login attempts are to be displayed.\n• AC-9(3): Based on the assessment of threats and risks, the changes to the user's account and the period for which this information must be displayed.\n• AC-9(4): Based on the assessment of threats and risks, any information in addition to the date and time of last successful login to display to the user.\n","None"]
["The organization must configure time-out periods for the \ntermination of user sessions.","ICAM-7","Internal service organization","AC-12","The time-out period will depend on the nature of the solution and types of user sessions.","None"]
["If security attributes are implemented or available in a solution, the organization must configure the value of these security attributes.","ICAM-8","Internal service organization","AC-16(2)","This requirement applies only for SaaS-based solutions that include security attributes (e.g. email service that offer information classification marking). ","None"]
["The organization must control the posting of publicly accessible information to the solution.","ICAM-9","Business owner","AC-22","• AC-22(A): The business owner must designate individuals authorized to post publicly accessible information.\n• AC-22(B): The business owner must ensure that authorized individuals are provided with the necessary training to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain confidential sensitive information.\n• AC-22(C): The business owner must review the proposed content of information prior to posting to ensure that confidentiality sensitive information is not included.\n• AC-22(D): The business owner must review on a quarterly basis the publicly accessible information for confidentially sensitive information, and must remove such information when it is discovered.","None"]
["The organization must use two-factor authentication to uniquely identify and authenticate users.","ICAM-10","Internal service organization","IA-2, IA-8","• This requirement applies to organizational users (e.g. employee) and non-organizational users (e.g. citizens).\n• IA-2(11), IA-8(100): The authentication mechanism must comply with ITSP.30.031 [9].","None"]
["The organization must use existing GC credentials and the single sign-on capability of the solution over solution-specific credentials to identify and authentication organizational (internal) users.","ICAM-11","Internal service organization","IA-2","The provision of a single sign-on capability (IA-2(10)) is a requirement of the SaaS application layer under the GC cloud PBMM profile.\n","None"]
["The organization must ensure that services connecting to the solution's APIs are appropriately identified and authenticated.","ICAM-12","Internal service organization","IA-9","• IA-9(1): The internal service organization must ensure that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification and authentication information.\n• IA-9(2): The internal service organization must ensure that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted between services and are consistent with organizational policies.","None"]
["The organization must appropriately manage identifiers.","ICAM-13","Internal service organization","IA-4","• The internal service organization must manage identifiers by:\n- IA-4(A): Receiving authorization (Note: Assuming that this authorization is provided under AC-2(B));\n- IA-4(B): Selecting an identifier that identifies the individual or service; and\n- IA-4(C): Assigning the identifier to the intended individual.\n• IA-4(D): The internal service organization must ensure that identifiers are not reused for at least 2 years.\n• IA-4(E): The internal service organization must disable identifiers after 90 days of inactivity.","None"]
["The organization must appropriately manage authenticators.","ICAM-14","Internal service organization","IA-5","• The internal service organization must manage authenticators by:\n- IA-5(A): Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual or, in the case of a service account, the individual responsible for the account;\n- IA-5(B): Establishing initial authenticator content, when applicable; \n- IA-5(C): Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;\n- IA-5(D): Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;\n- IA-5(F): Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for authenticators;\n- IA-5(G): Changing or refreshing authenticators at least every 180 days; \n- IA-5(H): Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; and\n- IA-5(I): Requiring individuals to take specific security safeguards to protect authenticators.\n• IA-5(1): The internal service organization must configure a minimum password policy:\n- IA-5(1)(a): Password requirements: case sensitive, minimum of eight characters, and at least one each of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters.\n- IA-5(1)(b): Number of change characters = at least one.\n- IA-5(1)(c): Lifetime restrictions = one day minimum, sixty day maximum.\n- IA-5(1)(d): Password re-use = 24 generations.\n• IA-5(6): The internal service organization must ensure that authenticators are protected to the same level as the solution's highest confidentiality category level.\n• IA-5(7): The internal service organization must ensure that static authenticators are encrypted when embedded in applications or access scripts.","None"]

{"sheet":"IR reqs","index":6,"n_rows":12,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":12,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,1,4,4]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on security incident management."]
["Security objective","The organization manages security incidents related to the SaaS-based solution to ensure a well-orchestrated and coordinated response to actual and suspected threat compromise.\nThe organization should leverage a centralized security incident management system (people, process, technology) to satisfy this security objective."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
["Other"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["INCM-1","The organization must implement a security incident handling process for the solution.","Security organization","IR-4","• IR-4(A): The incident handling process must include preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery.\n• IR-4(B): The security organization must coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities.\n• IR-4(C): The security organization must incorporate lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing/exercises, and implement the resulting changes accordingly.","None"]
["INCM-2","The organization must track and document all security incidents involving the solution.","Security organization","IR-5","• IA-5  The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.","None"]
["INCM-3","The organization must include reporting provisions in the security incident handling process.","Security organization","IR-6","• IR-6(A): The security organization must include in the security incident handling process reporting provisions for users and administrator to immediately report suspected security incidents to the security organization.\n• IR-6(B): The security organization must report security incidents to the organizations and within time periods specified in the GC CSEMP [13].","None"]
["INCM-4","The organization must develop a security incident response plan for the solution.","Security organization","IR-8","• The security organization must develop an incident response plan that:\n- IR-8(A)(a): Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;\n- IR-8(A)(b): Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;\n- IR-8(A)(c): Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;\n- IR-8(A)(d): Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;\n- IR-8(A)(e): Defines reportable incidents;\n- IR-8(A)(f): Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization; and\n- IR-8(A)(g): Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability.\n• IR-8(A)(h): The organization must ensure stakeholder review and approval of the incident response plan prior to implementation.\n• IR-8(C): The security organization must review the incident response plan at least annually.\n• IR-8(D): The organization must update the incident response plan to address service/organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing.","None"]
["INCM-5","The organization must appropriately communicate the incident response plan to individuals with assigned incident response responsibilities and other organizations.","ISO, BO, SO","IR-8","• IR-8(B): The ISO, BO, and SO of the organization must distribute copies of the incident response plan to individuals with assigned incident response responsibilities and other organizations as per the GC CSEMP.\n• IR-8(D): The ISO, BO, and SO of the organization must update the incident response plan to address solution or organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing.\n• IR-8(E): The ISO, BO, and SO of the organization must communicate incident response plan changes to individuals with assigned incident response responsibilities and other organizations as per the GC CSEMP.\n• IR-8(F): The ISO, BO, and SO of the organization must protect the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","None"]

{"sheet":"CM reqs","index":7,"n_rows":13,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":13,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[5,10,5,13],[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,1,4,4],[5,7,5,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on configuration management."]
["Security objective","The organization documents and controls change to the baseline configuration of the SaaS-based solution.\nThe organization can leverage an existing configuration management system (people, process, and technology) to satisfy this security objective."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
["Other","Cross references with: 1)  CCCS Local Assessment Question_List for first pass; 2) CCCS Local Assessment controls in Low/Medium as required.  \n"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["CONF-1","The organization must document and maintain under configuration control a current baseline configuration of the solution.","Internal service organization","CM-2,  CM-2(2)"," In the context of SaaS, configuration items consist of data collections, configuration settings, and documentation.","None"]
["CONF-2","The organization must control changes to the baseline configuration.","Internal service organization","CM-3","• CM-3(A): The internal service organization must determine the types of changes to the solution that are configuration-controlled.\n• CM-3(B): The internal service organization must review proposed configuration-controlled changes to the solution and approve or disapprove such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses.\n• CM-3(C): The internal service organization must document configuration change decisions associated with the solution.\n• CM-3(D): The internal service organization is responsible for implementing approved configuration-controlled changes to the solution.\n• CM-3(E): The internal service organization must retain records of configuration-controlled changes to the solution in accordance with operational and information management requirements. \n• CM-3(F): The internal service organization must audit activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the solution in accordance with organizational audit requirements.\n• CM-3(G): The internal service organization must coordinate and provide oversight for configuration change control activities through the organization's configuration change control board.","None"]
["CONF-3","The organization must include in the change management process an security impact analysis.","Internal service organization","CM-4","Also relates to CM-3(B).","None"]
["CONF-4","The organization must restrict the privileges to make configuration changes to the solution.","Internal service organization","CM-5","In normal circumstances, the privileges to make configuration changes should be assigned to a few individuals with the internal service organization. Restrictions would be enforced through the ICAM requirements.","None"]
["CONF-5","The organization must establish, document, implement, and maintain configuration settings for the solution in a manner that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements.","Internal service organization","CM-6","CM-6(D): The internal service organization must place configuration settings under configuration management in accordance with the requirements specified above.","None"]
["CONF-6","The organization must develop, document, and implement a configuration management plan for the solution.","Internal service organization","CM-9","• The internal service organization can manage the configuration of the solution under an existing configuration management plan.\n• The configuration management plan must:\n- CM-9(A): Address roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;\n- CM-9(B): Establish a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items; and\n- CM-9(C): Define the configuration items for the solution and place the configuration items under configuration management; and\n• CM-9(D): The internal service organization must protect the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.","None"]

{"sheet":"DP reqs","index":8,"n_rows":13,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":13,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[4,10,4,13],[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,7,4,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on data protection."]
["Security objective","The organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of GC data while at rest in the SaaS-based solution and while in transit to and from the solution and GC hosts and endpoints.\nAll the security controls in this design pattern may be inherited from the SaaS application or lower layers."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["DATA-1","The organization must backup GC data to maintain agreed upon service levels to the GC during contingencies.","Internal service organization","CP-9","• It is possible to satisfy this requirement without a traditional backup and restore solution, for example by replicating the data to another facility.\n• The frequency of the backups must be consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives.","None"]
["DATA-2","The organization must protect GC data while it is in transit between the solution and GC hosts and end points using GC-approved cryptography.","Internal service organization","SC-8","• The organization must protect the confidentiality and the integrity of GC data.\n• SC-8(1): The organization must implement cryptography in compliance with ITSP.40.111 [7] and ITSP.40.062 [8].","None"]
["DATA-3","The organization must implement and manage cryptography in accordance GC standards.","Internal service organization","SC-12, SC-13","The key management process must address key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction.","None"]
["DATA-4","The organization must use public key certificates that are issued under a suitable certificate policy by a GC-approved certification authority (CA).","Internal service organization","SC-17","The organization must use public key certificates in compliance with ITSP.40.111.","None"]
["DATA-5","The organization must protect GC data while it is at rest within the solution using GC-approved cryptography.","Internal service organization","SC-28","• The organization must protect the confidentiality and the integrity of GC data.\n• SC-28(1): Cryptography must comply with ITSP.40.111.","None"]
["DATA-6","The organization must define and configure input validation capabilities for user input and APIs.","Internal service organization","SI-10","This security control will likely be inherited from the SaaS application layer. However, there may be some aspects that are configurable or the GC may be able to influence changes in the SaaS application to satisfy specific requirements.","None"]
["DATA-7","The organization handles and retains information within the solution and information output from the solution in accordance with applicable GC legislation and TBS policies, directives, and standards.","Internal service organization","SI-12","As directed by departmental information \nmanagement authorities.","None"]

{"sheet":"NC reqs","index":9,"n_rows":9,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":9,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[4,10,4,13],[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,7,4,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on network connectivity."]
["Security objective","Interoperations between the SaaS-based solution and GC internal resources occur in compliance with applicable network connectivity security requirements."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["CONN-1","The organization must ensure that communications to and from the solution occur through the secure gateway in accordance with applicable requirements.","Internal service organization","AC-4, AC-17(1), AC-17(2), SC-7","The organization must ensure that communications to and from the solution occur through the secure gateway in accordance with applicable requirements.","None"]
["CONN-2","The organization must ensure that interconnections between the solution and GC internal resources are established in accordance with network security zoning standards.","Internal service organization","AC-4, AC-17(1), AC-17(2), SC-7","The network security zoning standards include ITSG-22 [10] and ITSG-38 [11], and SSC's security zoning standards.","None"]
["CONN-3","The organization must use dedicated workstations located in a management zone to access the solution using privileged accounts.","Internal service organization","AC-17(100)","This requirement applies to primary or subscription accounts and may apply to user and service accounts to which privileged access has been allocated.","None"]

{"sheet":"SM reqs","index":10,"n_rows":10,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":10,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[4,10,4,13],[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,7,4,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on security monitoring."]
["Security objective","The organization monitors the security of the SaaS-based solution to detect threats and inform in a timely manner the incident response process of actual and suspected threat compromise.\nThe organization should leverage a centralized security monitoring system (people, process, technology) to satisfy this security objective."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["SMON-1","The organization must continuously monitor the security of the solution to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks and unauthorized use of the services.","Security organization","SI-4, AC-2(G)","• SI-4(A): The security organization must ensure that the monitoring objectives are consistent with the GC CSEMP [13].\n• SI-4(B): The security organization must define and document the monitoring techniques and methods that will be used to detect unauthorized use.\n• SI-4(D): The security organization must implement measures to protect monitoring information from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.\n• SI-4(E): The security organization must implement a mechanism to heighten the level of monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or Canada.\n• SI-4(F): The security organization must obtain legal opinion with regard to its monitoring activities of the solution in accordance with GC legislation and TBS policies, directives, and standards.\n• SI-4(G): The security organization must determine the monitoring information that needs to be communicated, to whom (personal or roles), and the reasons or frequency of these communications. \n• AC-2(G): The security organization must monitor the use of solution accounts.","None"]
["SMON-2","For critical services, the internal service organization should consult with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) to explore the feasibility of installing government furnished equipment (GFE) on the provider's premise for monitoring purposes.","Security organization","SI-4","This requirement relates to SI-4(C). It was included as a result of a comment from CCCS in the context of the Next Gen Pay initiative.","None"]
["SMON-3","The organization must define and configure monitoring alerts and notifications of detected suspicious events.","Security organization","SI-4(5), SI-4(7)","• SI-4(5): The security organization must ensure that the alerts are sent to the right personnel or roles consistent with the GC CSEMP. \n• SI-4(7): The security organization must ensure that notifications of detected suspicious events are sent to the incident response personnel consistent with the SaaS subscription's security incident management process and the GC CSEMP. The internal service organization must also define and implement procedures to take the least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events upon detection.","None"]
["SMON-4 (not in Security Design Patterns for SaaS-based Information System Solutions)","When available, the organization must use the security verification capabilities within the solution to periodically verify the security status of the solution.","Security organization","SI-6","• This requirement may be inherited from the SaaS application or lower layers.\n• SI-6(B): The security organization must determine the reasons or frequency of those verifications.","None"]

{"sheet":"AU reqs","index":11,"n_rows":8,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":8,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[4,10,4,13],[0,1,0,4],[1,1,1,4],[2,1,2,4],[3,1,3,4],[4,7,4,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on auditing."]
["Security objective","The organization audits the use of the SaaS-based solution to ensure that only authorized individuals use the solution for authorized purposes."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["AUDT-1","The organization must configure auditable events to support investigations of security incidents.","Internal service organization","AU-2, AC-2(4), AC-6(9)","• This requirement applies only when the configuration of auditable events is exposed to consumers. \n• AU-2(B): The internal service organization must coordinate the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events.\n\n• The following events must be auditable:\n- AU-2(A): Successful and unsuccessful account logins, object access, policy change, system events, all administrator activity, authentication checks, authorization checks, data deletions, data access, data changes, and permission changes;\n- AC-2(4): Account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal; and\n- AC-6(9): Use of privileged functions.\n• AU-2(C): The internal service organization must provide a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.\n","None"]
["AUDT-2","The organization must periodically audit account-related activities.","Audit organization","AU-6, AU-2, AC-2(4), AC-6(9)","• AU-2(D): The auditor must determine which of the auditable events specified under APPM-15 must be subject to periodic audits. At a minimum, the audit must audit the events listed under AC-2(4) and AC-6(9). \n• AC-6(9): The auditor must audit the use of privileged functions at least weekly.\n• AU-6(A): For every event being audited, the auditor must define what constitutes inappropriate or unusual activity, and audit events on the basis of those activities.","None"]

{"sheet":"CP reqs","index":12,"n_rows":11,"n_cols":14,"rows_kept":11,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[4,10,4,13],[0,1,0,6],[1,1,1,6],[2,1,2,6],[3,1,3,6],[4,7,4,9]]}
["Goal","This security design pattern focuses on contingency planning."]
["Security objective","The organization plans for contingencies impacting the SaaS-based solution to avoid disruptions of essential GC program and service delivery.\nContingency planning must address all deliberate and accidental threats to which the SaaS-based solution is exposed."]
["Assumptions","None"]
["Consumer Notes"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"FIRST PASS",null,null,"SECOND PASS"]
["ID","Security requirement","Actors","Related security controls","Implementation requirements for PBMM","Implementation Status","Comment","Documentation Review Notes \n(How it is met/not met/partial/inherited) ","Source \n(document and page number(s))","Questions for Government Organization \n(either via walkthrough or email - assessor's choice)","Answers obtained via walkthrough(s)\n(if and as applicable - include source, if possible)","Assessor's Final Comments \nDescribe deficiencies, concerns, and any alternative implementations the vendor may have for meeting of this control. ","Identified Customer-specific Implementation Requirements \n(Specific elements the customer is responsible for implementing to ensure the CSP-allocated ITS security requirements are satisfied)","Recommendations for Risk Remediation \n(if and as applicable)"]
["CONF-1","The organization must define contingency requirements for the solution","Business owner","CP-2","• CP-2(A)(a): The business owner must identify the essential business capabilities that the solution is to support and associated contingency requirements.\n• CP-2(A)(b): The business owner must define recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics.","None"]
["CONF-2","The organization must develop a contingency plan to support contingency requirements.","Business owner","CP-2","The contingency plan must:\n- CP-2(A)(c): Address contingency roles, responsibilities, and assigned individuals with contact information; and\n- CP-2(A)(d): Address the maintenance of essential business capabilities despite a solution disruption, compromise, or failure.\n• CP-2(A)(f): The organization must review and approve the contingency plan prior to implementation.\n• CP-2(C): The organization must coordinate contingency planning activities with incident handling activities.\n• CP-2(D): The organization must review the contingency plan at least annually.\n• CP-2(E): The organization must update the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, solution, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing.","None"]
["CONF-3","The organization must appropriately communicate the contingency plan to individuals with assigned contingency responsibilities.","Internal service organization","CP-2","• CP-2(B): The internal service organization must distribute copies of the contingency plan to individuals with assigned contingency responsibilities.\n• CP-2(F): The internal service organization must communicate contingency plan changes to individuals with assigned contingency responsibilities.\n• CP-2(G): The internal service organization must protect the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification","None"]
["CONF-4","The organization must provide training to individuals with assigned contingency responsibilities.","Internal service organization","CP-3","•CP-3(A): The internal service organization must provide contingency training to individuals within 10 days of assuming contingency responsibilities.\n• CP-3(C): The internal service organization must provide contingency training at least annually thereafter.\n• CP-3(1): The internal service organization must incorporate simulated events into the contingency training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.","None"]
["CONF-5","The organization must periodically test the contingency plan.","Internal service organization","CP-4","• CP-4(A): The internal service organization must define test procedures for the contingency plan and test the plan at least annually to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan.\n• CP-4(1): The internal service organization must coordinate contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.\n• CP-4(B)(C): The internal service organization must review the contingency plan test results and implement corrective actions, if needed.\n","None"]

{"sheet":"Feature Requests","index":13,"n_rows":6,"n_cols":12,"rows_kept":6,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
[null,null,null,null,null,"When to use?","Use when you need to send a security related  feature request to a vendor."]
["FeatureRequest_ID","Clause_ID","SaaS_ID","SortOrder","Domain","Category","About the Feature Request","Sent to Vendor?","Suggested State for Inclusion","Decision Aid","Feature Request Text","User Defined Comments"]
[null,null,null,null,"Information","Identity, Credential and Access Management (ICAM)","Enables GC users to detect account take over situations.\n\nThe complexity of this feature request is minimal. If a provider rejects this request, consider finding another provider.","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 2.","Feature Request: Improve ability to detect account take over.\n \nCurrent situation: Your system does not allow its end users to detect account take over events.\n\nDesired outcome: \n1.\tEnd users can view 90 days of their login activity, and should be notified when key account information is changed. The following should be made available:\n1.\tAll successful login events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n2.\tAll unsuccessful login events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n3.\tAll second factor unsuccessful login events are made available to end users for 90 days. \n4.\tAll password change events are made available to end users for 90 days.\n5.\tAll successful AND unsuccessful password change events are made available to end users for 90 days. \n6.\tAll second factor administration events (adding, removing of second factor mechanisms) are made available to end users for 90 days.\n\nBenefits of the change:\n1.\tThese changes, when implemented, will allow end users to detect malicious account take over activity. This change shares the responsibility of account take over detection with your end users.\n \nNegative effects of the status quo:\n1.\tIf this change is not implemented, your cloud service is responsible for detecting and notifying its end users of suspected account take over activity.\n\nThank you for considering this feature request. ","AC-9 (4)"]
[null,null,null,null,"Integration","Identity, Credential and Access Management (ICAM)","The ability to use strong multi factor authentication should be a feature of the SaaS. If strong multi factor authentication is not available, there should be other strong account take over prevention measures in place. For example, the implementation of password banning based on wordlists of known bad passwords. \n\nThe complexity of this feature request should be minimal. If the vendor does not accept this request, consider finding another provider.","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 2.","Feature Request: Improve account takeover defences. \n\nCurrent situation:\n1.\t It is currently impossible to use strong multi factor authentication on your platform. The use of compromised passwords is also allowed. This can lead to a users account being more easily taken over by bots and bad actors.\n\nDesired Outcome:\n1.\tConsider adding strong multi factor authentication. \n2.\tConsider adding support for password banning. Especially if strong multi factor authentication can’t be implemented. When processing a request to update a password, the new password must be compared against a wordlist of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords. For example, passwords obtained from previous breaches; dictionary words; repetitive or sequential characters (e.g. ‘aaaaaa’, ‘1234abcd’); and, context-specific words, such as the name of the service, the username, and derivatives thereof.\n\nBenefits of the change:\n1.\tThese changes, when implemented, will help prevent accounts from being taken over. This will increase the confidence we have in your organization. 1) Allowing the use of strong multi factor authentication will help prevent account takeover; 2) Blocking the use of compromised passwords will help prevent credential stuffing attacks which leads to account takeover. \n\nNegative effects of the status quo:\n1.\tIf this change is not implemented, or equivalent protections are not put in place, then your service is vulnerable to credential stuffing/account take over attacks which makes your service not fit for use.","IA-2, IA-8, ICAM-8"]
[null,null,null,null,"Security","Supply Chain Risk Management","Providers processing Protected information should register with Public Services and Procurement Canada's (PSPC) Contract Security Program (CSP).\n\nPSPC will not register a provider if they are only to process Unclassified information. \n\nThe complexity of this feature request is minimal. If a provider rejects this request AND you are processing Protected information on their platform, consider finding another provider.","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 2.","Feature Request: Register with the Government of Canada’s Public Services and Procurement Canada's (PSPC) Contract Security Program (CSP) and Integrity Regime.\n \nCurrent situation: Your company is not registered with the Government of Canada’s Public Services and Procurement Canada's (PSPC) Contract Security Program (CSP) and Integrity Regime, therefore your services cannot be used to process Protected information.\n\n1.\tRegistration forms - https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src/formulaires-forms-eng.html\n2.\tLevels of security - https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src/protection-safeguarding/niveaux-levels-eng.html\n3.\tGovernment of Canada's Integrity Regime – https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/communiquez-contact-eng.html\n\nDesired outcome: \n1.\tYour company is in good standing with Public Services and Procurement Canada's (PSPC) Contract Security Program (CSP) and Integrity Regime. Specifically:\n1.\tYour company holds a valid Designated Organization Screening (DOS) with approved document safeguarding at the Protected level.\n2.\tYour company holds an ethical business status with Public Services and Procurement Canada's (PSPC) Integrity Regime.\n3.\tAll company personnel requiring access to Protected information hold a valid personnel security screening at the level of Secret, or as required by the Contract Security Program.\n\nBenefits of the change:\n1.\tThese changes, when implemented, will enable the Government of Canada to use your systems for processing Protected business activities. \n \nNegative effects of the status quo:\n1.\tIf this change is not implemented, your service will be ineligible for more sensitive business activities. \n\n\nThank you for considering this feature request. ","SA-12, S6"]
[null,null,null,null,null,"Security Incident Management"," The GC must be notified when its data has been comprised, or when the vendor's service is not available. There should be an expectation that the GC will be notified within a reasonable amount of time if there is an event. \n\nThe complexity of this feature request is minimal. If a provider rejects this request, consider finding another provider.","TBD",null,null,"In Development","IR-4, IR-6, INCM-3"]

{"sheet":"Sample Contract Clauses","index":14,"n_rows":45,"n_cols":13,"rows_kept":45,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[0,4,0,25]]}
[null,null,null,null,"MVP 3 is for experimental purposes only."]
[null,null,null,null,"When to use?","Use when required to provide contract clauses for a procurement effort."]
["Clause_ID","SaaS_ID","SortOrder","Domain","Category","Recommended Contract Clauses","For Tier 0?","For Tier 1?","For Tier 2?","User Defined Include","Suggested State for Inclusion","Decision Aid"]
[null,"I1",300,"Information","Data Protection","[X].1 Securing Canada’s Data  \n\n[X].1.1  The Contractor must protect Canada’s Data from unauthorized access, modification, or exfiltration. This includes implementing and maintaining appropriate technical and organizational security measures including information security policies, procedures, and security controls to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Canada’s Data.  \n","Required","Required","Required","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 0."]
[null,"API1",310,"Integration","API integration","[X].1 Application Programming Interfaces (API)\n[X].1.1 The Contractor must:\n\na) Provide services that use open, published, supported, and documented Application Programming Interfaces (API) to support activities such as interoperability between components and to facilitate migration of applications; \n\nb) Provide a means via API for applications to provision services, and extract reporting, billing and financial data pertaining to the cloud services consumed by the GC;\n\nc) Take reasonable measures to protect both internal and external APIs through secure authentication methods. This includes ensuring that all externally exposed API queries require successful authentication before they can be called and providing the ability for the GC to meet the GC’s standards on API (https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/modern-emerging-technologies/government-canada-standards-apis.html). ","Optional","Recommended","Recommended","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S7",332,"Security","Supply Chain Risk Management","[X].1 On-going Supply Chain Integrity \n[X].1.1 On-going Supply Chain Integrity Process\n[X].1.1.1 The Parties acknowledge that security is a critical consideration for Canada with respect to this FA and that on-going assessment of Cloud Services will be required with respect to individual SOs throughout the FA Period.  \n\n[X].1.1.2 The parties acknowledge that Canada reserves the right to review the native Cloud Services and third party marketplace services of any Contractor in whole or in part at any time for supply chain integrity concerns. This acknowledgement does not obligate the Contractor to support the SCI review. \n\n[X].1.1.3 Throughout the FA Period and any SO Period, the Contractor must provide to Canada information relating to any data breach of the Contractor’s network of which it knows, that results in either (a) any unlawful access to Canada’s content stored on Contractor’s equipment or facilities, or (b) any unauthorized access to such equipment or facilities, where in either case such access results in loss, disclosure or alteration of Canada’s content in relation to change of ownership, to the Cloud Services under this FA, and to any individual SO, that would  compromise the integrity, confidentiality, access controls, availability, consistency or audit mechanism of the system or the data and applications of Canada \n\n[X].2 Sub-processors\n\n[X].2.1 The Contractor must provide a list of Sub-processors that could be used to perform any part of the Cloud Services in providing Canada with the Cloud Services. The list must include the following information (i) the name of the Sub-processor; (ii) the identification of the scope activities that would be performed by the Sub-processor; and (iii) the country (or countries) where the Sub-processor would perform the activities required to support the Cloud Services.\n\n[X].2.2 The Contractor must provide a list of Sub-processors within ten days of the Framework Agreement award date. The Contractor must provide Canada notice (by updating the website and providing Customer with a mechanism to obtain notice of that update) of any new Sub-processor at least 14-days in advance of providing that Sub-processors with access to Customer Data or Personal Data.  \n\n[X].3 Change of Control\n\n[X].3.1 If Canada determines in its sole discretion that a change of control affecting the Contractor (either in the Contractor itself or any of its parents, up to the ultimate owner) may be injurious to national security, Canada may terminate the FA on a “no-fault” basis by providing notice to the Contractor within 90 calendar days of receiving the notice from the Contractor regarding the change of control. Canada will not be required to provide its reasons for terminating the FA in relation to the change of control, if Canada determines in its discretion that the disclosure of those reasons could itself be injurious to national security.\n\n[X].3.2 If Canada determines in its sole discretion that a change of control affecting a subcontractor (either in the subcontractor itself or any of its parents, up to the ultimate owner) may be injurious to national security, Canada will notify the Contractor in writing of its determination. Canada will not be required to provide the reasons for its determination, if Canada determines in its discretion that the disclosure of those reasons could itself be injurious to national security. The Contractor must, within 30 calendar days of receiving Canada’s determination, arrange for another subcontractor, acceptable to Canada, to deliver the portion of the Cloud Services being delivered by the existing subcontractor (or the Contractor must deliver this portion of the Cloud Services itself). If the Contractor fails to do so within this time period, Canada will be entitled to terminate the FA on a “no-fault” basis by providing notice to the Contractor within 120 calendar days of receiving the original notice from the Contractor regarding the change of control.\n\n[X].3.3 In this Article, termination on a “no-fault” basis means that neither party will be liable to the other in connection with the change of control and the resulting termination, and Canada will only be responsible for paying for those services received up to the effective date of the termination.\n\n[X].3.4 Despite the foregoing, Canada’s right to terminate on a “no-fault” basis will not apply to circumstances in which there is an internal reorganization that does not affect the ownership of the ultimate parent corporation or parent partnership of the Contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be; that is, Canada does not have a right to terminate the FA pursuant to this Article where the Contractor or subcontractor continues, at all times, to be controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same ultimate owner.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"B1",360,"Business","Terms of Service","[X].1 Service Level Agreements\nThe Cloud Service Provider's Service Level Commitments must provide GC support for their Cloud Services. Support must include, at the minimum, any published and Commercially Available support (i.e. warranty, maintenance and support services) typically provided to customers who provision the Cloud Service Provider's Commercially Available Public Cloud Services.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"B1",370,"Business","Terms of Service","[X].1 Notifications\n\nThe Cloud Service Provider must provide:\n\na) Notification of any interruption that is expected to impact service availability and performance, as agreed to by the parties and included in the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and/or Service Level Agreements (SLAs);  \n\nb) Regular updates on the status of returning the services to an operating state according to the agreed upon SLAs and system availability requirements, both as advance alerts and post-implementation alerts; \n\nc) Notification for services that will be discontinued and that has an impact on customer Services; \nd) Information system security alerts, advisories, and directives for vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the Cloud Services.\n","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S35",380,"Security","Information System Monitoring","[X].1 Service Portal – General\nThe Cloud Service Provider must provide a secure, web-based, self-service online portal that enables Canada to remotely administer the Cloud Services. This portal must include, at a minimum:\na) Service provisioning;\nb) Trouble ticketing with email-based notifications;\nc) Account management and user provisioning including:  \n    i) ability to manage users and associated data; and\n    ii) creating, deleting, and modifying user accounts and permissions;\nd) Authentication including ability to enable SSO experience;\ne) Ability to securely access the portal using multi-factor authentication mechanisms to authenticate users;\nf) Service health or status information including  resource usage statistics, reporting on performance, thresholds and alerts; and\ng) Service state transitions including starting and stopping.\nCloud Service provisioning/de-provisioning must be available via an Application Programming Interface (API). In addition, the Contractor must provide links to documentation, articles, tutorials and guidance in order to help the GC in the use of the API services. \n","Optional","Optional","Recommended","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S1",400,"Security","Documentation","[X].1 Roles and Responsibilities for Security \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities for the security controls and features of the Cloud Services between the Contractor and Canada. This includes, at a minimum, the roles and responsibilities for: \n    (i) account management; \n    (ii) boundary protection; \n    (iii) asset and information system backup; \n    (iv) incident management; \n    (v) System monitoring; and \n    (vi) vulnerability management. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must provide to Canada an up-to-date document that delineates the roles and responsibilities: \n    (i) at contract award; \n    (ii) on an annual basis; \n    (iii) when there are significant changes to such roles and responsibilities as a result of a Change to the Cloud Services; or \n    (iv) upon request of Canada.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S2",500,"Security","Third-Party Assurance","[X].1 Third-Party Assurance: Certifications and Reports \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must ensure that Canada’s Data, Contractor Infrastructure (including any IaaS, PaaS or SaaS Service provided to Canada) and Service Locations are secured with appropriate security measures that comply with the requirements set forth the Contractor’s security practices and policies. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must demonstrate that the measures comply with the requirements set forth in the following certifications and audit reports by providing independent third party assessment reports or certifications that addresses each service layer (e.g. IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) within the Cloud Service offering, including:  \n \n    (a) ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security management systems – Certification achieved by an accredited certification body; AND  \n \n    (b) ISO/IEC 27017:2015 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for Cloud Services achieved by an accredited certification body; AND  \n \n    (c) AICPA Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type II Audit Report 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality - issued by an independent Certified Public Accountant. \n \n[X].1.3 Each certification or audit report provided must: \n    (i) identify the legal business name of the Contractor or applicable Sub-processor; \n    (ii) identify the Contractor’s or Sub-processor’s certification date and the status of that certification; \n    (iii) identify the services included within the scope of the certification report. If the carved out method is used to exclude subservice organizations such as data centre hosting, the subservice organization’s assessment report must be included. \n \n[X].1.4 Each audit will result in the generation of an audit report which must be made available to Canada. Certifications must be accompanied by supporting evidence such as the ISO assessment report developed to validate compliance to the ISO certification and must clearly disclose any material findings by the auditor. The Contractor must promptly remediate issues raised in any audit report to the satisfaction of the auditor. \n \n[X].1.5 Each SOC 2 Type II audit report must have been performed within the 12 months prior to the start of the contract. A bridge letter may be provided to demonstrate that the Contractor \nis in process of renewal where there is a gap between the service organization’s report date and the user organization’s year-end (i.e., calendar or fiscal year-end).   \n \n[X].1.6 The Contractor is expected to maintain its certification of ISO 27001, ISO 27017, and SOC 2 Type II for the duration of the contract. The Contractor must provide, at least annually, and promptly upon the request of Canada, all reports or records that may be reasonably required to demonstrate that the Contractor’s certifications are current and maintained.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"P1",500,"Privacy","Third-Party Assurance","[X] Third-Party Assurance\n[X].1 Third-Party Assurance: Certifications  \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must ensure that in respect of any personal information including Canada’s Data that it may host, store or process, on Contractor Infrastructure (including any IaaS, PaaS or SaaS Service provided to Canada) and Service Locations are secured appropriate privacy and security measures that comply with the requirements set forth the Contractor’s privacy practices and policies. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must demonstrate that the measures comply with the requirements set forth in the following certifications by providing independent third party assessment reports or certifications that addresses each service layer (e.g. IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) within the Cloud Service offering, including: \n \n    (a) ISO/IEC 27018:2014 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors – Certification achieved by an accredited certification body. \n \n[X].1.3 Each certification provided must: \n    (i) identify the legal business name of the Contractor or applicable Sub-processor; \n    (ii) identify the Contractor’s or Sub-processor’s certification date and the status of that certification;\n    (iii) identify the services included within the scope of the certification report. If the carved out method is used to exclude subservice organizations such as data centre hosting, the subservice organization’s assessment report must be included. \n \n[X].1.4 Each audit will result in the generation of an audit report which must be made available to Canada. Certifications must be accompanied by supporting evidence such as the ISO assessment report developed to validate compliance to the ISO certification and must clearly disclose any material findings by the auditor. The Contractor must promptly remediate issues raised in any audit report to the satisfaction of the auditor. \n \n[X].1.5 The Contractor is expected to maintain its certification of ISO 27018 for the duration of the contract. The Contractor must provide, at least annually, and promptly upon the request of Canada, all reports or records that may be reasonably required to demonstrate that the Contractor’s certifications are current and maintained.    \n \n[X].2 Privacy Compliance \n[X].2.1 The Contractor must demonstrate through third party assessment reports and audit reports that it:\n    (a) Restricts creating, collecting, receiving, managing, accessing, using, retaining, sending, disclosing and disposing of Personal Information to only that which is necessary to perform the Cloud Services and; \n \n    (b) Has implemented updated security processes and controls such as access management controls, human resource security, cryptography and physical, operational and communications security that preserve the integrity, confidentiality and accuracy of all information and data and metadata, irrespective of format.  \n \n[X].3 Auditing Compliance \n[X].3.1 In the event Canada needs to conduct security and privacy audits, inspections and/or review any additional information (e.g., documentation, data flows, data protection description, data architecture and security descriptions), both Parties agree to negotiate a solution in good faith and consider both the rationale for Canada’s request and the Contractor’s processes and protocols. \n \n[X].3.2 The Contractor must conduct the privacy and security audits of the computers, computing environment and physical data centers that it uses in processing Canada’s Data containing PI as follows: \n  \n    (a) Where a standard or framework provides for audits, an audit of such control standard or framework will be initiated at least annually;  \n \n    (b) Each audit will be performed according to the standards and rules of the regulatory or accreditation body for each applicable control standard or framework; and \n \n    (c) Each audit will be performed by qualified, independent, third party security auditors that (i) is qualified under the AICPA, CPA Canada, or ISO certification regime, and (ii) conforms to the ISO/IEC 17020 quality management system standard at the Contractor’s selection and expense. \n \n[X].3.3 Each audit will result in the generation of an audit report that must be made available to Canada. The audit report must clearly disclose any material findings by the third party auditor. The Contractor must, at its own expense, promptly remediate issues and correct deficiencies raised in any audit report to the satisfaction of the auditor. \n \n[X].3.4 Upon request of Canada, additional supplementary evidence from the Contractor, including system security and privacy plans, designs, or architecture documents that provide a comprehensive system description including all the data elements containing PI, may be provided by the Contractor or a Sub-processor to supplement the certification and audit reports described in Section 5 (Third Party Assurance) in order to demonstrate the Contractor’s compliance with the required industry certifications.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S3",600,"Security","Third-Party Assurance","[X].1 Auditing Compliance \n \n[X].1.1  The Contractor must conduct the privacy and security audits of the security of the computers, computing environment and physical data centers that it uses in processing and protecting Canada’s Data as follows: \n\n    (a) Where a standard or framework provides for audits, an audit of such control standard or framework will be initiated at least annually;  \n \n    (b) Each audit will be performed according to the standards and rules of the regulatory or accreditation body for each applicable control standard or framework; and \n \n    (c) Each audit will be performed by independent, third party auditors that (i) are qualified under the AICPA, CPA Canada, or ISO certification regime, and (ii) conform to the ISO/IEC 17020 quality management system standard at the Contractor’s selection and expense. \n \n[X].1.2 Each audit will result in the generation of an audit report that must be made available to Canada. The audit report must clearly disclose any material findings by the third party auditor. The Contractor must, at its own expense, promptly remediate issues and correct deficiencies raised in any audit report to the satisfaction of the auditor. \n \n[X].1.3 Upon request of Canada, additional supplementary evidence from the Contractor, including system security plans, designs, or architecture documents that provide a comprehensive system description, may be provided by the Contractor or a Sub-processor to supplement the certification and audit reports described in Section 5 (Third Party Assurance) in order to demonstrate the Contractor’s compliance with the required industry certifications.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S4",700,"Security","Third-Party Assurance","[X].1 Cloud Service Provider (CSP) IT Security Assessment Program \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must demonstrate compliance with the security requirements selected in the GC Security Control Profile for Cloud-Based GC IT Services for Protected B, Medium \nIntegrity and Medium Availability (PBMM) \n(https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/modern-emergingtechnologies/cloud-computing/government-canada-security-control-profile-cloud-based-itservices.html) for the scope of the Cloud Services provided by the Contractor. Compliance must be demonstrated through the mapping of security controls to the applicable industry certifications identified below, and validated through independent third party assessments.   \n \n[X].1.2 Compliance will be assessed and validated through the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Information Technology (IT) Security Assessment Process (ITSM.50.100) (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/cloud-serviceprovider-information-technology-security-assessment-process-itsm50100).  \n \nThe Contractor must demonstrate that they participated in the process by successfully on-boarded, participated in, and completed the program. This includes providing the following documentation: \n\n    (i) A copy of the confirmation letter that confirms that they have on-boarded into the program;  \n    (ii) A copy of the most recent completed assessment report provided by CCCS; and \n    (iii) A copy of the most recent summary report provided by CCCS.  \n \nThe Contractor should contact the CCCS Client Services for any additional information related to the CSP IT Assessment Program.  \n \nIt is the continuous obligation of the Contractor of the proposed Cloud Services to notify CCCS when there are significant changes to its delivery of the IT Security services supporting the Contractor offering.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S12",800,"Security","Data protection","[X].1. Data Protection \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must provide the capability to allow Canada to: \n\n    (a) Implement encryption of data at rest for the Cloud Services hosting Canada’s Data where the encryption of data at rest remains in effect, uninterrupted, and active at all times, even in the case of equipment or technology failure, in accordance with Section 13 - Cryptographic Protection. \n \n    (b) Transmit Canada’s Data in a secure manner including ability for the GC to implement encryption for data in transit for all transmissions of Canada’s Data, in accordance with Section 13 - Cryptographic Protection and Section 21- Network and Communications Security. \n \n[X].1.2  The Contractor must:  \n \n    (a) Implement security controls that restricts administrative access to Canada’s Data and Systems by the Contractor and provides the ability to require the approval of Canada before the Contractor can access Canada’s Data to perform support, maintenance or operational activities.  \n \n    (b) Take reasonable measures to ensure that Contractor Personnel do not have standing or ongoing access rights to Canada’s Data, and access is restricted to Contractor Personnel with a need-to-know, including resources that provide technical or customer support, based on approval from Canada. \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor must not make any copies of databases or any part of those databases containing Canada’s Data outside of regular service resilience capabilities and within approved regional spaces or zones within Canada. \n \n[X].1.4 The Contractor must not move or transmit approved copies outside of agreed upon service regions except when approval is obtained from Canada. \n \n[X].1.5 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide Canada with a document that describes all additional metadata created from Canada’s Data.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"P2",800,"Privacy","Privacy by Design","[X].1 Privacy by Design \n \nThe Contractor must demonstrate that it implements privacy by design as part of its software development lifecycle, and in accordance with Schedule 1 – Security Obligations, Section 16 (Secure Development). \n \n","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S11",900,"Security","Multi-tenancy","[X].1 Data Isolation \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must implement controls to ensure appropriate isolation of resources such that Canada’s Data are not co-mingled with other tenant data, while in use, storage or transit, and throughout all aspects of the Cloud Services and Contractor Infrastructure’s functionality and system administration. This includes implementing access controls and enforcing appropriate logical or physical segregation to support: \n\n    (a) The separation between Contractor’s internal administration from resources used by its customers;  \n \n    (b) The separation of customer resources in multi-tenant environments in order to prevent one malicious or compromised consumer from affecting the service or data of another; and \n \n    (c) Ability for the GC to support isolation within GC-managed tenant environment. \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide Canada with a document that describes the approach for ensuring appropriate isolation of resources such that Canada’s Data are not co-mingled with other tenant data, while in use, storage or transit.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"I3",1000,"Information","Data Residency","[X].1 Data Location  \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must have the ability to store and protect Canada’s Data, at rest, including data in backups or maintained for redundancy purposes. This includes the ability to isolate data in Canada in approved data centers. An approved Data Centre is defined as the following: \n \n   (a) A data centre that meets all security requirements and certifications identified in Section 30 for Physical (Data Centre / Facilities) Security \n \n    (b) Ensures the infeasibility of finding a specific customer’s data on physical media; and \n \n    (c) Employs encryption to ensure that no data is written to disk in an unencrypted form, in accordance with Section 13 - Cryptographic Protection. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must certify that the delivery and provisioning of Cloud Services under this contract is from countries within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm) or the European Union (EU) (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en), or from countries with which \nCanada has an international bilateral industrial security instrument. The Contract Security Program (CSP) has international bilateral industrial security instruments with the countries listed on the following PSPC website: http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src/internationaleng.html and as updated from time to time. \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor must have the ability for Canada to isolate Canada’s Data hosted in Cloud Services in data centers that are geographically located in Canada.  \n \n[X].1.4 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must: \n \n    (a) Provide the GC with an up-to-date list of the physical locations, including city, which may contain Canada’s Data for each data centre that will be used to provide the Cloud Services; and \n \n    (b) Identify which portions of the Cloud Services are delivered from outside of Canada, including all locations where data is stored and processed and where the Contractor manages the service from. \n \n[X].1.5 It is the continuous obligation of the Contractor of the proposed Cloud Services to notify \nCanada when there are updates to the list of physical locations which may contain Canada’s Data.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S38",1000,"Security","Service Continuity","[X].1 Data Location  \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must have the ability to store and protect Canada’s Data, at rest, including data in backups or maintained for redundancy purposes.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"I2",1100,"Information","Data protection","[X].1 Data Transfer and Retrieval \n \nThe Contractor must provide the capability including tools and services that allow Canada to: \n\n    (a) Extract all online, nearline, and offline Canada’s Data, including, but not limited to, databases, object and file storage, system configurations, cloud activity logs, source code hosted in a Canada code repository, and network configurations such that any Canada End User can use these instructions to migrate from one environment to another environment; and \n \n    (b) Securely transfer all Canada’s Data, including content data and associated metadata, in a machine-readable and usable format, including CSV format, and in accordance with the Library and Archives Canada Guidelines on File Formats for Transferring Information Resources of Enduring Value (https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/services/governmentinformation-resources/guidelines/Pages/guidelines-file-formats-transferring-informationresources-enduring-value.aspx).","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S8",1200,"Security","Information Assurance and Asset Protection","[X].1 Data Disposition and Returning Records to Canada \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must securely dispose or reuse resources (e.g. equipment, data storage, files, and memory) that contain Canada’s Data and ensure that previously stored data cannot be addressed by others customers after it is released. This includes all copies of Canada’s Data that are made through replication for high availability and disaster recovery. The Contractor’s disposal or reuse of resources must be aligned with one of the following: \n    (i) National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M6); \n    (ii) Guidelines for Media Sanitization (NIST SP 800-88); or \n    (iii) Clearing and Declassifying Electronic Data Storage Devices (CSE ITSG-06). Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s process for disposal or reuse of resources. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must provide Canada with confirmation that demonstrates successful erasing, purging or destruction of all resources, as appropriate, and an ability to prevent re-instantiation of any removed or destroyed system, capability (software or process), data, or information instances once Canada discontinues its use of the Cloud Services.","Required","Required","Required","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 0."]
[null,"S13",1300,"Security","Data protection","[X].1 Cryptographic Protection \n \nThe Contractor must: \n    (a) Configure any cryptography used to implement confidentiality or integrity safeguards, or used as part of an authentication mechanism (e.g., VPN solutions, TLS, software modules, PKI, and authentication tokens where applicable), in accordance with Communications Security Establishment (CSE)-approved cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic key sizes and crypto periods; \n \n    (b) Use cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic key sizes and crypto periods that have been validated by the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program \n(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/), and are specified in ITSP.40.111 Cryptographic Algorithms for Unclassified, Protected A, and Protected B Information, or subsequent versions (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/cryptographic-algorithms-unclassifiedprotected-and-protected-b-information-itsp40111); \n \n    (c) Ensure that FIPS 140 validated cryptography is employed when encryption is required, and is implemented, configured, and operated in a Cryptographic Module, validated by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/groupgroupe/crypto-module-validation-program), in an either approved or an allowed mode to provide a high degree of certainty that the FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module is providing the expected security services in the expected manner; and \n \n    (d) Ensure that any FIPS 140-2 modules in use have an active, current, and valid certification. FIPS 140 compliant/validated products will have certificate numbers.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S15",1400,"Security","Data protection","[X].1 Key Management \n \nThe Contractor must provide Canada with a key management service that provides: \n\n    (a) Creation/generation and deletion of encryption keys by the GC; \n \n    (b) Definition and application of specific policies that control how keys can be used;  \n \n    (c) Protection of access to the key material including prevention from Contractor access to the key material in unencrypted fashion;  \n \n    (d) Ability to audit all events related to key management services, including Contractor access for Canada’s review;  \n \n    (e) Ability to securely import GC generated keys from GC-managed on-premise hardware security module (HSM) without exposure of key plaintext during the import process; \n \n    (f) Ability to prevent the Cloud Service Provider to recover plaintext copies of the GC generated keys; and \n\n    (g) Ability to delegate key use privileges for use by the Cloud Services used for the GC managed services.","Optional","Optional","Recommended","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S20","1904-02-08","Security","Endpoint protection","[X].1. Endpoint Protection \n \nThe Contractor must implement, manage, and monitor security-hardened endpoints with active host-based protections to prevent against malware, attacks and misuse in accordance with industry recognized configuration guidelines such as those found in NIST 800-123 (Guide to General Server Security), the Center for Internet (CIS) Benchmarks or an equivalent standard approved by Canada in writing.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S30",1600,"Security","Secure Development","[X].1. Secure Development  \n \nThe Contractor must implement a software and system development lifecycle that applies information system security engineering principles throughout the information system life cycle and in the development of software and websites and services, and conforms to industry standards and best practices, such as (i) NIST, (ii) ISO 27034, (iii) ITSG-33, (iv) SAFECode, or (v) Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) standards such as Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) or an equivalent standard approved by Canada in writing. Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s documented software and system development lifecycle approach and process.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S25",1700,"Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","[X].1 Identity and Access Management \n  \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must have the ability for Canada to support secure access to Cloud Services including ability to configure:\n\n    (a) multi-factor authentication in accordance with CSE's ITSP.30.031 V2 (or subsequent versions) (https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/node/1842/html/26717) using GC-approved credentials;  \n \n    (b) Role-based access;  \n \n    (c) Access controls on objects in storage; and  \n \n    (d) Granular authorization policies to allow or limit access. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must have the ability to establish organization-wide defaults to manage tenant-wide policies.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S24",1800,"Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","[X].1 Federation \n  \n[X].1.1  The Contractor must have the ability for Canada to support federated identity integration including: \n \n    (a) Support for open standards for authentication protocols such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 and OpenID Connect 1.0 where the End User credentials and authentication to cloud services are under the sole control of Canada; and  \n \n    (b) Ability to associate Canada unique identifiers (e.g. a Canada unique ID, a Canada email address, etc.) with the corresponding Cloud Service user account(s).","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S23",1900,"Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","[X].1 Privileged Access Management \n   \n[X].1.1  The Contractor must: \n\n    (a) Manage and monitor privileged access to the Cloud Services to ensure that all service interfaces within a multi-tenant environment are protected from unauthorized access, including those that are used to host GC services;  \n \n    (b) Restrict and minimize access to the Cloud Services and Canada’s Data to only authorized devices and End Users with an explicit need to have access; \n \n    (c) Enforce and audit authorizations for access to the Cloud Services and Canada’s Data; \n \n    (d) Constrain all access to service interfaces that host Canada’s Data to uniquely identified, authenticated and authorized End Users, devices, and processes (or services);  \n \n    (e) Implement password policies to protect credentials from compromise by either online or off-line attacks and to detect these attacks by logging and monitoring events such as (i) successful use of credentials, (ii) unusual use of credential, and (iii) access to and exfiltration from the password database, in accordance with CSE's ITSP.30.031 V3 (or  subsequent  versions) (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/user-authentication-guidance-information-technology-systems-itsp30031-v3);\n\n    (f) Implement multi-factor authentication mechanisms to authenticate End Users with privileged access, in accordance with CSE's ITSP.30.031 V3 (or subsequent versions) (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/user-authentication-guidance-information-technology-systems-itsp30031-v3); \n\n    (g) Implement role-based access control mechanisms to assign privileges which form the basis to enforce access to Canada’s Data; \n \n    (h) Define and implement separation of duties to achieve, at a minimum, separation of service management and administration roles from information system support roles, development roles from operational roles, and access management roles from other operational roles; \n \n    (i) Adhere to the principles of least privilege and need-to-know when granting access to the Cloud Services and Canada’s Data; \n \n    (j) Use security-hardened endpoints (e.g. computers, end user devices, jump servers, etc.) that are configured for least functionality (e.g. dedicated endpoint that does not have Internet browsing or open e-mail access) to provide support and administration of Cloud Services and Contractor Infrastructure; \n \n    (k) Implement an automated process to periodically audit, at a minimum, account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions; and \n \n    (l) Upon termination of employment, terminate or revoke authenticators and access credentials associated with any Services Personnel. \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s approach and process for managing and monitoring privileged access of the Cloud Services.","Required","Required","Required","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 0."]
[null,"S26",2000,"Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","[X].1 Remote Management  \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must manage and monitor remote administration of the Contractor's Cloud Service that are used to host GC services and take reasonable measures to: \n\n    (a) Implement multi-factor authentication mechanisms for authenticate remote access users,  in accordance with CSE's ITSP.30.031 V3 (or subsequent versions) (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/user-authentication-guidance-information-technology-systems-itsp30031-v3); \n \n    (b) Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions, in accordance with Section 13 (Cryptographic Protection); \n\n    (c) Route all remote access through controlled, monitored, and audited access control points; \n \n    (d) Expeditiously disconnect or disable unauthorized remote management or remote access connections;  \n \n    (e) Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information. \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s approach and process for managing and monitoring remote administration of the Cloud Services.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S27",2100,"Security","Network Security","[X].1 Network and Communications Security \n \nThe Contractor must: \n\n    (a) Provide the ability for Canada to establish secure connections to the Cloud Services, including providing data-in-transit protection between Canada and the Cloud Service using TLS 1.2, or subsequent versions; \n \n    (b) Use up-to-date and supported protocols, cryptographic algorithms and certificates, as outlined in CSE’s ITSP.40.062 (https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/guidance-securelyconfiguring-network-protocols-itsp40062) and ITSP.40.111 \n(https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/cryptographic-algorithms-unclassified-protected-andprotected-b-information-itsp40111); \n \n    (c) Use correctly configured certificates within the TLS connections in accordance with CSE guidance. \n \n    (d) Provide the ability for Canada to implement network access controls and security rules that allow or deny network traffic to Canada resources.","Required","Required","Required","TBD","Yes","- This contract clause should be included for tier 0."]
[null,"S28",2200,"Security","Network Security","[X].1 Dedicated Connections  \n \nFor IaaS, the Contractor must provide the ability for the GC to establish private redundant connectivity to the Cloud Services. This includes: \n\n    (a) Establishing connectivity either directly into the GC Wide Area Network (WAN) or via GC Cloud Exchange Provider located at 151 Front in Toronto and/or 625 Rene Levesque in Montreal, or in a GC-approved location within the geographic boundaries of Canada; \n \n    (b) Enabling full backup and disaster recovery services through redundant connections within and across Contractor data centers; \n \n    (c) Physical connectivity links that are optical, and that provide a minimum of 10 Gbps with the option to add additional links that provide up to 40 Gbps in aggregate, with optional 100 Gbps connectivity;  \n \n    (d) Support for virtualization and multi-tenancy for all network components; \n \n    (e) Support for dynamic routing protocols (BGP) for all connections;  \n \n    (f) Support for GC-approved protocols as outlined in: \n        i. ITSP.40.062 Guidance on Securely Configuring Network Protocols, Section 3.1 for AES cipher suites\n        ii. ITSP.40.111 Cryptographic Algorithms for Unclassified, Protected A, and Protected B Information  \n \n    (g) Provide a description of all the data centre geographical locations in Canada where the capability is available.","Optional","Optional","Recommended","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S33",2300,"Security","Information System Monitoring","[X].1 Logging and Auditing \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must implement log generation and management practices and controls for all Cloud Service components that store or process Canada’s Data, and that conform with industry standards and best practices, such as those found in NIST 800-92 (Guide to Computer Security Log Management), or an equivalent standard approved by Canada in writing. Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s documented log generation and management practices and controls.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"API3",2340,"Integration","API integration","[X].1 Logging and Monitoring\n\n[X].1.1 For SaaS, the Contractor must provide APIs that provide the ability to: \n    i) inspect and interrogate data at rest; and\n    ii) export security event logs for the Solution(s); and\n    iii) assess events such as user access and behaviour, administrator access and\nbehaviour, and changes to third-party API access, stored in application logs.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S34",2350,"Security","Information System Monitoring","[X].1 Logging and Auditing \n  \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must provide the ability for Canada to export security event logs for the Cloud Services it consumes, in support of GC operations including monitoring of the Cloud Services and for e-discovery and legal holds. \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor must enable Canada to centrally review and analyze audit records from multiple components from the Cloud Services consumed by the customer. This includes the ability for Canada to: \n \n    (a) log and detect audit events such as (i) successful and unsuccessful account login attempts, (ii) account management, (iii) object access and policy change, (iv) privilege functions and process tracking, (v) system events, (vi) deletion of data;  \n \n    (b) record in logs (or log files) audit events that are time synchronized and timestamped in coordinated universal time (UTC) and protected from unauthorized access, modification, or deletion while in transit and at rest; \n \n    (c) separate Security Incidents and logs for different Canada accounts to enable Canada to monitor and manage events within its boundary that are affecting its instance of an IaaS, PaaS or SaaS Cloud Service provided to it by the Contractor or a Sub-processor; and \n \n    (d) forward Canada tenant events and logs to a GC-managed centralized audit log system using standardized reporting interfaces, protocols, and data formats (e.g. Common Event Format (CEF), syslog, or other common log formats) and APIs that support log data remote retrieval (e.g. via a database interface using SQL, etc.).","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S10",2400,"Security","Continuous Monitoring","[X].1 Continuous Monitoring \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must continually manage, monitor, and maintain the security posture of \nContractor Infrastructure and Service Locations hosting Canada’s Data throughout the contract, and ensure that the Cloud Services provided to Canada are in a manner that complies with these Security Obligations. As part of this obligation, the Contractor must: \n\n    (a) Actively and continuously monitor threats and vulnerabilities to Contractor Infrastructure, Service Locations, or Canada’s Data; \n \n    (b) Undertake best efforts to prevent attacks through security measures such as denial of service protections;  \n \n    (c) Undertake best efforts to detect attacks, Security Incidents, and other abnormal events; \n \n    (d) Identify unauthorized use and access of any Cloud Services, data and components relevant to Canada’s IaaS, PaaS or SaaS Cloud Service; \n \n    (e) Manage and apply security-related patches and updates in a timely and systematic manner to mitigate vulnerabilities and remedy any publicly reported issues in the Cloud Services or libraries that the Cloud Services make use of, and provide advance notices of patches in accordance with agreed-upon service level commitments;  \n\n    (f) Respond, contain, and recover from threats and attacks against the Contractor Cloud Services; and \n \n    (g) Where required, take proactive countermeasures, including taking both pre-emptive and responsive actions, to mitigate threats. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor’s Cloud Services must allow for GC application data (for IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) and GC network traffic (for IaaS and PaaS) of cloud hosted GC services to be copied and forwarded to a predetermined location (in the cloud or on GC premises). \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor’s Cloud Services must allow Canada to deploy and operate security software to perform advanced monitoring and mitigations of cyber threats for Canada’s Cloud Services at the Canada managed host and network layer, for Canada managed components only.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S21",2400,"Security","Denial of Service Attacks","[X].1 Continuous Monitoring \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must continually manage, monitor, and maintain the security posture of \nContractor Infrastructure and Service Locations hosting Canada’s Data throughout the contract, and ensure that the Cloud Services provided to Canada are in a manner that complies with these Security Obligations. As part of this obligation, the Contractor must: \n\n    (b) Undertake best efforts to prevent attacks through security measures such as denial of service protections;","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0.","This is a lessor requirement as (a) and c are missing"]
[null,"S31",2400,"Security","Vulnerability Management","[X].1 Continuous Monitoring \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must continually manage, monitor, and maintain the security posture of \nContractor Infrastructure and Service Locations hosting Canada’s Data throughout the contract, and ensure that the Cloud Services provided to Canada are in a manner that complies with these Security Obligations. As part of this obligation, the Contractor must: \n \n    (e) Manage and apply security-related patches and updates in a timely and systematic manner to mitigate vulnerabilities and remedy any publicly reported issues in the Cloud Services or libraries that the Cloud Services make use of, and provide advance notices of patches in accordance with agreed-upon service level commitments;","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S36",2500,"Security","Security Incident Management","[X].1 Security Incident Management  \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor’s Security Incident response process for the Cloud Services must encompass IT security incident management lifecycle and supporting practices for preparation, detection, analysis, containment, and recovery activities. This includes: \n\n    (a) A published and documented Security Incident Response Process for review by Canada that is aligned with one of the following standards: \n        (i) ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security incident management; or \n        (ii) NIST SP800-612, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide; or \n        (iii) GC Cyber Security Event Management Plan (GC CSEMP) \n(https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/accessinformation-privacy/security-identity-management/government-canada-cybersecurity-event-management-plan.html); or \n        (iv) other best practices from industry standards, if Canada determines, in its discretion, that they meet Canada’s security requirements. \n \n    (b) Documented processes and procedures of how the Contractor will identify, respond, remediate, report, and escalate Security Incidents to Canada, including: \n        (i) the scope of the information security incidents that the Contractor will report to Canada; \n        (ii) the level of disclosure of the detection of information security incidents and the associated responses; \n        (iii) the target timeframe in which notification of information security incidents will occur; \n        (iv) the procedure for the notification of information security incidents; \n        (v) contact information for the handling of issues relating to information security incidents; and\n        (vi) any remedies that apply if certain information security occur. \n \n    (c) Ability for the Contractor to support Canada’s investigative efforts for any compromise of the users or data in the service that is identified. \n \n    (d) Allows only designated representatives of Customer (e.g. SSC Security Operations Center) authorized by the Technical Authority:\n        (i) to request and receive discrete access and information associated with Customer’s Data (user data, system/security event logs, network or host packet captures, logs from security components such as IDS/IPS/Firewalls, etc.), in an unencrypted fashion, for the purposes of conducting investigations; \n        (ii) the ability for Customer to track the status of a reported information security event. \n \n    (e) Procedures to respond to requests for potential digital evidence or other information from within the Cloud Services environment and includes forensic procedures and safeguards for the maintenance of a chain of custody; \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s Security Incident Response Process. \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor must:\n \n    (a) Work with Canada’s Security Operations Center(s) (e.g. CCCS, Departmental SOC) on Security Incident containment, eradication and recovery in accordance with the Security Incident Response process.  \n \n    (b) Maintain a record of security breaches with a description of the breach, the time period, the consequences of the breach, the name of the reporter, and to whom the breach was reported, and the procedure for recovering data or the service; and  \n \n    (c) Track, or enable Canada to track, disclosure of Canada’s Data, including what data has been disclosed, to whom, and at what time. \n \n[X].1.4 Canada may require forensic evidence from the Contractor to assist in a GC investigation.  The Contractor agrees to provide assistance to the GC on a best effort basis.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S37",2600,"Security","Security Incident Management","[X].1 Security Incident Response  \n \n[X].1.1  The Contractor must alert and promptly notify Canada (via phone and email) of any compromise, breach or of any evidence such as \n    (i) a security incident, \n    (ii) a security malfunction in any asset, \n    (iii) irregular or unauthorized access to any Asset, \n    (iv) large scale copying of an Information Asset, or \n    (v) another irregular activity identified by the Contractor, that leads the Contractor to reasonably believe that risk of compromise, or a security or privacy breach, is or may be imminent, or if existing safeguards have ceased to function, over the following period (7 days x 24 hours x 365 days), and will be made without undue delay, in any event, within 72 hours, and within the Contractor’s service level commitments. \n \n[X].1.2 If the Contractor becomes aware of and determines a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to Customer Data or Personal Data while processed by the Contractor (each a “Security Incident”), the Contractor must promptly and without undue delay \n    (i) notify Canada of the Security Incident; \n    (ii) investigate the Security Incident and provide Canada with detailed information about the Security Incident; and \n    (iii) take reasonable steps to mitigate the cause and to minimize any damage resulting from the Security Incident.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S19",2700,"Security","Data protection","[X].1 Information Spillage \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must have a documented process that outlines its approach for an Information Spillage Incident. The process must be aligned with: \n    (i) ITSG-33 Security Control for IR-9 Information Spillage Response; or \n    (ii) another industry standard, approved by Canada in writing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Contractor’s Information Spillage process must include, at a minimum: \n\n        (a) A process for identifying the specific data elements that is involved in a System’s contamination; \n \n        (b) A process to isolate and eradicate a contaminated System; and \n \n        (c) A process for identifying Systems that may have been subsequently contaminated and any other actions performed to prevent further contamination. \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s Information Spillage Response Process.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0.","I feel like [X].1.1.ii.a should not be attached to .ii"]
[null,"S32",2800,"Security","Vulnerability Management","[X].1 Security Testing and Validation \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must have a process that allows Canada to conduct a non-disruptive and non-destructive Vulnerability Scan or Penetration Test of Canada’s portion of the Cloud Service components within the Contractor environment.  \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must provide the ability to enable a self-service security health check or scoring tool that enables the measurement of the security posture of the Cloud Services configured by Canada.","Optional","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Not recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S40",2900,"Security","Personnel Security","[X].1 Personnel Security Screening \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must implement security measures that grant and maintain the required level of security screening for Contractor Personnel engaged in the provision of the Cloud Services and for Sub-processor personnel pursuant to their access privileges to information system assets on which Canada’s Data is stored and processed. \n\n[X].1.2 The Contractor screening measures must be applied in accordance with the definition and practices in the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening (https://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=28115), or use an acceptable equivalent agreed to by Canada.  \n \n[X].1.3 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s personnel security screening process. The process must provide, at a minimum: \n\n    (a) A description of the employee and Sub-processor positions that require access to Customer Data or have the ability to affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the Cloud Services; \n \n    (b) A description of the security screening activities and practices, including notification procedures that need to be followed if screening has not been completed or if the results give cause for doubt or concern; \n \n    (c) A description of the security awareness and training as part of employment onboarding,  when employee and sub-processor roles change, and on an ongoing basis, to ensure that employees and Sub-processors understand, are aware of, and fulfil, their responsibilities for information security;  \n \n    (d) A description of the process that is enforced when an employee or sub-processor changes their role or when employment is terminated;  \n \n    (e) The approach to detecting potential malicious insiders and controls implemented to mitigate the risk of access to GC data and/or affect on the reliability of Cloud Services hosting Canada’s data.  ","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S39",3000,"Security","Physical and Environmental Protection","[X].1 Physical (Data Centre / Facilities) Security \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must implement physical security measures that ensure the protection of IT facilities and information system assets on which Canada’s Data are stored and processed against all forms of tampering, loss, damage, and seizure. Physical protection of all facilities that host Canada’s Data, must be applied in accordance with, or use an adequate risk-based approach based on a prevent-detect-respond-recover approach to physical security, aligned with the physical security controls and the practices in the Treasury Board Operational Security Standard on Physical Security (http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12329). The security measures required under this include, at a minimum: \n \n    (i) Sufficient redundancy and recovery capabilities within and between the Contractor’s facilities including, being geographically disparate such that the loss of one facility does not prohibit recovery of data and Canada’s Data within the prescribed service level commitments; \n \n    (ii) Proper handling of IT Media; \n \n    (iii) Controlled maintenance of all information systems and their components to protect their integrity and ensure their ongoing availability; \n \n    (iv) Controlled access to information system output devices to prevent unauthorized access to Canada’s Data;  \n \n    (v) Limiting physical access to Canada’s Data and Service Locations to authorized Cloud Services Personnel based on position or role and the need-to-access principle, and validated by two forms of identification;  \n \n    (vi) Escorting visitors and monitoring visitor activity;  \n \n    (vii) Enforcing safeguarding measures for GC data at alternate work sites (e.g., telework sites); and \n \n    (viii) Recording and monitoring all physical access to Service Locations and all logical access to Systems hosting Canada’s Data, using a combination of access logs and video surveillance in all sensitive areas and intrusion detection mechanisms. \n \n[X].1.2 Upon request of Canada, the Contractor must provide a document that describes the Contractor’s physical security measures.  \n \n[X].1.3 If any physical security measures is to change in a way that materially degrades the physical security, the Contractor must inform Canada.","Recommended","Required","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S6",3100,"Security","Supply Chain Risk Management","[X].1 Supply Chain Risk Management \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must implement safeguards to mitigate supply chain threats and vulnerabilities to IT services in order to maintain confidence in the security of the sources of information systems and the IT components used to provide Cloud Services. This includes, but is not limited to designing and implementing controls to mitigate and contain data security risks through proper separation of duties, role-based access, and least privilege access for all personnel within the supply chain. \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor must have a supply chain risk management approach including a Supply Chain Risk Management Plan that is aligned with one of the following best practices: \n  \n    (i) ISO/IEC 27036 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security for supplier relationships (Parts 1 to 4);  \n\n    (ii) NIST Special Publication 800-161 -- Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations; or \n\n    (iii) ITSG-33 security control for SA-12 where the organization defined security safeguards are documented in an SRCM plan. \n\n[X].1.3 Within 90 days of contract award, the Contractor must: \n\n    (a) Provide proof that the SRCM approach and plan has been independently assessed and validated by an independent third party certified under AICPA or CPA Canada, and/or ISO certification regime \n\n    OR \n\n    (b) Provide Canada with a copy of the SRCM Plan on an annual basis, or upon request of Canada.  \n\n[X].1.4 In the situation where the Contractor is a SaaS provider using a GC-approved IaaS Provider that already complies with the Section 31 - Supply Chain Risk Management requirements, within 90 days of contract award, the SaaS provider using a GC-approved IaaS provider must provide an information communication technology (ICT) product list that describes the ICT equipment that is being deployed in the GC-approved IaaS provider environment for a supply chain integrity (SCSI) review. This SCSI review will be conducted no sooner than every three years.","Recommended","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","- Recommended for tier 0."]
[null,"S41",3200,"Security","Industrial Security Program","[X].1 Industrial Security Program – Security Requirement for Canadian Suppliers \n \n[X].1.1 The Contractor must, at all times during the performance of the Contract/Standing Offer/Supply Arrangement, hold a valid Designated Organization Screening (DOS) with approved Document Safeguarding at the level of PROTECTED B, issued by the Industrial Organization Security Services Directorate (OSS), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). \n \n[X].1.2 The Contractor personnel requiring access to PROTECTED information, assets or work site(s) must EACH hold a valid personnel security screening at the level of SECRET, or \nRELIABILITY STATUS, as required by the security guide, granted or approved by the OSS/PSPC. \n \n[X].1.3 The Contractor MUST NOT utilize its Information Technology systems to electronically process, produce or store PROTECTED information until written approval has been issued by the client department security authority.  After approval has been granted, these tasks may be performed at the level of PROTECTED B including an IT Link at the level of PROTECTED B. \n \n[X].1.4 The Contractor/Offeror must comply with the provisions of the: \n\n    (a) Security Requirements Check List and security guide (if applicable), attached at Annex B and C; \n \n    (b) Industrial Security Manual (Latest Edition); \n \n    (c) OSS website: Security requirements for contracting with the Government of Canada, located at www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src \n \nNOTE:  There are multiple levels of personnel security screenings associated with this file. In this instance, a security guide must be added to the SRCL clarifying these screenings. The security guide is normally generated by the organization's project authority and/or security authority. \n \n[X].2 Industrial Security Program – Security Requirements for Foreign Suppliers \n \nThe Canadian Designated Security Authority (Canadian DSA) for industrial security matters in Canada is the Industrial Security Sector (ISS), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), administered by International Industrial Security Directorate (IISD), PSPC.  The Canadian DSA is the authority for confirming Contractor/Subcontractor compliance with the security requirements for foreign suppliers.  The following security requirements apply to the foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor incorporated or authorized to do business in a jurisdiction other than Canada and delivering/performing outside of Canada for the Cloud Services described in the Cloud Solution, in addition to the Privacy and Security Requirements. These security requirements are in addition to those requirements identified in the Section entitled Protection and Security of Data Stored in Databases.  \n \n[X].2.1 The Contractor/Subcontractor certifies that the delivery and provisioning of Cloud Services under the terms of this contract must be from a country within the North Atlantic \nTreaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) or from a country with which Canada has an international bilateral security instrument. The Contract Security Program (CSP) has international bilateral security instruments with the countries listed on the following PSPC website: http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src/international-eng.html and as updated from time to time.  \n\n[X].2.2 The Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must at all times during the performance of the contract/subcontract be registered with the appropriate government administered supervisory authority in the country(ies) in which it is incorporated or operating and authorized to do business. The Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must provide proof of its registration with the applicable supervisory authority to the Contracting Authority and the Canadian DSA. \n \n[X].2.3 The Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must, at all times during the performance of the contract, hold an equivalence to a valid Designated Organization Screening (DOS), issued by the Canadian DSA as follows:  \n \n    (a) Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must provide proof that they are incorporated or authorized to do business in their jurisdiction.  \n \n    (b) The Foreign recipient Contractor/Sub-processor/Subcontractor must identify an authorized Contract Security Officer (CSO) and an Alternate Contract Security Officer (ACSO) (if applicable) to be responsible for the overseeing of the security requirements, as defined in this contract.  This individual will be appointed by the proponent foreign recipient Contractor’s/Subcontractor’s Chief Executive officer or Designated Key Senior Official, defined as an owner, officer, director, executive, and or partner who occupy a position which would enable them to adversely affect the organization’s policies or practices in the performance of the contract. \n \n    (c) The Contractor/Subcontractor must not grant access to CANADA PROTECTED B information/assets, except to personnel who have a need-to know for the performance of the contract and have been screened in accordance with the definition and practices in the Treasury Board Standard on Security Screening (https://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=28115), or use acceptable equivalent measures agreed to by Canada.  \n \n    (d) CANADA PROTECTED information/assets, provided to the foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor or produced by the Foreign recipient Contractor /Subcontractor, must: \n \n        i. not be disclosed to another government, person or firm, or representative thereof not directly related to the performance of the contract, without the prior written consent of Canada. Such consent must be sought from the Canadian DSA in collaboration with the Contracting Authority; and \n \n        ii. not be used for any purpose other than for the performance of the contract without the prior written approval Canada. This approval must be obtained by contacting the Contracting Authority (in collaboration with the Canadian DSA). \n \n[X].2.4 The Foreign recipient Contractor /Subcontractor MUST NOT remove CANADA PROTECTED information/assets from the identified work site(s), and the foreign recipient Contractor/ Subcontractor must ensure that its personnel are made aware of and comply with this restriction. \n \n[X].2.5 The Foreign recipient Contractor /Subcontractor must not use the CANADA PROTECTED information/assets for any purpose other than for the performance of the contract without the prior written approval of the Government of Canada.  This approval must be obtained from the Canadian DSA. \n \n[X].2.6 The Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must, at all times during the performance of the contract hold an equivalence to an approved Document Safeguarding Capability (DSC) at the level of CANADA PROTECTED B. \n \n[X].2.7 The Foreign recipient Contractor/Subcontractor must comply with the provisions of the Security Requirements Check List attached at Annex B and C. \n \n[X].2.8 Canada has the right to reject any request made separate and apart from the authorization in this Contract in connection with the Contractor delivering Cloud Services to electronically access, process, produce, transmit or store CANADA PROTECTED data related to the Cloud Services in any other country if there is any reason to be concerned about the security, privacy, or integrity of the information.","Optional\n\nGone from last place to first place. It can be managed in the risk and the poam.","Recommended","Required","TBD","No","None","Noting the \"This SCSI review will be conducted no sooner than every three years.\""]

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["GC Cloud Tiered Assurance Model"]
[]
["Requirements",null,"Tier 0","Tier 1",null,null,"Tier 2",null,null,"Tier 3","Remarks"]
["Scope",null,"SaaS","IaaS","PaaS","SaaS","IaaS","PaaS","SaaS"]
["GC Impact",null,"Very Low","Low",null,null,"Moderate",null,null,"High"]
["Categorization",null,"Unclassified","Up to and including Protected A, Low Integrity, Low Availability",null,null,"Up to including Protected B, Medium Integrity, Medium Availability",null,null,"Above Protected B","As per the Directive on Service and Digital (https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32601)"]
["Data Residency",null,"Anywhere","Anywhere",null,null,"In Canada",null,null,"In Canada"]
["Location",null,"Off-premise","Off-premise","Off-premise","Off-premise","Off-premise","Off-premise","Off-premise","On premise"]
["Deployment Model",null,"Public","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Public, Community, Hybrid","Private, Community"]
["Compliance","Applications","Self-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix\n\nOR\n\n ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \n\nOR\nDepartmental Assessment\n\n",null,null," ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \n\nAND \n\nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix",null,null,"ISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality"]
[null,"Platform",null,null,"\n ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \n\nAND \n\nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix\n","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\n ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \nAND \nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix",null,"ISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\nISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality"]
[null,"Resource Abstraction Layer, Hardware, Facilities",null," ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \n\nAND \n\nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix\n","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\n ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \nAND\nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\n ISO 27001 OR\nSOC 2 Type II \nAND \nSelf-assessment to CSA Cloud Controls Matrix","ISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\nISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality","Inherited from GC-approved Cloud Service Provider \n\nOR\n\nISO 27001 AND ISO 27017 AND\nSOC 2 Type II for the trust principles of security, availability, processing integrity, and confidentiality"]
["Privacy",null,"Not applicable","Privacy Controls Attestation (TBD)","Privacy Controls Attestation (TBD)","Privacy Controls Attestation (TBD)","ISO 27018","ISO 27018","ISO 27018"]
["Security Assessment Activities"]
["Responsible for Security Assessments",null,"Department","Leverage GC-approved CSPs under Tier 2, assessments performed as part of the GC Cloud Services Framework Agreement","Leverage GC-approved CSPs under Tier 2, assessments performed as part of the GC Cloud Services Framework Agreement","PSPC\nor \nDepartment\nor \nCCCS based on exception process","CCCS Assessments as per the GC Cloud Services Framework Agreement","CCCS Assessments as per the GC Cloud Services Framework Agreement","CCCS Assessments as per the GC Cloud Services Framework Agreement or via the PSPC RFSA",null,"Should we permit departments to buy PB SaaS (if not on any vehicle) or should this be done via the PSPC RFSA.\n\nRecommend that CCCS assessments be performed on the first party services offered by the CSP. Services that do not meet policy requirements should be flagged for business owner awareness."]
["Level of Supply Chain Integrity (SCI) Assessment",null,"Level 0\n- SCI Risk Assessment\n- Open Source Only","Level 1\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 1 \n- Company Only","Level 1\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 1 \n- Company Only","Level 1\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 1 \n- Company Only","Level 2\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 2\n--includes sub-processors\n--ICT Product List. If not compliant with 800-161 or SA-12\n- Full assessment including onboarding to CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","Level 2\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 2\n--includes sub-processors\n--ICT Product List. If not compliant with 800-161 or SA-12\n- Full assessment including onboarding to CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","Level 2\n- Ownership SCI Check Level 2\n--includes sub-processors\n--ICT Product List. If not compliant with 800-161 or SA-12\n- Full assessment including onboarding to CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program"]
["Tools Available for Assessment",null,"SaaS Assessment Tool\nand/or\nVendor Risk Management Tool\nAND \nCCCS Low Workbook","CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","SaaS Assessment Tool\nand/or\nVendor Risk Management Tool\nAND \nCCCS Low Workbook","CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program","Enterprise via CCCS CSP IT Security Assessment Program*\n\nDepartment only SaaS using SaaS Assessment Tool AND \nCCCS Medium Workbook \n",null,"To maintain visibility into cloud services, it is recommended that a review of the cloud submissions are triaged, in order to identify cloud services that may require additional assessment. \n\nTo ensure that Departments are performing appropriate risk management activities, additional guidance is required to outline the risk assessment approach required. This could be included in the Guideline on Service and Digital.\n\nFor SaaS assessments performed by Departments, all residual risks should be  signed off by Departmental CIO/CSO, and should follow proper systems development and project life cycle activities.\n\n*CCCS Exceptions to the assessment prioritization would be based on a combination of the following factors:\n\n1) Operational need to further GC interests whereby legal action would result (e.g. within a matter of 30-60 days to meet a significant operational shortfall) or there is a national or international aspect/treaty (i.e. G8 summit, international refugee mission etc.)\n2) The application or solution of note is very niche but has national impact and provides a specific capability only provided by a very small market (i.e. 1 or 2 providers) \n3) There were unforeseen circumstances that prevented planning in accordance with established procedures (e.g. COVID-19 pandemic) or provides an emergency capability at an enterprise level for GC operations. \n4) An order in council or direction from the PMO requires prioritization\n5) When two or more departments have requested the same service.\n6) When the service supports processing of high-value information for the GC (e.g. PBHH)"]

{"sheet":"Consumer Assessment","index":16,"n_rows":39,"n_cols":16,"rows_kept":39,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["When to use?","Use when triaging the level of effort required to authorize a CSP for use in the GC. "]
["Department Considerations (DRAFT)"]
[]
["Domain","Category","Question ","Description","SPIN 2017-01 Reference","TBS Reference","Other References","Source","GC ESA Tools and Templates","Controls Mapping","Department/Project or \nVendor/Provider Response","Tier 0"," Comments","Tier 0 Override State","Tier 0 Suggested State","Tier 0 Decision Aid"]
["Business","Business Owner","Who is the business owner of the information?",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Business Owner","What are the business processes that are supported by the information?",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Criticality","Is the application being used by the organization for a critical business function?",null,null,null,null,"Gartner",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Legislation","What legislation applies to the information? (e.g. Privacy Act)",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Users","Who are the users of the information?",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Users","What permissions do the users require to the information? (i.e. read, write, modify and/or delete)",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Business","Terms of Service","Has the Department reviewed the terms and services to understand how data will be used and how it will be accessed?",null,null,null,null,"PANDU PIN",null,"USER DEFINED",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Information","Information Assurance and Asset Protection","Is personal information being stored in the cloud service? ","When departments are considering using cloud services for storing personal information, guidance must be sought from privacy and access to information officials within their institution. Completing a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) will help to identify the privacy risks.\n","6.2","DDSM, Appendix C","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"RA-2 Security categorization\nSA-8 Security engineering principles\nSA-11 Develop security testing and evaluation\nSC-28 Protection of data at rest","Be sure critical data stored is protected by automatic enforcement of policy-based tagging, access and encryption rules.","Required",null,"TBD"]
["Information","Security Categorization","What is the security categorization of the business processes and information  processed within this service?\n","Before using cloud services to support departmental programs and services, departments must identify and categorize information based on the degree of injury that could be expected to result from a compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability.","6.1.1","Security categorization tool","None specified","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist","Security Categorization Tool","RA-2 Security categorization","[GARTNER] Data classification/labelling - These do nothing on their own, but are useful inputs for policies created elsewhere. Automatic classification is much more useful than manual.",null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Documentation","Does the department have a plan to configure the controls related to the customer?","Departments must implement department-level security controls in their cloud-based services, depending on the service model being deployed. For example, if the service model is IaaS, departments will need to implement the security controls of the platform and application layers of the cloud technology stack. Even under the SaaS service model, additional security controls such as user access need to be implemented.\n","6.2.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"SA-3 System development lifecycle\nSA-8 Security Engineering Principles\nSA-10 Developer Configuration Management \nSA-11 Developer Security Testing \nSA-15 Development process, standards, and tools\nSI-10 Information Input Validation\nPL-8 Information System Architecture",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Continuous Monitoring","How does the department have a continuous monitoring plan in place which includes cloud services?","Departments must continuously manage the security risks to their information and IT assets throughout the life of their programs and services. Such management includes continuously monitoring cloud-based services as an essential component of an effective IT security strategy. Continuous monitoring encompasses activities such as:\n•monitoring threats and vulnerabilities\n•reviewing the results of system monitoring\n•self-assessment and internal audits\n•developing corrective action plans where necessary to remediate deficiencies\n","6.1.5","None specified","Using GC-provided services, such as those from SSC’s Security Operations Centre, can help departments meet some of these requirements.\n","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CA-7 Continuous monitoring",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Data protection","Does the department have a Secure web gateway (SWG) to monitor SaaS applications?","SWG awareness of SaaS applications not only increases visibility and control but can also improve application performance.",null,null,null,"Gartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Data protection","Does the party responsible for managing the cryptographic keys have a key management plan that meets the requirements defined in CSE guidance?",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Data protection","Does the department obtain authorization and apply controls to protect sensitive data before using it for testing and development?","Using sensitive or protected data for testing and development instances or applications within cloud services requires appropriate authorization and compensating controls.","6.2.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"SA-3 System development lifecycle\nSA-8 Security Engineering Principles\nSA-10 Developer Configuration Management \nSA-11 Developer Security Testing \nSA-15 Development process, standards, and tools\nSI-10 Information Input Validation\nPL-8 Information System Architecture",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the department leverage GC enterprise identity and authentication services?","Departments must identify and authenticate individuals and devices to an appropriate level of assurance before being granted access to information and services hosted in cloud services. Such authentication is in accordance with the Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance and aligns with GC enterprise identity and authentication services. \n","6.2.3","Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance","ITSP.30.031 V2","SPIN 2017-01\n\nGartner SaaS Security Checklist",null,"AC-2 Account Management\nAC-3 Access Enforcement\nAC-5 Separation of duties\nAC-6 Least privilege\nIA-2 Identification and authentication (organizational users)\nIA-3 Device identification and authentication \nIA-8 Identification and authentication (non-organizational users)",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Identity, Credential, and Access Management","Does the department implement and manage privileged access? Which mechanisms are used?","For privileged user access to cloud-based services, the use of stronger authentication mechanisms (for example, multi-factor authentication) must be configured. Additional security measures, such as the use of privileged access workstations and dedicated management networks, may further mitigate the risks associated with privileged access. \n\nRefer to CSE guidance in ITSP.30.031 V2 User Authentication Guidance for Information Technology Systems. \n","6.2.3","Standard on Identity and Credential Assurance","ITSP.30.031 V2","SPIN 2017-01\n\nBe confident identity policies extend consistently across your entire cloud, eliminating excessive privileges.",null,"AC-2 Account Management\nAC-3 Access Enforcement\nAC-5 Separation of duties\nAC-6 Least privilege\nIA-2 Identification and authentication (organizational users)\nIA-3 Device identification and authentication \nIA-8 Identification and authentication (non-organizational users)",null,"Required","Should be broken up so that MFA gets its own CE","TBD"]
["Security","Asset and Configuration Management","Does the Department have an understanding and visibility of all their assets in the cloud?","Departments must be aware of the assets they hold and their associated sensitivity and criticality. It is essential that all assets are accounted for, regardless of location. Any changes to cloud-based services and their configurations need to be appropriately managed and consist of activities such as:\n•authorizing and properly testing changes\n•maintaining known and approved system and component designs, settings, parameters and attributes","6.2.5","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CM-2 Baseline configuration\nCM-3 Configuration Change Control\nCM-6 Configuration Settings\nCM-7 Least functionality\nCM-8 Information system component inventory\nCM-9 Configuration management plan\nSA-22 Unsupported System Components\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Asset and Configuration Management","Does the Department appropriately manage their cloud services configurations including:\n•authorizing and properly testing changes\n•maintaining known and approved system and component designs, settings, parameters and attributes?","Departments must be aware of the assets they hold and their associated sensitivity and criticality. It is essential that all assets are accounted for, regardless of location. Any changes to cloud-based services and their configurations need to be appropriately managed and consist of activities such as:\n•authorizing and properly testing changes\n•maintaining known and approved system and component designs, settings, parameters and attributes","6.2.5","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CM-2 Baseline configuration\nCM-3 Configuration Change Control\nCM-6 Configuration Settings\nCM-7 Least functionality\nCM-8 Information system component inventory\nCM-9 Configuration management plan\nSA-22 Unsupported System Components\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Asset and Configuration Management","Does the Department ensure that measures are implemented to support “hardening” (for example, disabling of all non-essential services, ports or functionality) of systems, devices and applications? ","When using IaaS and PaaS, the GC is responsible for implementing measures to support “hardening” (for example, disabling of all non-essential services, ports or functionality) of systems, devices and applications. Doing so will help ensure that the following are appropriately configured:\n•operating systems\n•applications\n•virtual hosts\n•networks\n•endpoint devices and services \n","6.2.5","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CM-2 Baseline configuration\nCM-3 Configuration Change Control\nCM-6 Configuration Settings\nCM-7 Least functionality\nCM-8 Information system component inventory\nCM-9 Configuration management plan\nSA-22 Unsupported System Components\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Network Security","Does the Department ensure that all external interfaces of the cloud-based service are identified and appropriately protected?","All external interfaces of the cloud-based service must be identified and appropriately protected. Management interfaces may require increased levels of protection. Refer to CSE’s guidance in:\n•ITSG-22 Baseline Security Requirements for Network Security Zones in the Government of Canada\n•ITSG-38 Network Security Zoning - Design Considerations for Placement of Services within Zones\n","6.2.4","None specified","ITSP.40.111\nITSP.40.062 \nITSG-22\nITSG-38","Enforce proper network access policies, ensuring security groups are properly configured to minimize attack surface.",null,"CA-3 System interconnections\nSC-7 Boundary protection\nSC-8 Transmission confidentiality and integrity\nSC-12 Cryptographic key establishment and management\nSC-13 Cryptographic protection",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Risk Management","Are GC enterprise services being utilized? Provide rationale if enterprises services are not being utilized.","Departments are responsible for effectively managing and using cloud services, including adequately protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information that is stored, processed and transmitted. Using GC-provided services can help meet some of the requirements outlined in the sections that follow. \n\n",6,null,"For more information on best practices, refer to Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE’s) cloud security guidance. ","SPIN 2017-01",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Risk Management","Does the department continuously manage the security risks to their information and IT assets throughout the life of their programs and services?","Departments must continuously manage the security risks to their information and IT assets throughout the life of their programs and services.","6.1","GC Cloud Security Risk Management Approach and Procedures document","ITSG-33","SPIN 2017-01",null,"RA-3 Risk assessment",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Risk Management","Has the department initiated and implemented Security Assessment and Authorization activities for the cloud-based service?","Departments must perform security assessment and authorization of their information systems or services before approving them for operation. In the context of cloud, this responsibility extends to any additional security controls being implemented to satisfy departmental requirements (as per section 6.1.2 of this document).","6.1.4","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CA-2 Security assessments\nCA-6 Security authorization",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Risk Management","Does the department have an established plan that includes security throughout the project life cycle?","Understanding the overall effectiveness of security controls is essential in determining and managing the residual risks under which a cloud-based service will be operating. Prioritizing security at the beginning of a project life cycle and building security in cloud-based services from the outset are also effective ways to streamline security assessment and ensure successful authorization.","6.1.4","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CA-2 Security assessments\nCA-6 Security authorization",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Secure Development","Does the department have an established system development lifecycle that follows industry best practices for the Secure Development and Implementation of the cloud services?","Departments must address security requirements and adjust security requirements throughout all the stages of the system development life cycle, including:\n•at the earliest stages of planning and review\n•as part of a cloud exit strategy \n\nCloud-based services are expected to be designed and developed following industry best practices (for example, SAFECode Fundamental Practices for Secure Software Development, ISO/IEC 27034 and OWASP) in order to minimize security issues that could:\n•compromise GC information\n•cause a loss of service\n•enable other malicious activity \n","6.2.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"SA-3 System development lifecycle\nSA-8 Security Engineering Principles\nSA-10 Developer Configuration Management \nSA-11 Developer Security Testing \nSA-15 Development process, standards, and tools\nSI-10 Information Input Validation\nPL-8 Information System Architecture",null,"Recommended","If APIs will be used","TBD"]
["Security","Secure Acquisition","Does the department apply graduated safeguards based on the sensitivity of the information and assets?","Departments must apply graduated safeguards that are commensurate with the risks to their information and IT assets, with more rigorous safeguards as asset values, service delivery requirements, and threats to confidentiality, availability or integrity increase.","6.1.2","GC Cloud PBMM profile","ITSG-33, Annex 1","SPIN 2017-01",null,"Too broad",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Secure Acquisition","Does the department acquire cloud services that are available from centrally procured cloud services?","Departments must ensure that IT security requirements are addressed at every stage of contracting when acquiring cloud services. These requirements are also subject to the provisions of any international information-sharing agreements. Centrally procured cloud services (for example, a GC cloud brokered service) must be used when available. \n","6.2.10","None specified","ITSP.40.006 v2","SPIN 2017-01",null,"MP-6 Media sanitization\nSA-4 Acquisition process\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Secure Acquisition","If centrally procured services are not used, has the department included IT security requirements in cloud acquisitions?","Departments must ensure that IT security requirements are addressed at every stage of contracting when acquiring cloud services. These requirements are also subject to the provisions of any international information-sharing agreements. Centrally procured cloud services (for example, a GC cloud brokered service) must be used when available. \n","6.2.10","None specified","ITSP.40.006 v2","SPIN 2017-01",null,"MP-6 Media sanitization\nSA-4 Acquisition process\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Vulnerability Management","Does the Department have an effective patch and vulnerability management process? Has the Department ensured that all of the components that it is responsible for have been incorporated into its patch and vulnerability management process?","When using IaaS and PaaS, the GC is responsible for performing vulnerability and patch management of its cloud-based services. An effective vulnerability and patch management process must be developed and tested as a key part of a defence-in-depth strategy. Such a process includes:\n•monitoring relevant information sources for vulnerability alerts\n•implementing corrective actions in a timely manner\n\nCSE provides additional guidance in ITSB-96 Security Vulnerabilities and Patches Explained - IT Security Bulletin for the Government of Canada and, where required, on an emergency basis.\n","6.2.6","None specified","ITSB-96","SPIN 2017-01",null,"RA-5 Vulnerability scanning\nCA-8 Penetration Testing\nSI-2 Flaw remediation\nSI-5 Security alerts, advisories, and directives",null,"Required","If an asset gains access to the SaaS it must be managed. ","TBD"]
["Security","Vulnerability Management","Is the department subscribed to, or monitoring, appropriate sources for vulnerability and patch alerts for the components that it is are responsible for?",null,null,null,null,"New Zealand Government Cloud Risk Assessment Tool",null,null,null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Service Continuity","Does the department have its own business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place to ensure that it can recover from a service outage or an incident that leads to data loss or corruption, or the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?\n\n","In support of IT continuity planning, departments must take into account their cloud-based services in their contingency and disaster recovery plans. Such planning includes understanding where GC data is stored, replicated or backed up by the cloud service (where applicable, given the relevant cloud service model). ","6.2.9","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"CP-2 Contingency plan\nCP-9 Information system backup",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]
["Security","Information System Monitoring","Has the department implemented measures to audit and monitor access to cloud-based services?","As part of an active defence strategy, departments must ensure that measures are implemented to audit and monitor access to their cloud-based services. Using GC-provided services, such as those from SSC’s Security Operations Centre, can help departments meet requirements for information system monitoring and security incident management.","6.3","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"AU-2 Audit events\nAU-6 Audit review, analysis, and reporting\nAU-12 Audit generation\nIR-4 Incident handling\nIR-5 Incident monitoring\nIR-6 Incident reporting\nIR-8 Incident response plan\nSI-4 Information system monitoring\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Information System Monitoring","Does the department leverage CCCS security services (e.g. SOC monitoring)?","As part of an active defence strategy, departments must ensure that measures are implemented to audit and monitor access to their cloud-based services. Using GC-provided services, such as those from SSC’s Security Operations Centre, can help departments meet requirements for information system monitoring and security incident management.","6.3","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"AU-2 Audit events\nAU-6 Audit review, analysis, and reporting\nAU-12 Audit generation\nIR-4 Incident handling\nIR-5 Incident monitoring\nIR-6 Incident reporting\nIR-8 Incident response plan\nSI-4 Information system monitoring\n",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Information System Monitoring","Does the department have the ability to configure an adequate level of logging and reporting to:\n•enable the prompt detection of suspicious activities\n•facilitate investigation of and response to security incidents\n•support auditing?\n\n\n","Continuously monitoring system events and performance, and including a security audit log function in all information systems, enables the detection of incidents in support of continued delivery of services. It is essential that an adequate level of logging and reporting is configured for the scope of the cloud-based service within the GC’s responsibility. Such documentation will help:\n•enable the prompt detection of suspicious activities\n•facilitate investigation of and response to security incidents\n•support auditing\n\nRetention policies for the audit log function should be set in accordance with:\n•Library and Archives Canada’s generic valuation tool for information technology\n•other departmental requirements and standards\n","6.3.1","None specified","None specified","SPIN 2017-01",null,"AU-2 Audit events\nAU-6 Audit review, analysis, and reporting\nAU-12 Audit generation\nSI-4 Information system monitoring",null,null,null,"TBD"]
["Security","Security Incident Management","Does the department have an established incident response plan to minimise the impact of a security incident or breach?","Departments provisioning cloud-based services are responsible for:\n•establishing appropriate mechanisms to respond effectively to security incidents\n•exchanging incident-related information with designated lead departments such as the GC-CIRT, in accordance with GC incident reporting protocols (specifically, to support the completion of incident reports and responses to Request for Actions)\n•establishing mechanisms to inform service recipients of cyber security events that impact their systems or information\n","6.3.2","GC CSEMP","None specified","SPIN 2017-01","GC CSEMP","IR-4 Incident handling\nIR-5 Incident monitoring\nIR-6 Incident reporting\nIR-8 Incident response plan",null,"Required",null,"TBD"]

{"sheet":"LookUpTables","index":17,"n_rows":9,"n_cols":16,"rows_kept":9,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Yes","Unclassified","Very Low","SaaS","Public Cloud","Not Done",true,"Privacy Controls Attestation (TBD)","Canada","No","TLS 1.2 or greater","Met","Minimum","Met","TBD","TBD"]
["No","Protected A","Low","PaaS","Private Cloud","Level 0",false,"ISO 27018","Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom or the United States","AWS","TLS 1.1","Partial","Enhanced","Partial","Yes","Feature Request Sent"]
["Other","Protected B","Medium","IaaS","Community Cloud","Level 1",null,null,"Other","Azure","Other","Not Met",null,"Not Met","No","In Progress"]
[null,"Protected C","High","Marketplace","Hybrid Cloud","Level 2",null,null,null,"GCP",null,"Inherited",null,"Met (inherited)",null,"Implemented"]
[null,"Other",null,"Other","On-Premise Cloud","Level 3",null,null,null,"IBM",null,"TBD",null,"None",null,"Not Implemented"]
[null,null,null,null,"Other",null,null,null,null,"?",null,"Out of Scope",null,"Out of Scope",null,"Not Accepted"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"?"]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"?"]
["TBD"]